Washington
D.C., October 26, 2006 - A CIA panel
of experts concluded
in 1997 that North Korea was likely to collapse within five
years, according to declassified documents posted today on the
Web by the National Security Archive. This "Endgame"
exercise of former U.S. policymakers, intelligence officers
and outsider experts warned that the North Korean regime could
not remain "viable for the long term," with the majority
doubting the "current, deteriorating status could persist
beyond five years." Citing the "steady, seemingly
irreversible economic degradation in the North," the panel
concluded that "the current situation in North Korea appears
beyond corrective actions that do not fundamentally threaten
the regime's viability." (Note 1)
The long-term stability, sustainability and putative vulnerability
of the North Korean regime are once more vital factors in the
diplomatic and strategic calculations of the U.S. and its allies.
Now that North Korea has tested a nuclear device, and is possibly
preparing for a second test, world attention has turned to the
challenge of persuading Pyongyang to step back from a path it
has been following for decades and give up its goal of developing
a nuclear weapons stockpile. The Bush administration continues
to reject one-on-one negotiations with Pyongyang, as Secretary
of State Condoleezza Rice made clear in a recent interview with
CNN, in which she argued that only multilateral talks confronting
Pyongyang with the power of five, rather than one, have any
chance of success, while bilateral talks would allow North Korea
to pursue a strategy of divide and conquer. (Note
2) Against this approach, others, such as former U.S. Ambassador
to South Korea Donald Gregg and Don Oberdorfer, chairman of
the U.S.-Korea Institute at the Johns Hopkins University Nitze
School of Advanced International Studies, have argued that direct
talks with Pyongyang offer the only real hope for resolving
the security dilemmas on the Korean peninsula, not coercive
steps taken unilaterally or bilaterally. (Note
3)
Despite these criticisms, the Bush administration has taken
the lead in pushing for UN-mandated sanctions to put economic
and financial pressures on Kim Jong Il, but as recent reports
make clear, the key players for making any sanctions really
effective, especially China and South Korea, are loath to take
steps that might seriously undermine North Korea. They and other
regional players fear the aftermath of a collapse that would
send refugees swarming across borders and create the threat
of North Korean military forces possessing chemical and biological
weapons striking out on their own for survival. (Note
4) This point is also driven home by Robert Kaplan's article
in the current issue of Atlantic Monthly. In his article,
"When North Korea Falls," Kaplan discusses at length
the apparently deep concern among U.S. and South Korean officials
that the major challenge is not a nuclear North Korea, but the
coming collapse of the country. (Note 5)
This is, however, a viewpoint that has been around for some
time. The 1997 CIA exercise described in the CIA document reproduced
below is one striking example of this belief, apparently widespread
during the 1990s, that the long term challenge facing the U.S.
on the Korean Peninsula was not the North's pursuit of nuclear
weapons (a challenge which in 1997 seemed to be under management
as a result of the 1994 Framework Agreement), but the North's
inevitable fall into economic and political chaos. As David
Straub, a former senior Foreign Service officer with
extensive experience in Japan and South Korea stressed at a
recent Woodrow Wilson Center workshop on Korean security issues,
wishful thinking is unfortunately a very common and widespread
phenomenon among people and governments. (Note
6) Straub recounted experiences with American officials
and experts coming to the U.S. embassy in Tokyo in the 1990s
pontificating on their prognoses for the inevitable collapse
of the North Korean regime, giving odds that allowed Pyongyang
anywhere from a few months to perhaps two years before falling.
While stressing that it was not and to his knowledge is not
official U.S. policy, Straub suspected that there are some within
the inner sanctums of the Bush administration who believe that
with any luck, sanctions might be the straw that breaks the
camel's back, bringing down the communist regime.
Through the work of the National Security Archive Korea Project,
documents are coming to light that reveal some of this history
of concern and, as some would have it, wishful thinking regarding
North Korea's staying power. The documents below provide a window
into the views of administrations going back to Ronald Reagan,
and the growing concern under the Clinton administration that
famine and its attendant pressures on Pyongyang were weakening
the ability of the North Korean government to retain control
and power. (Note 7) As these documents make
clear, particularly with respect to the Clinton administration,
the threat was not seen as imminent, but still inevitable; the
key unknowns were how long the decline would take, and what
would be the straw that broke the North Korean camel's back.
