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E.O. 12065: RUS-2 AND 3, 2/2/61 (HAIG, ALEXANDER M.)

OVIP (CHUN, DOU HWAN), PEPR, MNUC, PARM, KS, US

SUBJECT: KOREA PRESIDENT CHUN'S VISIT -- THE SECRETARY'S MEETING AT BLAIR HOUSE

TOP SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

FOLLOWING HIS INFURNAL DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT CHUN ENROUTE TO BLAIR HOUSE FROM ANDREWS AFB ON SUNDAY AFTERNOON, FEBRUARY 1. THE SECRETARY MET BRIEFLY AT BLAIR HOUSE WITH KOREAN FOREIGN MINISTER LHO SMIN YONG (M-K: NO SIN-YONG). PRESENT WITH THE POREIGN MINISTER WERE ASSISTANT MINISTER GUNG (M-R: KONG WO-MYUNG) AND ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT HER (M-R: HO HWA-PYONG). U.S. AMBASSADOR

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ALSO PRESENT.

FOREIGN MINISTER LAB TOLD SECRETARY HALG THAT THE ORAFI JOINT COMMUNIQUE DATED FEBRUARY 1, 1981 'AS AGREEABLE TO HIS GOVERNMENT. THE ORIGINAL KORLAN DRAFT HAD CONTAINED A "POLITICAL" PARAGRAPH ENDORSING PRESIDENT CHUN'S VARIOUS ACTIONS TO RESTORE POLITICAL STABILITY IN KOREA, BUT HE UNDERSTOOD THE SECRETARY OBJECTED TO THIS ON GROUNDS THAT: THE U.S. ACTION IN INVITING PRESIDENT CHUN SPOKE

LOUDER THAN MORDS, AND BY THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HISHED TO REFRAIN FROM PUBLIC COMMENT ON KOKEA'S IN-TERNAL AFFAIRS.

THE SECRETARY WENT ON TO SAY THAT

COUNTRIES WAS TO KEEP IN MIND THE STRATEGIC FACTORS WHICH WERE THE BASIS OF OUR CLOSE FRIENDSHIP. PART WE WOULD MAINTAIN AND IMPROVE OUR MILITARY FORCES IN KOREA. WE WOULD RETAIN OUR NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN KOREA. 190 s⊵erre√

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ALTHOUGH -- AS HE HAD EXPLAINED TO PRESIDENT CHUN -- IT WAS IMPURTANT FOR THE RUK TO CONTINUE COOPERATING WITH DUR NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY. HE APPRECIATED KORLA'S CURRENT ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES AND WOULD THY TO BE HELPFUL WITH FMS AND HEAPONS SUPPLY INCLUDING THE F-16. HE REALIZED THAT THE KOREANS MIGHT BE UNEASY ABOUT OUR TIES WITH CHINA! HE WOULD TAKE KOREAN VIEWS INTO ACCOUNT WHILE PROLEDING WITH A RELATIONSHIP DICTATED BY OUR STRATEGIC CONCERN OVER THE POLAH BEAR.

5. THE FUREIGN MINISTER WELCOMED THESE REMARKS, PREDICTING SMOOTH SAILING FOR OUR RELATIONS. SECRETARY HAIG AGREED BUT POINTED OUT THAT SOME PROBLEMS WERE INEVITABLE. THEY WOULD BE MANAGEABLE, HOWEVER, IF HE COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY. HE URGED THAT THE KOKEAN GOVERNMENT USE OUR AMBASSADOR IN SECUL OR THE KUREAN AMBASSADOR IN HASHINGTON TO LET HIM KNOW OF ANY DIFFICULTIES. THE FOREIGN MINISTER ENDORSED USE OF THESE OFFICIAL CHANNELS.

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7. FINALLY THE FOREIGN MINISTER ASKED IF ME COULD SEND A DISTINGUISHED, AND VERY HIGH LEVEL DELEGATION TO THE PRESIDENTIAL INAUGURATION IN SECUL ON MARCH 3RD AS WELL AS PUBLICIZE OUR INTENTIONS SO AS TO INFLUENCE THE JAPANESE, EUROPEANS, AND OTHERS. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT HE NEEDED TO DISCUSS THIS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN, BUT HE WOULD SEE THAT WE SENT A DISTINGUISHED DELEGATION HEADED BY A SENIOR PERSONAGE. HAIG

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