#### THE WHITE HOUSE

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
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II 90373

April 26, 1988

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE NUMBER 305

## OBJECTIVES AT THE MOSCOW SUMMIT



- -- to demonstrate the success of this Administration's approach to the Soviet Union based on the principles of strength, realism, and Western unity;
- -- to consolidate the gains made by this Administration on the four-part agenda with the Soviet Union and to press for further progress, particularly on attainment as soon as possible of a START agreement which fully meets our security concerns, significant improvement in the Soviet Union's human rights performance, and resolution of regional conflicts beyond Afghanistan;
- -- to reaffirm to both the Soviets and West Europeans that the United States remains fully committed to overcoming the postwar East-West division of Europe, and that broad progress toward this goal is the best guarantee of long-term stability and improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations.


My visit to the Soviet Union should not be seen as a dialogue only with the Soviet government, but also as a way of communicating with the Soviet people. I want to emphasize throughout my trip that the democratic values that make our country great are those toward which much of the world--including, we hope, the Soviet Union--is moving. At the same time, I wish to make clear that, while we welcome promises of reform within the USSR, the policies of the United States and the West toward Moscow must be based on Soviet deeds rather than words. Only a realistic approach can pass the test of time and contribute to the stable development of the East-West relationship.

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
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### Specific Objectives in the Soviet Union

My specific objectives in the Soviet portion of my trip include:

- -- to stress the importance of progress in Soviet human rights performance across the board -- an increased rate of emigration, family reunification, release of prisoners of conscience, and especially, changes in laws and practices that will produce greater respect for individual liberties -- as a means of furthering overall improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations;
- -- to make maximum practical progress toward an agreement for a fifty percent reduction in U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces, while making clear to the Soviet side that we have no deadline and that the pressures of time cannot be used to obtain an agreement which does not fully meet our security concerns;
- -- to follow through on the progress made on the regional agenda in the signing of the Geneva instruments. This includes emphasizing to the Soviets the importance of completing a prompt withdrawal from Afghanistan, reaffirming our objective of a genuinely independent, non-aligned Afghanistan in which the Afghan people are free to determine their own future, and actively engaging the Soviets to be helpful in resolving other regional issues on our agenda;
- -- to consolidate progress and move forward on bilateral issues, including exchanges and, where warranted, economic relations;
- -- to press for progress on all other matters of interest on our four-part agenda and to assure the Soviets that we are prepared to continue working actively on this agenda through the end of this Administration.

### Specific Objectives in Western Europe

My objectives in Western Europe include emphasizing to our friends and Allies:


- -- that the U.S. gives, and will continue to give, the highest priority to shared Western interests and security concerns in our bilateral dialogue with the Soviets;
- -- that Western unity and strength are the twin pillars which have proven their success in negotiation with the Soviets;







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-- that we must guard against exaggerated expectations on the future pace and achievement of U.S.-Soviet relations or the reform process underway in the Soviet Union, but be willing to move forward as quickly as the situation allows;

-- that we will do our part to ensure continuity and stability in the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

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May 27, 1982

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE NUMBER 307

REVIEW OF UNITE STATES ARMS REDUCTION POSITIONS
IN PREPARATION OR THE MOSCOW SUMPLET (U)

Based on the current state of arms reductions are gotiations, as well as the views of my senior advisors, this NSDD sets out U.S. arms reduction positions and objectives for the May 29 ~ June 2, 1988 summit meeting in Moscow. This NSDD is not intended as a comprehensive statement of U.S. arms reduction policy; except where specifically noted, previous U.S. positions and previous guidance remain valid. (S)

Substantive arms reduction discussions in Moscow should focus on START, Defense and Space, Swiet non-compliant with the ABM Treaty, and issues concerning the ABM Treaty view. In the areas of nuclear testing clemical weapons and conventional forces arms control, bering unforeseen aftreum tances, we will limit ourselves to redewing and recording progress made elsewhere and to signific these nuclear terring agreements negotiated in Geneva. (S)

#### START (U)

In Moscow we will seek the bllowing:

- -- We will continue the procate a legall with ling sublimit of 3300 ICBM RVs and will discuss how to record the current Soviet intentions with regard to their program.
- -- We will provide the Soviets details of our proposed verification scheme for mobile ICBMs based upon the decisions
  reflected in guidance issued on my behalf by the National
  Security Council staff on May 24, 1988. Based on Soviet
  receptiveness to this verification approach, I will make the
  decision in Moscow whether to discuss specific numerical
  limits on mobile ICEBS and, if so, what i mits to propose.
- -- If warranted by diviets movement in ther reas, I am prepared to agree to a low testing and movementation of silo-based here. Legans subject to appropriate restrictions on the modernization of such missing (by not on other ICBM modernization) and subject to the United states having an equal right to heavy I BMs.

SECRET Declaration: OADR

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under provisions of E.O. 12958
by J. Saunders, National Security Council

# MINANIE

Building upon the Regulavik formula for heavy bombers carrying gravity belos or SRAMs, we will seek to resolve additional issues concerning air-brothing weapons in a single, integrated package as follows:

While continging o prefer a counting rule of 10 ALCMs per bomber 11 the Soviets accept our approach to counting rule, we can accept an outcome which meets the following criteria:

-- For the .S. a counting rule of no more than 10

Alche pe B-2;
For existing Soviet bombers counting rule of no less than 5 ALCMs per BEAR-H and no less than 8 ALCHs per Blackjack;

Provisions for agreeing on counting rules for future bomber types.

No sublimit on ALCMs or bomber weapons;

No restrictions on conventionally-armed cruise missiles:

1000 km range cut-off for counting nuclear-armed ALCM

- (acceptable only if the Soviets agree to the remaining elements of our apposal);
  Acceptance of the J.S. position on bember and bomber weapon distinuishability and valification;
  No constraints on LCM inventor; an Acceptance of the limited right to convert ALCM bombers to non-ASSA lambers and non-ACC pompers to conventional bombers see forth in the LS. draft of the Conversion or Elimination Protocal.
- On sea-launched cruise missiles, if the Saviets appear interested in moving from their current position to a declaratory approach will base supposed approach on reciprocal non-binding declarations of acquisition plans for all nuclear-armed SLCMs regardless of their range. If such a scheme were agreed to, the United States would declare it has no plans to acquire more than 1500 nuclear-armed SLCMs.
- We will continue the expanded data exchange begun in Geneva. (S)
- In implementing these decimens, our priorities should be:
- First priority. Resolving issues related to the joint summit statement apparate START statement as required.
- seking Soviet greaten to the ALCM position set no Second priorit both.
- Third priority. Setting forth additional details of the U.S. approach to mapile ICBM verification

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Fourth priority. Continuing the expanded data exchange. (S)

Soviet ABM Treaty Non-compliance and the ABM Treaty Review (U)

We will reaffirm in Moscow our long-standing concern with Soviet failure to comply with and to correct soviet violations of the ABM Treaty. We will make it clear that we will not sign any strategic arms agreements, either in STARs or in Defense and Space, while the issue of the illegal Soviet Krasnoyarak radar remains unresolved, and that we consider the only appropriate resolution to be dismantle ent or destruction of the radar. (S)

The third five-year review of the ABM Treaty must be conducted by October, 1988. We will not attempt to conduct the review in Moscow on the margins of the summit, nor will we plan on delaying it past October. Within those parameters, interagency consideration of options for the timing and forum of the review should be expedited. Taking into account developments during discussions in Moscow, especially with regard to Krasnoyarsk, I would like to be able to decide the U.S. position on the timing and forum of such a review as soon as possible following the Moscow summit. (S)

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