The pattern of growing concern is seen in the documents from
the last half of the Clinton presidency. When Clinton met with
Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto in April 1996, the assessment
given him was that despite the severe strains on North Korea's
economic system, "we do not believe the regime's survival
is under serious threat in the near term," a conclusion
also reached in State Department talking points on the North
Korean situation prepared that same spring. (Documents
No. 5 and 6) By the end of 1996, the prognosis was growing
more dire, with predictions of a bad harvest and reports that
"Civilians are dying of starvation, and even many military
troops are malnourished." (Document No.
9) A briefing provided to Secretary of State-designate Madeleine
Albright in December 1996 warned that "the ongoing deterioration
of the North Korean economy potentially threatens the stability
of northeast Asia," but also stressed that, "Despite
concerns about the sudden collapse of the DPRK, our ability
to influence events there is limited…" (Document
No. 11) By early 1997, the CIA was warning that the continued
economic decline was confronting Pyongyang with eroding public
support, growing hardship for the political and military elite,
and the threat that efforts to reform the economy could unleash
forces potentially destabilizing to the communist regime. (Document
No. 12) The remaining years of the Clinton presidency saw
this dilemma growing deeper for North Korea, as State Department
intelligence reports warned of a possible "Countdown to
Starvation" (Document No. 15) and
noted increased flows of refugees seeking to cross into China,
with the potential for destabilizing the border area between
the two countries and increasing Beijing's concern over the
future course of developments. For Clinton State Department
officials, Kim Jong Il and his advisers faced a daunting challenge:
"To successfully recover and rebuild from a devastating
decade of decline, North Korea's leaders must make gut-wrenching
decisions" regarding how wide-ranging and fast to pursue
economic reform and government transparency, with the choice
apparently reduced to one between an inevitable fall into economic
and political chaos, or the prospect of destabilizing change.
(Document No. 19) Given this choice, and
Kim Jong Il's fierce determination to hold to power, many saw
the North's fall as inevitable, if not imminent.
If Kim Jong Il's hold on power is as tenuous as some would
believe, then sanctions may be viewed as the diplomatic equivalent
of controlled demolition, or as some would put it, regime change.
Did "wishful thinking" about North Korea influence
the Bush administration's refusal to engage in direct talks
with Pyongyang, while similar assessments of the North Korean
regime's stability prompted South Korea's and China's efforts
to moderate harsh U.S. positions? No doubt, these perceptions
of North Korea's sinking fortunes, and by implication Kim Jong
Il's motivations and objectives in pursuing nuclear weapons,
have affected and continue to color U.S. and allied strategies
and tactics for responding to Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions.
Documents
Note:
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Document
1: State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Briefing Memorandum, The Political and Economic Situation
in North Korea, November 6, 1985 [FOIA Release]
This INR memorandum locates North Korea's economic ills in
its "ideological straightjacket of self-reliance for 40
years," and notes the start of debates over new policies
and approaches to invigorate the economy.
Document
2: CIA National Intelligence Daily, North Korea: The World
Through Pyongyang's Eyes, March 18, 1993 [FOIA Release]
This CIA assessment seeks to get inside Kim Il Sung's head
to illuminate the rationale behind Pyongyang's return to a hard
line stance towards the IAEA and the West, noting that North
Korea "continues to behave in ways that are counterproductive
to its desperate need for Western economic assistance."
Striking a theme that will recur throughout the 1990s, the CIA
concluded that "the North had to choose between pushing
forward with fundamental changes or reversing course."
Document
3: State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Intelligence Brief, China/North Korea: Food Aid?, March
16, 1996 [FOIA Release]
This INR brief notes further recurring themes in the ongoing
assessment of North Korea's economic woes: the important role
China plays in providing aid to Pyongyang, and Beijing's desire
to keep the North Korean regime "afloat" out of self-interest
to prevent an influx of refugees across the border.
