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*Service Général du
Renseignement
de la Sécurité*

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- (c) The problem of this militia, indeed, of their destabilizing strategy, proved to be quite significant as it poses a threat to the UNAMIR and its staff. Consequently, it needs to be analyzed by the highest UN authorities. The personal representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Booh Booh, was even requested to draw President Habyarimana's attention to the subject.

One of the objectives pursued by this militia is allegedly to target Belgian soldiers participating in the UNAMIR in order to provoke the withdrawal of the Belgian detachment, considered as the most formidable of the UNAMIR.

- (d) Operation of the Interahamwe

This is an organization that carries out overt operations. It is the youth wing of the MRND ("INTERAHAMWE ZA MRND").

It has a National Committee and a "college of advisers".

It has an official and clear address (P.O. Box 1055 at the Kigali Post Office).

The organization's seal is a hoe and a sickle (typical local weapon) crossing each other. This design is surrounded by a circle bearing the inscription "INTERAHAMWE ZA MRND" and their address. Members of the Inerahamwe appear in their uniform during public functions (they wear caps with MRND colours and military boots).

They are reported to receive substantial financial support.

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Since they also receive support from personalities of the former regime who are still in office, they operate with almost total impunity. In very rare cases, if it happens that the Police or the Gendarmerie Nationale arrest them, they are released very fast.

Through the MRND and CDR (Coalition for the Defence of the Republic) political parties, they have access to the official media including the famous RTLM ("*Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines*", known for its extremism and frequently denounced for its anti-Belgian campaigns.

An informant allegedly declared to the UNAMIR that he had worked at the Security Service of the Presidency of the Republic and that in such a capacity he had been, in consultation with the Chief of Staff, responsible for the military training of the Interahamwe.

Thus, the Interahamwe are said to use military installations, with cooperation from the FAR instructors. Their members would thus receive basic military instructions.

Some allege that 1,300 young Interahamwe have already been trained in training camps outside Kigali (of whom at least 300 have allegedly been trained since the UNAMIR was deployed). The objective also is to have a minimum of 800 Interahamwe in and around Kigali.

They would be transported particularly in vehicles belonging to ONATRACOM (National Public Transport Board) including at least five buses daily, from a pick-up point located north of Kanombe.

They could be transported to a camp near Lake Ihema, in the Kagera national park and also to camps in Gako (map No. 24, Bugesera military zone), Rutara [or Rukara- (illegible), to the East of Lake Muhazi], Gikoro, Gishali and Murambi. Other camps are located in the Nyungwe forest (South West of the country, at the Burundian border), where a training camp (probably designed for the Burundian PARMEHUTU) is allegedly being constructed near a place previously used by gold diggers, and also in the Gishwati forest (East Gisenyi) and on mount Kigali, to the North of Kanombe (1584 and 1883 coordinates), where night drills are

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reportedly organized. The last camp is allegedly located in Mukamira (Ruhengeri map, 4521 coordinate).

They could also use FAR communication facilities.

Amongst Rwandans, their victims are said to be mostly members of the MDR political party. They have allegedly been instructed particularly to locate all Tutsi families. It is said that there are plans to assassinate Tutsis in areas where they are concentrated.

During demonstrations, the Interahamwe are sometimes armed with machetes, clubs and stones.

They are also alleged to distribute weapons clandestinely among the population.

(e) Interahamwe allies

The Interahamwe are not the sole supporters of the Hutu extremism.

There is also the CDR youth wing, called "IMPUZAMUGAMBI", who are the equivalent of the Interahamwe within the CDR, a very close ally of the MRND.

It is equally alleged that the Interahamwe has very close contacts with certain FAR units, including particularly the Presidential Guard and the Gendarmerie Nationale.

For instance, the FAR units deployed near refugee camps in Burundi, are known to have been deaf to calls for assistance when the Tutsis were being taken away.

It is alleged that there exists a "death squad", which is said to be a very organized and well-drilled group of murderers. This group is reported to be specialized particularly in assassinations and acts of very brutal intimidation. They are alleged to use the tactic of very swift raids, which leave no traces behind. It is presumed that this group has links with the Presidential Guard (supposed to cater

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for its recruitment), as well as the Gendarmerie Nationale and a few other specialized units.

Its members, even the military, operate in mufti.

There is also a "zero network", which allegedly helped the former Minister of Defence, Mr. Gasana, to escape in 1993.

- (f) Weapon caches and distribution are also talked about.

There isn't very reliable and particularly usable information on this subject. It seems the two camps continue to acquire weapons in view of a possible resumption of hostilities.

