

The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev

1985

Donated by A.S. Chernyaev to The National Security Archive

Translated by Anna Melyakova

Edited by Svetlana Savranskaya

<http://www.nsarchive.org>

Translation © The National Security Archive, 2006

January 4th, 1985.

I am falling behind the events. And they are bustling.

Before the New Year's I was distressed for Ponomarev:¹ Kosolapov asked for permission to print in *Communist* the conclusion we wrote for B.N. [Ponomarev] for the eight-volume *International Labor Movement*. In response, he received instructions from Zimyanin² to remove the footnote that it was the conclusion—let it, he says, be just an article... This is how Zimyanin now gives orders to B.N., being lower in rank than him! But something else is the most important—he reflects the “opinion” that it is not necessary to establish the connection (for many decades into the future) between Ponomarev and this fundamental publication in an official Party organ... That is, they are preparing our B.N. for the hearse. I think he will not survive the XXVII Congress; in any case not as CC [Central Committee] Secretary.

At work, almost every day brings evidence of his helplessness. His main concern right now is to vindicate at least something of his self-imagined “halo” of the creator of the third (1961) Party Program. In no way can he reconcile himself to the fact that life has torn “his creation” to pieces. He blames everything on the intrigues of either Gorbachev³ or Chernenko⁴; but mainly on “the curly one” (this is how he calls Chernenko's assistant Pechenev); and also in part on Aleksandrov⁵ and Zagladin.⁶ He complains to me, seeking in me somebody to talk to, a sympathizer. But I, naturally, keep quiet. Now Chernenko's article is published in No. 18 of *Communist*, written mostly by the same Pechenev. But to B.N., it is like a sickle across the balls, to use the language of Academician Arbatov.⁷

We wrote (on Ponomarev's instructions) proposals to the CC “on the consolidation of the ICM [International Communist Movement]”—about the new Conference. Now he is going to marinate it, afraid to cause any irritation: do not bother [me], so to say, with your ICM, when we all have the forthcoming Congress on our minds.

... Such attitude towards our work (the work of the International Department) can be attributed to the gerontology and incompetence, the absence of a culture of politics, to [the absence of] Lenin's sweeping approach. However—this is only in form. In essence, indeed, “our little business” with “consolidating the unity of the ICM” has become an anachronism. And, naturally, it arouses a healthy annoyance against the background of [some] real and difficult problems.

¹ Boris Nikolayevich Ponomarev—Head of the Central Committee International Department, Chernyaev's direct boss.

² Mikhail Vasilievich Zimyanin—member of the CPSU Central Committee in charge of ideological work

³ Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev—member of the Central Committee, future General Secretary.

⁴ Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko—General Secretary of the Communist Party, 1984-1985.

⁵ Andrei Alexandrov-Agentov—Chernenko's Foreign Policy Assistant

⁶ Vadim Valentinovich Zagladin—member of the Central Committee International Department

⁷ Georgy A. Arbatov—Head of the Institute of U.S. and Canada of the USSR Academy of Sciences

Zagladin got sick before the New Year's. His articles show up every week (not a hyperbole) in one or another journal. He dresses commonplace banalities in decent, sometimes beautiful journalistic form and presents them as theoretical essays. Many people accept his compositions as such. But such pathological productivity triggers mockery among the majority of literary and politically competent people. In the department, people are beginning to understand that this [productivity], in particular, is also due to the fact that "work-wise" he does practically nothing, except for receiving delegations (which also became a distinctive sublimation of his graphomania).

Recently an anonymous letter about him was received from the Lenin International School... and also about Pankov, the Rector, as well. They are friends since the time of MGIMO,⁸ for over thirty years. It is alleged that Zagladin receives honoraria, that he does not complete his part-time hours (this is nonsense), and provides a "cover-up" for Pankov's extortion. He and his deputies manage to earn 1200 rubles per month each.

Gorbachev gave instructions: Ponomarev, Ligachev,⁹ and Zimyanin must investigate [the allegations] and report to the CC; thus the matter is set into action.