Document
4: State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Intelligence Assessment, DPRK: Grappling with Food Shortage,
April 4, 1996 [FOIA Release]
This INR assessment, though only partially released, begins
the process of following Kim Jong Il's efforts to secure his
place as Kim Il Sung's successor, with the worsening food crisis
presenting a serious challenge that could put the North Korean
leader in a "political bind."
Document
5: State Department Briefing Memorandum, Clinton-Hashimoto
Meeting, April 17, 1996, Subject: Korean Peninsula [FOIA
Release]
This memorandum, prepared for Clinton's meeting with Japanese
Prime Minister Hashimoto, again emphasizes the balancing act
Pyongyang is attempting to carry out, seeking to address the
growing economic problems without endangering the political
survival of Kim Il Sung's fledgling leadership.
Document
6: State Department Talking Points in re situation
in North Korea, May 1996 [FOIA Release]
These talking points, apparently prepared for trilateral consultations
with Japan and South Korea, outline the points of agreement
regarding the situation in North Korea: the nation was in a
steep decline, but not facing a serious threat of collapse;
the role this crisis is playing in pushing Pyongyang to seek
aid talks with the outside word, and the assessment that, despite
the deepening food crisis, Kim Jong Il is succeeding in maintaining
political and social control.
Document
7: State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Intelligence Assessment, DPRK: Famine Nears, May 11,
1996 [FOIA Release]
This INR report adds new graphic detail to the assessment of
North Korea's downward economic spiral, writing of "large
numbers of people foraging for wild roots and grasses,"
as "Border regions are being deforested and some factories
dismantled to barter lumber and scrap for Chinese flour."
North Koreans are described as feeling their situation is "the
worse since the days of extreme privation during the Korean
War."
Document
8: Memorandum, Winston Lord to Secretary Warren Christopher,
Subject: PL 480 Title II Emergency Food Aid for North Korea,
May 23, 1996 [FOIA Release]
This memorandum, while providing additional details on the
food emergency confronting Pyongyang, lays out the rationale
for providing food aid to North Korea in terms of the broader
policy goals. Believing that the DPRK was "deeply appreciative"
of the earlier U.S. humanitarian aid in February 1996, Lord
links this appreciation to North Korea's participation in a
first round of missile talks and agreement on Korean War remains.
Lord argues that further unconditional humanitarian aid could
encourage more progress on bilateral U.S.-DPRK issues and work
to elicit a positive response from North Korea to the Four Party
Peace Proposal.
Document
9: State Department Memorandum, North Korea's Food Situation,
October 1996 [FOIA Release]
This memorandum, apparently prepared in the fall of 1996 for
another round of trilateral talks with Japan and South Korea,
updates the food crisis in North Korea and the continuing need
for humanitarian aid. The U.S. position is that it had no current
plans to offer additional aid to North Korea, seeking to reconfirm
the consensus that South Korea should take the lead on any major
food assistance, but remaining open to reviewing new international
appeals for help on the merits, an assessment that had to take
into account the political ramifications of any decision to
help or not help Pyongyang.
Document
10: State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Intelligence Memorandum, North Korea - Food Shortage and
Political Stability, ca. December 1, 1996 [FOIA Release]
This assessment from late 1996 again draws the conclusion that
the severe food shortage is not causing any serious political
problems for the North Korean regime, as the populace continues
to view this crisis as but one more remnant of long-standing
imperialist designs upon North Korea. In a refrain of the argument
put forth by Winston Lord in his memorandum to Secretary Christopher
earlier in the year (see Document No. 8 above), the memorandum
does link the economic crisis to Pyongyang's "unprecedented"
appeal for international aid, as well as steps taken to encourage
private barter trade both domestically and with China.