It is however certain that a gunrunning network exists. Weapons, besides those currently supplied outside this network, were already available in great quantities given the successive wars and disturbances that occurred in the great region (Rwanda and neighbouring countries). They come from the fighting, deserters, etc...

Several months ago, it was already indicated that grenades were being sold on the market at BF 20. Today, it is reported that in certain "hot" neighbourhoods, prostitutes even accept to be paid in grenades.

Since the end of January 1994, UNAMIR has seized several grenades in Kigali. They are all of brand "GR F HE M 72" b and come from the batch 1 PRB 75.

Information available to us on the gunrunning is reflected in Annex B.

- (g) You will find in Annex C, a list of names (most of which are already known to the UNAMIR) of known officials or staunch supporters of the Interahamwe.

2. COMMENTS

- (a) Therefore, the pieces of information available to us, to date, on the problem of the Interahamwe militia is often contradictory, depending on their origin.

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It appears logical that those accused of supporting them, indeed, leading and using them, try to deny at all costs the existence of this problem or at least to minimize it. Thus, the Presidency of the Republic and the MRND deny both the military training given to the Interahamwe and the distribution of weapons to the population.

We feel that denying the existence of the problem would be reckless and that there exists sufficient evidence to attribute responsibility thereof to close authorities of the Presidency of the Republic and the MRND party. Official denials do not at all change this finding.

Another issue is to succeed in establishing the facts considered.

- (b) Likewise, much importance should not be given to the Interahamwe militia and the consequences of their actions. In fact, if they could melt into the population, it would be exaggerating to believe that the whole population would espouse their philosophy and the goals they are pursuing. The majority of the population endures this problem and is tired of the troubles caused by the conflict. It aspires to peace.

A section of the population also supports political parties other than those allied to the MRND. But then, those that condemn the Interahamwe or do not approve of them are often compelled to be silent out of fear.

Such fear comes from possible Interahamwe reprisals against those who denounce them or refuse to assist them as well as from authorities which support them in secret but can take unpleasant measures against opponents or persons who are lukewarm.

Parties opposed to the MRND, as well as the FPR and other opposition parties (MDR and allies), tend to exaggerate Interahanwe actions and importance.

Thus, for instance, the current Prime Minister (Ms Agathe Uwilingiyimana of the MDR) claims that she has information on Interahamwe military training and the distribution of weapons to the population.

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There is a tendency to easily mix up ordinary crime with acts of terrorism or political intimidation. Furthermore, there are some small crimes (plundering) that can be attributed to "displaced persons", grouped in camps, but who use such plundering as a rare means of survival.

Finally, it should be remembered that since the Interahamwe are known, their opponents may on occasions try to heap responsibility for their own ravages on the Interahamwe.

- (c) Furthermore, the Interahamwe are recruited among the youth wing of the MRND. These are idle young people, with no future, who naturally are not disciplined and are hardly controlled by their officials. They may, outside planned and guided missions, commit isolated abuses since they will only be satisfying personal interests. They would act more out of the lure of gain (money, through theft or extortion of funds, or beer) or the pleasure of being violent without running the risk of being prosecuted. They would use the ethnic problem as a pretext to commit crimes.

In the face of a clear and resolute action, it is possible that they would prefer to vanish in thin air.

Since they mix freely with other young delinquents in their native places, it is not always easy to determine the person with whom one is really dealing.

Moreover, this situation will be further complicated in the near future, when thousands of FAR soldiers will be demobilized. Discontented, such soldiers may join deserters and other delinquents.

- (d) One of the problems that the UNAMIR encounters is the fact that the Arusha Accords provide that it must conduct its investigations in collaboration with the Gendarmerie Nationale, a section of which very often has links with criminals (particularly, if they are the Inerahamwe). Furthermore, the UNAMIR staff does not speak Kinyarwanda and thus must use the services of interpreters. It is not easy to conduct investigations within a population that is already secretive and

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easily hypocritical by nature, and in addition intimidated with threats of reprisals.

Informers are often anonymous and accusations are traded.

As long as the broad-based transitional government and the new institutions are not put in place and are not functioning properly, UNAMIR will continue to encounter these particular difficulties.

- (e) Undoubtedly, it should be underscored that we are dealing with what could be termed "a new form of guerilla movement". These are no longer clandestine and armed groups that melt into the population to oppose a politically established regime in a bid to try to seize power from it. Indeed, these are clandestine groups organized by the former regime (still in place during the political transition), whose objective is to object to agreed concessions or at least reduce them in actual facts and hinder the progress of the transition.

