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O 211610Z OCT 89 FM AMEMBASSY LIMA TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2786 INFO DEAHQS WASHDC DEPTJUSTICE WASHDC NSC WASHDC CIA WASHDC/CNC COAST GUARD WASHDC US CUSTOMS WASHDC JCS/DOD WASHDC/ISA

SECTION 01 OF 03 LIMA 15853

INM FOR AL MATANO

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: SNAR, PE

SUBJECT: WASHINGTON INTERAGENCY COMMENTS ON NARCOTICS

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR PERU

(A) STATE 330364

- (B) LIMA 14884
- (C) STATE 309956
- ENTIRE TEXT. 1.
- IN A SEPARATE CABLE, WE ARE SUBMITTING A REVISED VERSION OF OUR PLAN TO IMPLEMENT THE ANDEAN STRATEGY IN PERU. ALL OF YOUR POINTS HAVE BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THIS CABLE IS A DETAILED RESPONSE TO YOUR CABLE SO YOU CAN MORE EASILY UNDERSTAND WHAT WE HAVE DONE, WITHOUT



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WADING THROUGH TWO VERSIONS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN,

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY: DONALD A. JOHNSTON DATE/CASE ID: 10 JUL 2001 200003835



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A READERS GUIDE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, IF YOU WILL.

- 3. PREFACE-OVERVIEW (PARA 3). WE HAVE DONE A PREFACE WHICH EXPLAINS THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH WE HAVE TO OPERATE AND WHY WE HAVE CHOSEN TO GIVE PRIORITY TO CERTAIN PROGRAMS. IT IS PROBABLY LONGER THAN YOU WANT BUT WE DECIDED TO GIVE YOU OUR RATIONALE IN DEPTH. IT CAN BE REDUCED FOR THE FINAL DRAFT AFTER EVERYONE UNDERSTANDS WHAT WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO DO.
- ISOLATE KEY COCA GROWING AREAS (PARA 4). 4. CHANGED THE LANGUAGE SOMEWHAT AND EXPLAINED OUR RATIONALE IN DETAIL IN THE PREFACE. THE CRUX OF THE MATTER IS THAT WE ARE UNLIKELY TO GET ANY MORE PERUVIAN SUPPORT FOR COUNTER-NARCOTICS ACTIVITIES UNTIL WE HELP THEM SOLVE THEIR NUMBER ONE PROBLEM, WHICH IS SUBVERSION. THE PROGRAM IS REPEAT IS AN ANTI-SUBVERSIVE PROGRAM. HOWEVER, IT IS LIMITED TO THE COCA PRODUCING AREAS AND IS DESIGNED TO COMBAT BOTH TERRORISTS AND DRUG TRAFFICKERS. WE HAVE EXPLAINED TO THE PERUVIANS IN GREAT DETAIL OUR EXPECTATIONS ABOUT RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE NEED FOR THE PROGRAMS TO ADVANCE OUR COUNTER-NARCOTICS EFFORTS. THEY KNOW THAT WE ARE MONITORING THEM AND WILL NOT MAKE ADDITIONAL RESOURCES AVAILABLE UNLESS THEY LIVE UP TO THEIR SIDE OF THE DEAL.
- 5. AS TO HOW WE CAN MONITOR THEIR USE OF THE RESOURCES, WE DO NOT THINK THAT WILL BE AN INSOLUBLE PROBLEM, IN SPITE OF RESTRICTIONS ON THE PRESENCE OF U.S. PERSONNEL IN COMBAT ZONES. WE CANNOT SEND U.S. MILITARY ADVISORS ALONG WITH THE ARMY WHILE THEY PATROL THE ZONE. NEITHER THE USG NOR THE GOP WANTS THAT.



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HOWEVER, OUR EXPERIENCE SHOWS THAT PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS GET FULL COVERAGE IN PARLIAMENT AND IN THE MEDIA. IF THERE ARE VIOLATIONS WE ARE GOING TO KNOW ABOUT THEM AND WE CAN DEMAND EXPLANATIONS. IF THE EXPLANATIONS ARE NOT FORTHCOMING WE CAN WITHHOLD ADDITIONAL MONIES. WE SHOULD NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT AS SOON AS THE MONEY FOR PERUVIAN HIGH PRIORITY PROGRAMS STOPS SO DO THE COUNTER-NARCOTICS EFFORTS.