Document
11: State Department Memorandum, Korean Peninsula Issues,
December 1, 1996 [FOIA Release]
This briefing memorandum, prepared for Secretary of State-designate
Madeleine Albright, again puts the issue of the U.S. response
to North Korea's economic dilemmas within the broader context
of American policy objectives for the Korean peninsula. The
bottom line is stated clearly and unequivocally: "As the
North Korean economy has deteriorated, we and the ROK have also
cooperated to prevent the precipitate collapse of the DPRK,
since it would present unacceptable military risks and economic
costs."
Document
12: CIA Briefing Book, Key Analytic Challenges: Priority
Issues; North Korea, February 1997 [FOIA Release]
As the second Clinton administration began, the CIA laid out
the key elements of the North Korean policy issues confronting
the government. The challenge is clear: "North Korea will
remain a serious challenge to regional stability as long as
the Stalinist regime endures - and we cannot yet predict its
downfall." In what must have been a now frustrating observation,
the analysis notes that the ongoing economic deterioration is
sapping the stability of Kim Jong Il's regime, yet somehow he
remained firmly in control. Still, perhaps for some a ray of
hope (or fear) could be seen in the observation that the deprivation
was finally beginning to affect the elites and eroding (though
by how much and to what effect is not said) popular faith in
the regime.
Document
13: State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Intelligence Assessment, Roundtable on North Korean Food
Crisis, July 3, 1997 [FOIA Release]
As the economic crisis deepened, the State Department INR and
Office of Korean Affairs convened a roundtable of experts to
discuss the crisis, its potential impact on regime stability
and broader U.S. policy interests. Echoing earlier assessments,
the panel found that the food crisis was real, though uncertainty
remained as to its scope and potential for actual famine in
North Korea. The experts also agreed that aid alone would not
solve the crisis, which required addressing deep structural
problems, a step that carried its own risks for Pyongyang. While
no one held that the communist regime was facing imminent collapse,
most felt its long-term prospects were dim if current trends
continued. Despite these uncertainties, the panel reconfirmed
the judgment that U.S. support of humanitarian aid to North
Korea was in line with other U.S. policy goals on the peninsula,
including preventing the outbreak of war, creating a stable
peace, promoting change in Pyongyang and reducing the nuclear
threat.
Document
14: CIA Intelligence Report, Exploring the Implications
of Alternative North Korean Endgames: Results for a Discussion
Panel on Continuing Coexistence Between North and South Korea,
January 21, 1998 [FOIA Release] (pages after 20-36 excised)
In 1997, the CIA devoted at least two exercises to exploring
the national security implications of different endgame scenarios
on the Korean Peninsula. A March 1997 panel examined the implications
of three scenarios: a limited North Korean invasion of the South,
a coup attempt and ensuing civil war in the North, and peaceful
unification under South Korea's leadership. This exercise concluded
that from Seoul's perspective, the optimum endgame would be
gradual reconciliation leading to eventual reunification on
South Korean terms, without unacceptable economic costs. To
further investigate this scenario, a second roundtable of experts
was convened in late 1997 to examine the potential for reconciliation
as well as the implications of a prolonged period of competitive
coexistence between the two Koreas. The results of that roundtable,
reported in this partially declassified CIA report, stressed
that the fundamental variable is "the question of time"
- would North Korea be able to survive long enough for peaceful
reunification to occur, or was the regime more likely to collapse
due to its endemic economic problems? While rehearsing the familiar
observations about Kim Jong Il's ability to stay in command,
the report notes the common view held by South Korea and other
regional powers that for the time being, the continued existence
of North Korea is preferable to the unpredictable costs of reunification
in the near term, either peaceful or otherwise. The odds against
the regime's continued survival were low, however, as the majority
of the experts doubted the regime could persist beyond five
years - i.e., 2002 - given the unwillingness or inability of
Pyongyang to pursue fundamental reforms.
Document
15: State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Intelligence Brief, North Korea: Countdown to Starvation?,
March 3, 1998 [FOIA Release]
This INR report notes that the North Korean government had
warned that the country's grain stocks would be depleted by
mid-March, leading the World Food Program to state that immediate
aid was needed to avoid "potential starvation." The
document is interesting for the light it sheds on how difficult
it was (and is) to accurately determine the extend of North
Korea's food crisis, noting the range of estimates emerging
from other nations and international organizations. It is also
interesting for its conjecture that Pyongyang may have made
its declaration in part to sound out the new South Korean government
of Kim Dae Jung.