This transition is usually guaranteed by a supra-national body (UN in the case of Rwanda, likewise the Former Yugoslavia, Somalia or Cambodia).

The authority supporting the clandestine militia tries to gain time through repeated denials or verbal condemnations of their actions (yet they sponsor those very actions). Working on their own territory and having residual but ever powerful means (generally, these are former single-party regimes, or dictators), the said authority has almost total freedom of action.

Resources for acquiring intelligence available to a foreign power (and generally, a multinational power) of the supranational body retained as guarantor of the transition are always insufficient to enable it to understand and correctly analyze the phenomenon confronting it.

This, coupled with its imprecise terms of reference (not very clear and always too limited) leaves the power extremely vulnerable and exposed to acts of terrorism, not only in ensuring the security of its own staff but also in accomplishing its mission.

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Therefore, it would be advisable to develop rapidly (as early as possible) a structure for acquiring intelligence in the countries concerned. Though this is an indispensable thing to do, but then it should not be improvised.

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8

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SUMMARY OF ACTS ATTRIBUTED TO THE INTERAHAMWE AND
REFERENCES MADE TO THEM

On 19 April 1993, the assassination of Col. Mayuya, was attributed to the Interahamwe;

On 18 May 1993, the assassination of the MDR leader, Emmanuel Gapyisi, was attributed to the Interahamwe;

On 9 September 1993, the presiding Judge of the Supreme Court, Mr. Joseph Kavaruganda, was the victim of a bomb attack, which was attributed to the Interahamwe.

Following the Burundi events of October –November 1993, the Interahamwe and the Impuzamugambi were accused of aiding the Burundi Hutus in their attacks on the Tutsis along the Burundi border, which attacks allegedly left many dead and injured; In the Burundi Hutu refugee camps (to the South of Burundi), it is also indicated (Oxfarm report of 20 December 1993) that groups of Hutu youth receive “physical training”, certainly from the “PT”, and according to an unverified rumour they are reportedly armed with machetes, bows and spears;

On 14 November and 7 December 1993, Mr. Nkubito escaped two attacks; the Interahamwe were suspected because Mr. Nkubito had witnessed the trafficking of provisions meant for the displaced persons;

On 23 to 24 November 1993, in Ngarama (25 km to the East of Byumba), an Interahamwe “Cellule Chief” was killed by a grenade; four reasons were given: intra-Interahamwe dispute (the most plausible), RPF attack, accident during preparation of an attack and “elimination” by a furious population;

On 15 December 1993, in the Gendarmerie Nationale camp of the Kimihurura Secteur, a gang of 50 or 60 men, obeying orders from a known member (?) of the Interahamwe, is hunting down “free women” accused of poisoning;

WS02-545

9

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On 18 and 19 December 1993, in Kigali, the Interahamwe participated in demonstrations;

On 20 December 1993, in Kimichanga, there was a confrontation between the Interahamwe and a certain "wise group" (?);

On 22 December 1993, in Kagarama (Kicukiro - Kigali) and in Nyamirambo, the Interahamwe allegedly took it out on the Tutsis;

On 27 and 28 December 1993, the Inreahamwe intimidated the population of Gikondo, Magerwa and Gatenga;

On 27 December 1993, threats of Interahamwe actions against the Rutongo camp were indicated (North of Kigali);

On 28 December 1993, in Kigali, in the Kacyru neighbourhood, "vengeance" was perpetrated against a family and the Interahamwe were accused of associating with criminals; a policeman is alleged to have guided the attackers; the casualties were one dead and three injured;

On 5 January 1994, the end of the swearing-in ceremony (finally, only President Habyarimana took the oath of office) was punctuated by an Interahamwe demonstration;

On 8 January 1994, the Sous-Prefet of Kigali participated in an Interahamwe demonstration; Gendarmes in mufti are said to have also participated in the demonstration; the Gendarmerie Nationale intervened only belatedly to disperse the demonstration; an appeal to block access to the CND was made on the RTL;M;

On 9 January 1994, the UNAMIR Information, Education and Press Office (IEPO) published a press release in which it attributed the 5 January demonstration to the

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Interahamwe and the associate militia, who had wanted to prevent the Member of Parliament from going to the CND;

On 10 January 1994, the RPF chairman condemned, in a press release, the acts perpetrated by the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi (youth wing of the CDR party)

On 10 January 1994, in Kigali, it was indicated that the Interahamwe were doing physical exercises and "bothering" the population.