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- 6. THESE COUNTER-SUBVERSIVE PROGRAMS MAKE SENSE TO US. WE ARE DEPENDENT ON A GOVERNMENT THAT IS STABLE, DEMOCRATIC AND CAPABLE OF HELPING US MEET OUR OWN PROGRAM GOALS. IF SENDERO OVERTHROWS THE GOVERNMENT OR PROVOKES A MILITARY COUP WE ARE OUT OF THE DRUG CONTROL BUSINESS. THEREFORE, THIS IS SOMETHING WE HAVE TO DO.
- 7. MILITARY BACK UP FOR VEHICLE SEARCH PROGRAM (PARA 4). WE HAVE ELIMINATED THE SENTENCE. WHAT WE WERE REFERRING TO WERE SQUADS OF INFANTRY TASKED WITH PROVIDING SECURITY FOR PEOPLE DOING THE SEARCHES. WE REQUIRE NO RESOURCES FOR THOSE SQUADS BEYOND WHAT IS BEING PROVIDED. THE REQUIREMENT FOR SECURITY IS A PERUVIAN PROBLEM, NOT ONE WHICH NEEDS TO BE DISCUSSED IN THE INTERAGENCY GROUP.
- 8. BLOCKING PRECURSOR CHEMICALS (PARA 5). WE HAVE ADDED A NOTE SAYING THAT IF THE STUDY OF PRECURSOR CHEMICALS SHOWS THAT A LOT OF CHEMICALS WHICH ENTER THROUGH TRADITIONAL PORTS OF ENTRY ARE BEING DIVERTED TO DRUG PRODUCTION WE WILL DESIGN A PROGRAM TO TAKE CARE OF IT. AT PRESENT WE DON'T THINK THAT IS THE CASE AND ARE NOT ASKING FOR RESOURCES.



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O 211610Z OCT 89

FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
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
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INM FOR AL MATANO

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: SNAR, PE SUBJECT: WASHINGTON INTERAGENCY COMMENTS ON NARCOTICS

9. CONTROL OF KEY AIR CORRIDORS (PARA 6). WE ARE NOT WEDDED TO THE IDEA OF A RADAR SYSTEM. WE PUT IT IN BECAUSE IT IS A FAVORITE OF PRESIDENT ALAN GARCIA AND WE HAVE BEEN ASKED BY VIRTUALLY EVERY HIGH-LEVEL VISITOR, BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN, INCLUDING TWO U.S. ATTORNEYS GENERAL, WHY WE ARE NOT DOING IT. FOR THREE YEARS WE HAVE BEEN ASKING FOR A TECHNICAL EVALUATION. WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER IT IS DO-ABLE OR COST EFFECTIVE. WE LEAVE THAT UP TO YOU. WE ARE NOT INCLUDING THE COST OF A RADAR SYSTEM IN OUR COST CALCULATIONS, ALTHOUGH THE FIGURE REMAINS IN THE CABLE.



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- 10. STRENGTHEN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM TO PROSECUTE DRUG TRAFFICKERS (PARA 7). A LOT OF CASES GET THROWN OUT OF COURT BECAUSE THEY HAVE NOT BEEN PREPARED WELL. WE WOULD LIKE TO PROVIDE SOME HELP TO THE PERUVIANS IN THIS FIELD. IT WILL NOT TAKE MUCH. DEA ALREADY HAS TEAMS THAT TEACH SEMINARS AND WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THEM CONDUCT MORE. WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO EXPAND THE USAID ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE PROGRAM MARGINALLY TO GIVE THE PERUVIANS THE RESOURCES THEY NEED.
- 11. SECURITY FOR SENIOR POLITICAL, POLICE AND JUDICIAL OFFICIALS (PARA 7). WE PUT IT IN BECAUSE IT WAS ONE OF YOUR PRIORITIES. YOU WILL NOTE THAT WE DO NOT THINK THAT SUCH PROGRAMS ARE OF MUCH UTILITY IN PERU AT THE PRESENT TIME.
- 12. SECURITY FOR THE MISSION (PARA 7). WE THINK YOU ARE OPERATING UNDER A MISUNDERSTANDING CAUSED, PERHAPS, BY THE CONFUSING FORMAT WE USED IN OUR ORIGINAL MESSAGE. THE SECTION ON SECURITY AND OTHER PERSONNEL NEEDS FOR THE MISSION WAS NOT MEANT TO BE PART OF THE