Document
16: State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Intelligence Brief, DPRK: Food Supply Precarious, July
6, 1998 [FOIA Release]
This brief note comments on observations of recent Western
visitors to North Korea that the people seem "reasonably
well-fed" and in overall better physical shape than last
year, according to reports from the U.S. Embassy in Seoul. Despite
these reports, international organizations continued to forecast
a persistent and deepening food crisis.
Document
17: State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Intelligence Brief, DPRK: Food Situation Grim, November
18, 1998 [FOIA Release]
As 1998 neared its end, the reports from North Korea continued
to present a mixed picture, combining inadequate grain harvests,
widespread malnutrition and stunted growth for large percentages
of North Korean children. Pyongyang is trying to promote more
agricultural production, using reforms similar to those adopted
in China. Given that the regime's priority was keeping the capital
supplied with food, observations of conditions in Pyongyang
likely did not represent the situation throughout the nation.
Document
18: State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Intelligence Brief, DPRK/PRC: "Refugee" Roundup?,
February 8, 1999 [FOIA Release]
This INR brief notes that despite recent reports that the food
situation had stabilized somewhat in North Korea, China still
had to deal with a "wandering population" of largely
rural residents seeking to cross the border into China in search
of better conditions. Apparently, the growing numbers of such
refugees was leading Beijing to adopt more aggressive steps
to locate and forcibly repatriate these illegal immigrants,
with even more harsh steps possible if the Chinese leadership
decided the situation on the border is becoming destabilized.
Document
19: Memorandum, Donald Keyser to Madeleine Albright, Subject:
North Korea-Assessing the Economy [with attached INR Intelligence
Assessment, same title], October 19, 2000 [FOIA Release]
As the Clinton administration was drawing to a close, there
was some movement towards more productive engagement with Pyongyang,
as seen in Secretary of State Albright's trip to North Korea
in October and Kim Jong Il's proposed, but aborted, visit to
Washington, D.C. These signs of movement were still shadowed
by the North's continued economic ills, as seen in this memorandum
to Secretary Albright (and read by her, as seen in the 'MKA"
stamp) forwarding an INR assessment of the North Korean economy.
As the cover memorandum to Albright stressed, North Korea faced
"gut-wrenching" decisions if it was to stem and reverse
the slide into economic collapse. The INR assessment, which
roots the collapse of North Korea's heavy industry in its dependence
on Russia and East Europe for economic aid, fuel, inputs and
markets, lays out two basic tasks necessary for economic reform
in the nation: increased transparency about the nation's economic
situation, including officials more knowledgeable about Western
values and practices, and so more open to cooperation with Western
international economic organizations, and an urgent program
to rebuild human capital, which had been so depleted by famine,
disease and inadequate education.
Notes
1. See Document 14.
2. See Rice's comments reported under "Five
Governments, One Crazy Guy, " in Al Kamen, "Diplomacy
Turns a Profit," The Washington Post, October
25, 2006, p. A15.
3. See Donald Gregg and Don Oberdorfer, "Wrong
Path on Korea," The Washington Post, September
6, 2006, p. A15.
4. For a very good discussion of the diplomatic
challenge facing the imposition of effective sanctions, particularly
from the viewpoint of Chinese and South Korean participation,
see the briefing
by CSIS experts on October 11 2006.
5. Robert D. Kaplan, "When North Korea
Falls," The Atlantic Monthly (October 2006), 64-73.
6. Click
here for a webcast of this conference, including David Straub's
comments.
7. During the Wilson Center workshop, it was
noted that some believe that the assumption North Korea was
on its last legs were a factor in assessing the 1994 Framework
Agreement, making concerns about Pyongyang's commitment to carrying
out its obligations under the agreement largely moot.