Washington,
DC, September 20, 2006 - On the thirtieth anniversary
of the assassination of former Chilean ambassador Orlando Letelier
and his American colleague Ronni Karpen Moffitt, the National
Security Archive today called on the U.S. government to release
all documents relating to the role of General Augusto Pinochet
in the car bombing that brought terrorism to the capital city
of the United States on September 21, 1976.
Hundreds of documents implicating Pinochet in authorizing and
covering up the crime were due to be declassified under the
Clinton administration but were withheld in the spring of 2000
as evidence for a Justice Department investigation into the
retired dictator's role. After more than six years, according
to Peter Kornbluh, who directs the Archive's Chile Documentation
Project, it is time to release them. "If there is not going
to be a legal indictment," Kornbluh said, "the documents
can and will provide an indictment of history."
The Archive today released a declassified
memo to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger reporting on
a CIA approach in early October 1976 to the head of the Chilean
secret police, Manuel Contreras, regarding U.S. concerns about
Operation Condor assassination plots. The secret memo, written
by Kissinger's deputy for Latin America, Harry Schlaudeman,
noted that Contreras had denied that "Operation Condor
has any other purpose than the exchange of intelligence."
While the car bombing in downtown Washington, D.C. that killed
Letelier and Moffitt took place on September 21, 1976, the memo
contains no reference to any discussion with Contreras about
the assassinations--even though DINA was widely considered to
be the most likely perpetrator of the crime. In 1978, Contreras
was indicted by a U.S. Grand Jury for directing the terrorist
attack.
The document was obtained by Kornbluh under the Freedom of
Information Act.
The memorandum to Kissinger adds to a series
of documents that have been obtained by the National Security
Archive that shed light on what the U.S. government knew about
Operation Condor--a collaboration of Southern Cone secret police
services to track down, abduct, torture, and assassinate opponents
in the mid and late 1970s--and what actions it took or failed
to take prior to the Letelier-Moffitt assassination. On August
23, 1976, Kissinger's office sent a carefully-worded
demarche for U.S. ambassadors in Chile, Argentina, Bolivia,
Uruguay, and Paraguay to deliver to their host governments to
halt assassination missions. But the next day, U.S.
Ambassador to Chile David Popper balked at approaching Pinochet
because "he might take as an insult any inference that
he was connected with such assassination plots." Instead
Popper requested permission to send the CIA station chief to
talk to Contreras. For reasons that remain hidden in still-classified
documents, Schlaudeman did not authorize that approach until
October 4, two weeks after the car bombing in Washington.
Indeed, on September 20, 1976, the day before the Letelier-Moffitt
assassination, Schlaudeman
ordered his own deputy to tell the Southern Cone ambassadors
"to take no further action" on pressuring the
Condor nations to halt assassination plotting, because "there
have been no reports in some weeks indicating an intention to
activate the Condor scheme." In his October
8 memo to Kissinger transmitting the CIA memorandum of conversation
with Col. Contreras, Schlaudeman argued that "the approach
to Contreras seems to me to be sufficient action for the time
being" because "the Chileans are the prime movers
in Operation Condor."
The Archive also released a second
memo from Schlaudeman to Kissinger reporting on a cable
from U.S. Ambassador to Uruguay Ernest Siracusa voicing his
concerns on presenting the Condor demarche. Siracusa, the memo
suggests, feared that he would become a target of Operation
Condor if he followed his diplomatic instructions, and recommended
that Schlaudeman approach Uruguay's ambassador to Washington
instead. In his memo
to Kissinger dated August 30, 1976, Schlaudeman spelled
out the U.S. position on Condor assassination plots: "What
we are trying to head off is a series of international murders
that could do serious damage to the international status and
reputation of the countries involved."
Kornbluh noted that neither the CIA memorandum of conversation
with Contreras nor the Siracusa cable has been declassified
and urged the Bush administration to release all records relating
to Operation Condor and the Letelier-Moffitt case. "Amidst
today's ongoing effort against international terrorism,"
he noted, "it is important to know the full history of
the failure of U.S. efforts to detect and deter a terrorist
plot in the heart of Washington, D.C."
Documents
Note:
The documents cited in this Electronic Briefing Book are in PDF
format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe
Acrobat Reader to view.
Action
Memorandum, Ambassador Harry Schlaudeman to Secretary Kissinger,
"Operation Condor," August 30, 1976
Source: Freedom of Information Act
request
Briefing
Memorandum, Ambassador Harry Schlaudeman to Secretary Kissinger,
"Operation Condor," October 8, 1976
Source:
Freedom of Information Act request