On 13 January 1994, a report of the Ambassador of Belgium indicated that both the MRND and CDR played active roles in RTLM broadcasts, which resumed their attacks on Belgium with greater vigour;

On 16 January 1994, a (CTMB) report ascribed to persistent political hold-up the disturbing increased insecurity defined as a combination of banditry, politically and ethnically related terrorism and Interahamwe activities;

On 19 January 1994, the Interahamwe leadership reacted to the IEPO press release by alleging that it had been dictated by the RPF; it also challenged all the other charges brought against the Interahamwe; lastly, it took it out on the UNAMIR soldiers (particularly the Belgians);

On the night of 22 January 1994, a grenade exploded in the Nyamirambo neighbourhood and the Gendarmerie Nationale arrested one Interahamwe member.

On 26 January 1994, a guided demonstration against constant insecurity was organized by the Kigali population before the CND and the UNAMIR HQ; it was immediately hijacked by the Interahamwe and the consequence thereof was violence (smashed vehicles and several injured);

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In Kigali (no precise date) it was indicated that the Interahamwe were taking it out on people known for their "pro-Belgian" stance, particularly, bar managers and the girls who frequented the Belgian soldiers.

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Annex B

INFORMATION OBTAINED ON ARMS CACHES

It is alleged that there are at least four arms caches in Kigali, the main one being at the Interahamwe headquarters, in the Kimihura neighbourhood (an African UNAMIR officer had seen tens of guns there);

In Kigali, Mr. Setiba's house in Gitiyinyoni (0285 coordinates) is alleged to be a clandestine ammunition dump;

In Kigali, a place called Karambo, reportedly belonging to Mr. Séraphin Twahirwa, was alleged to be a clandestine ammunition dump.

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Annex C

LIST OF KNOWN INTERAHAMWE OFFICIALS

National Committee

Chairman: Jerry Robert Kajuga;

Senior Vice-Chairman: Phénéas Ruhumuliza;

First Vice-Chairman: Georges Rutaganda;

Secretary-General: Eugène Mbarushimana;

Treasurer General: Dieudonné Niyitegeka

College of advisers:

Chairman, Commission on Social and Legal Matters: Bernard Maniragaba;

Chairman, Research and Development Commission: Joseph Serugendo;

Chairman, Commission on Political Matters and Propaganda: Jean Pierre Sebanetsi;

Chairman, Economic and Financial Commission: Ephrem Nkezabera;

Chairman, Follow-up and Assessment Commission: J. M. V. Mudahinyuka;

Chairman, External Relations and Documentation Commission: Alphonse Kanimba.

Members:

WS02-545

14

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A certain Shyorongi (/) was said to be an active Interahamwe member;

Likewise, a certain Taba (?).

Known or suspected supporters:

Mr. Séraphin Rwabukumba, President Habyarimana's brother-in-law;

Col. Sagatowa, Chief of Presidential Security and the President's brother-in-law;

Col. Bagosora, Principal Private Secretary at the Ministry of National Defence (?);

Lt. Col. Anatoli, Commanding Officer of Gisenyi operations;

Lt. Col. Bahufite, Commanding Officer of Byumba operations;

Principal Private Secretary at the Press Office (?);

Sous-Prefet of Kigali town;

Manager of the RTLM (extremist radio of the MRND and CDR persuasions), Mr. Nahimana, proposed by the MRND for a post of minister in the broad-based transitional government;

Mr. Kabuga, Kigali businessman, known as sponsor of the Interahamwe; he is a close relative to Col. Bizimungu (who has just been appointed Brigade Commander); he is said to have acquired his wealth through various forms of trafficking; his daughter is allegedly married to Jean Pierre Habyarimana; he is alleged to be a major shareholder in the RTLM and an influential member of the MRND, feared for his influence with the President; he

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has a tea plantation a section of which is located in the area under RPF control; he also has very many buildings;

Mr. Setiba (also see Annex B) is alleged to have some ties with the Interahamwe;

Mr. Séraphin Twahirwa (also see Annex B), Idem;

Mr. Gervais Nzabanterura, Nzirorera's accountant, who allegedly supplies weapons for military training;

Mr. Claudien Nshimiye of the Rwanda Social Fund, who allegedly participates in the military training;

Mr. Gaparata, residing in Kimisange (neighbourhood South of Kigali), who reportedly destroyed a restaurant belonging to a Tutsi, located in the Kimihurura neighbourhood (and allegedly received a moped as payment for that service);

Ms Rose Karushara, who is said to be an important link in the conclusion of "elimination contracts" and lives near Carf Khadafi (in the Nyabugogo Secteur in Kigali).