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IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY PROPER. IT IS MERELY TO REMIND YOU THAT THIS MISSION IS ALREADY BADLY OVER EXTENDED. IT IS NOT REALISTIC TO EXPECT THE SAME NUMBER OF PEOPLE TO ADMINISTER, MONITOR AND INSPECT HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS WORTH OF NEW PROGRAMS, HOUSE AND SUPPORT HUNDREDS OF NEW TDY PERSONNEL, AND KEEP THE DRUG TRAFFICKERS AND SENDERO LUMINOSO OFF OUR BACKS WITH THE SAME NUMBER OF PEOPLE WE HAVE RIGHT NOW.

13. WE DON'T KNOW WHERE THE BODIES OR THE MONEY ARE GOING TO COME FROM, MUCH LESS WHERE WE ARE GOING TO PUT THEM. BUT THE FACT REMAINS THAT THEY ARE GOING TO BE



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NEEDED.

- 14. SETTING NEW MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE (PARA 8). WE HAVE MADE THE MOPS FOR SOME SECTIONS MORE GENERIC AS YOU REQUESTED.
- 15. ENHANCE POLITICAL COMMITMENT TO DRUG PROGRAMS (PARA 7). ON THE CONTRARY, THE GOALS ARE PERFECTLY REASONABLE, ESPECIALLY SINCE THEY FOCUS MOSTLY ON THE INCOMING ADMINISTRATION, UNDER WHATEVER PRESIDENT MAY BE ELECTED. THERE IS OVERWHELMING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO COMBAT DRUG TRAFFICKING AND WE JUST HAVE TO BUILD ON THAT. NOW THAT WE HAVE SUBSTANTIAL RESOURCES TO WORK WITH, WE THINK IT CAN BE DONE.
- 16. IMPEDE TRANSFER OF DRUG MONEY (PARA 9). WE ARE RELUCTANT TO BREAK THE TWO SECTIONS OUT AS YOU SUGGEST. TO DO SO SIMPLY BECAUSE WE HAVE RESOURCES TO DO IT PUTS THE CART BEFORE THE HORSE. THE PROBLEM IS THAT WE ARE ALREADY ASKING THE PERUVIANS TO DO MORE THAN THEY ARE CAPABLE OF DOING. THE SCARCEST RESOURCE IS WELL-TRAINED POLICE MANPOWER. ALL INDICATIONS ARE THAT NOT MUCH DRUG MONEY MOVES OUT OF HERE. THEREFORE, WE HAVE GIVEN THIS A VERY LOW PRIORITY AND PREFER SIMPLY TO DETERMINE HOW SUCH MONEY MOVES. IF OUR GUESSES ARE WRONG AND IT LOOKS LIKE THERE IS ENOUGH MONEY TO GO AFTER, WE CAN REDEFINE OUR OBJECTIVES LATER.





17. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE (PARA 9). THE ERROR WAS DUE TO A TYPO. THE FIGURE IN TARGET 3B UNDER OBJECTIVE IIIB SHOULD HAVE BEEN THIRTY MILLION, NOT FORTY. THAT ADDS



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INM FOR AL MATANO

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: SNAR, PE SUBJECT: WASHINGTON INTERAGENCY COMMENTS ON NARCOTICS UP TO THE SIXTY MILLION DOLLAR OVERALL FIGURE WHICH IS PROJECTED IN NSD 18 FOR FY 91.

