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APPENDIX

Planning Task: The Management and Termination of War with the USSR

It is U.S. policy to develop a capability so that, in the event of war with the USSR, military force can be used in a discriminating manner, to bring about a cessation on terms acceptable to the United States, to deter Soviet antipopulation attacks on the USA and its allies, and to avoid unnecessary damage in enemy countries. Terms for cessation could be both political and military. The U.S. war aim would not be "unconditional destruction." The conduct and termination of war should be responsive both to the circumstances of initiation and to post-war security and political objectives.

There would consequently be basic policy decisions to be taken during the course of the war and during the transition to truce and settlement. These decisions would have to be taken on the basis of information then available, possibly in communication with enemy and allied commanders or political leaders.

Detailed plans for the coordination of military force with war objectives and negotiations appear neither feasible nor desirable. Detailed planning can help to assure that military forces, information and communications, operational plans, decision procedures, and possibly enemy expectations, are adapted to this concept of war conduct. The ways in which this concept might be carried out should be expected to vary over time. The following planning tasks are essential to this concept.

1. The possible stopping points in war with the USSR.

What forces on both sides, in what conditions of readiness, deployment, vulnerability, and potential endurance, would constitute a viable basis for cessation? What intelligence and surveillance would be needed? How much uncertainty can be tolerated? What are the political implications of various force configurations - e.g., ground occupation of countries, internal military control, alliance relations? What truce conditions have to be ignored because they cannot be ascertained, monitored, or controlled? What are the lead times in terminating various actions? What are the risks and degradations suffered by suspension of certain actions? Can some "natural" or "preferred" terminal goals be identified at different stages in the war? What self-inflicted enemy destruction can be demanded and monitored?


Appendix

The information and communications that would be available, and that can be developed, to support this concept.

The value and adequacy of information depends on the situations to be identified and the decisions to be reached. In particular, the criteria for evaluating and interpreting enemy conduct need to be developed. Targeting restraint, or suspension of action, by the enemy will have to be judged under conditions of actual warfare. In the event of negotiation, verification of enemy (or allied) allegations may be essential. Estimates of enemy control over forces will be needed. Rapid estimates of the magnitude of civil damage to the enemy, allies and ourselves will be needed. Communications must be adequate not only for the conduct of war operations but for secure phased termination and for the transition from war operations to truce surveillance. Communications with forces may have to permit demonstration in support of negotiation, as well as planned target destruction.

Criteria for targeting.

With respect to targeting of military forces, decisions must be made on the utility of being able to destroy differing proportions of the enemy strategic nuclear force quickly given the prospect that a sizeable proportion of it almost certainly cannot be eliminated quickly. A related issue is the utility of being able to destroy the protected portion of the enemy's strategic force over a period of days or weeks. Another problem is to assess the importance of being able to attrite enemy forces other than major nuclear forces - for example, to prevent enemy forces from seizing territory. A fourth problem is the constraints policy that should be adopted for targeting in and near satellites. Also, post-war objectives may conflict with some intra-war targeting criteria. Once war has terminated the U.S. may attach positive value to structures and assets surviving in the USSR. Depending on the regime or regimes to be dealt with, the condition of satellite or former-satellite countries, the condition of allies of the U.S. and neutrals, a Soviet or non-Soviet Russia might be a source of supply, or even a claimant, for economic goods. The stability of successor regimes might depend on the economic viability of the region. These considerations are in addition to questions of surviving Soviet command and control as a possible prerequisite to successful termination, and in addition to the role of surviving but vulnerable Soviet assets as bases for intra-war deterrence.




4. The forces best suited for the terminal stage of war, for secure policing of a truce, and for post-war security and support of war aims.

Special armed-reconnaissance, demonstration, and surveillance functions, as well as specialized capture and occupation functions, might be needed in support of any armed truce or termination under conditions of uncertainty as to enemy remaining capabilities. Special surveillance of enemy areas outside the war area will be needed, and some surveillance of allied and unallied forces may be The prospects are for something like a drastic asymmetrical disarmament undertaking, reached under conditions of crisis, uncertainty, and distrust. Weapon and force characteristics best suited to the initiation of war will not necessarily have the characteristics best suited to the terminal and transition stages. Successful counterforce operations may be largely wasted if they cannot be exploited for favorable termination and deterrence of enemy residual anti-population campaigns; weapons suited to the terminal stages should therefore receive substantial emphasis. These weapons may have a policing and surveillance function quite different from counterforce or civil-damage functions; they may even be able to take advantage of an environment in which the enemy is as concerned as we with their successful performance.

5. Decision and negotiation in war.

Decisions within the war will involve: recognizing enemy conduct from the information available; deciding the scope of the war by country and by target category; anticipating stopping points and modes of termination; estimating enemy expectations and intentions about war conduct and termination; formulating terms for truce, withdrawal, or enlargement of war; reacting to apparent or real enemy overtures, tacit or explicit; demonstrating residual U.S. capacity for prosecution of the war; and coordinating all of this with U.S. and allied forces. Time pressure, uncertain information, and the unprecedented character of the diplomacy, will impose acute limitations. The possible paths of events, phasing into the transitional or post-war period, should be explored for familiarity with the problem not to arrive at detailed plans. Similarly, decisions and negotiations in an intense crisis short of thermonuclear war, and the transition into war itself, need to be explored, particularly in relation to the performance of military forces, intelligence and reconnaissance, and communications in such a crisis.



techniques recently developed and used by Defense and State for the study of decision and negotiation in political-military crisis should be examined to see if similar explorations of war conduct and war termination can be fruitful. Questions such as, "How does the U.S. know when the war is over," or "How does the USSR disarm itself to the satisfaction of the U.S. in the terminal stage of war," are typical of those that need to be addressed. The extent to which U.S. war aims and war-conduct objectives depend on, or are facilitated by, Soviet expectations, Soviet comprehension of U.S. doctrine, and Soviet capacity for control of its own forces, should be part of this study.