18. PRIORITIES (PARA 10). OUR PLAN IS ALREADY MORE AMBITIOUS THAN IS PROBABLY REALISTIC. GIVEN THE FUNDING LEVELS WHICH WE HAVE BEEN GIVEN, WE ARE GOING TO BE LUCKY TO ACHIEVE WHAT HAS BEEN LAID OUT. IF YOU RAISE ADDITIONAL ITEMS TO HIGH PRIORITY YOU WILL RISK CREATING UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS. WE DO NOT SEE HOW EVERYTHING CAN BE HIGH PRIORITY. WE THINK IT IS MORE REALISTIC TO KEEP IIIB A LOW PRIORITY. WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO PUTTING FIELD INTELLIGENCE AS A HIGH PRIORITY BECAUSE IT

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IS A KEY TO MANY OF THE OTHER OBJECTIVES. HOWEVER,




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INTELLIGENCE WAS NOT ONE OF THE OBJECTIVES YOU GAVE US TO WORK WITH IN THE INSTRUCTION CABLE. WE THINK REDUCING THE DEFENDENCE OF THE PERUVIAN ECONOMY ON COCA DOLLARS SHOULD ONLY BE MEDIUM PRIORITY, ESPECIALLY SINCE FAR TOO FEW FUNDS HAVE BEEN ALLOCATED TO ACHIEVE MUCH PROGRESS. IF IT IS GOING TO BE A HIGH PRIORITY, WE WILL NEED MORE RESOURCES AND EARLIER. AGAIN, IT IS A PROBLEM OF CREATING EXPECTATIONS THAT CANNOT BE MET WITHIN EXPECTED RESOURCES LEVELS.

REVIEW COSTING (PARA 11). WE HAVE GONE THROUGH AND CHECKED ALL OF OUR FIGURES. THEY ARE OUR BEST GUESSES AS TO HOW MUCH THINGS ARE LIABLE TO COST. HOWEVER, WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR TAKING A LOOK AT COSTS INVOLVED WITH OBJECTIVE IIC, DESTROYING EXISTING LABS. IF THE COST OF THE ADDITIONAL SNOWCAP TEAMS AND THE PURCHASE PRICE OF ADDITIONAL HELICOPTERS AND AIRCRAFT HAVE TO BE TAKEN OUT OF OUR SHARE OF THE MONEY, THEN WE ARE GOING TO NEED TO SCALE BACK OUR EXPECTATIONS CONSIDERABLY. WILL BE ABLE TO STEP UP OPERATIONS IN THE UHV BUT WE WILL PROBABLY NOT BE ABLE TO EXPAND THEM TO INCLUDE A MAJOR BASE OF OPERATIONS IN A SECONDARY AREA. IF YOU THINK WE HAVE TO FUND THOSE ITEMS PLEASE LET US KNOW AND WE WILL REDRAFT THAT SECTION AND ELIMINATE OBJECTIVE IIC, TARGET 2.

20. WE HAVE ALSO ADDED A NEW TARGET, NUMBER 4 UNDER OBJECTIVE IIIA, TO CREATE AN ELITE LONG-RANGE RECONNAISANCE UNIT TO SEARCH OUT LABS AND OTHER HIGH-VALUE TARGETS. THERE IS STILL DISCUSSION GOING ON IN THE MISSION ABOUT THIS ITEM BUT WE ARE UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE FROM THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR TO CREATE SUCH A FORCE. RATHER THAN HAVE TO COME UP WITH FUNDING



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LATER, WE ARE PROPOSING THE GROUP NOW WITH AN OPTION TO

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DROP IT IF WE CAN'T JUSTIFY IT OR IF THE MINISTER BACKS OFF.

- 21. BY OUR CALCULATIONS, THE WHOLE PACKAGE ADDS UP TO SOMETHING LIKE USDOLS 170 MILLION OVER TWO YEARS. THAT IS WITHIN OUR PROJECTED CEILING OF USDOLS 175 MILLION. (REMINDER: WE DID NOT INCLUDE FUNDING FOR RADAR.)
- 22. THERE YOU HAVE IT. WE HOPE WE HAVE ANSWERED ALL OF YOUR QUESTIONS. IF NOT, LET US KNOW AND WE WILL GIVE IT ANOTHER SHOT.
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