B.N. himself "drafted" a letter to Shaposhnikov, Rykin, and Toporikov, i.e. already started a premeditated disclosure (and discrediting of Zagladin) in a fairly broad circle. I found out about the letter from Rykin. And today B.N. ordered me to read the actual text.

I do not know whether this will harm Zagladin, but it will obviously harm Pankov on the eve of the Congress: now he will not be elected delegate. Ligachev, the keeper of party morals, will not allow it.

On the first of January I celebrated the New Year's with Plamis. [We] had a good discussion. He just returned from a tour of the Philippines, Thailand, Laos, and Singapore.

And I, in turn, talked profusely about Rybakov's novel *The Children of Arbat*, which had a heartfelt impact on me. This, indeed, is a novel of the century, a kind of an "artistic exploration" of an epoch, next to which the almost-genius *Virgin Lands*,¹⁰ devoted to the same years, turns into a provincial reference. And what a moral purification of society it would be if that book was allowed to be published!

January 7th, 1985.

⁸ Moscow State Institute of International Relations

⁹ Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev—member of the Politburo of the CC CPSU, promoted by Gorbachev.

¹⁰ Leonid Brezhnev's book, which was mandatory reading in all educational institutions in the USSR

These are the kinds of passages that appear in *Pravda* (a certain Olga Kuchkina—an article about amateur theaters in Moscow)... And everybody pretends that such an interpretation of *Hamlet* can be associated with somebody else! Listen to this:

“In *Hamlet*, there are two accomplishments: the image of Hamlet and the image of the play as a whole. There is a rhythm of a well-adjusted mechanism, in which “something is rotten” only from the perspective of Hamlet’s heightened self-consciousness and world awareness—for the others, the habitual mechanism is still functioning normally. They weave intrigues and conspiracies; human dignity and life itself have no value. ‘He was a good man in the full sense of the word’—the father of prince Hamlet—and so he was removed; and now the love of power is triumphant, and personal and gain-seeking interests are skillfully presented as interests of the state.”

Arbatov reported: the Plenum on the Scientific and Technological Revolution (STR) had been cancelled, i.e. the question about the STR had been dropped. This is either because they do not want Gorbachev in the role of the speaker, punishing him for England, or because there is nothing to say or impossible to implement that which is said.

January 9th, 1985.

Today in “Pravda” about the results of the Gromyko-Schultz meeting in Geneva. Unexpectedly positive, especially for me, who knew what our man’s directives were, and what the Americans brought with them (according to their public statements and their press). [It would be great] if there was actually a shift!

And so all this Ponomarev-Shaposhnikov commotion with energizing the anti-war movement is being erased just like an annoying audiotape.

That is, if one looks at it from my corner. But on the whole, this is how it’s supposed to be, for it cannot be otherwise: there are no real contradictions, no deadly clashes of truly vital interests, as it was in 1914 or 1940-1. Evidently, they will not go to war solely for ideology at the end of the XX century, with the existence of nuclear weapons. Wars for ideology are fought in Vietnam, in Afghanistan, on distant peripheries of the “civilized world.”

Ponomarev still torments me with the (CPSU) Program. This irritates me, because when it was time to write the text, he didn’t even try to put me into the “working group,” but when he wants to patch up work badly done, he slips it to me “outside of the context” (i.e. do not touch adjacent paragraphs and pages). Out of spite, I do not miss a chance to stick his nose into the banal places: verbosity, repetition, cheap propagandist language, superficiality... and this was written by intelligent, educated, competent people. This is all because twenty people were writing this at once, and were constantly glancing back at different superiors: does it please—or displease them.

In a word, a text is born that will disappoint those, who are not indifferent, who still expect from the Party Program a fresh, new charge for thought and an object of pride for one's Party. Most likely there will be nothing to be proud of.

Yesterday the Secretariat of the CC [took place]. Three hours. The first issue under discussion was the work of the Embassy's Party committee, in this case of the FRG.

Then—the situation with shoe manufacturing. A splendid mess. But it was not this that “distressed” me—a usual thing! I sensed that Gorbachev is beginning to be sucked in by “the routine.” Yesterday's discussion somehow reminded one of analogous ones under Kirilenko¹¹ (by its chaos and helplessness). Each Minister demonstrates with numbers that it could not have been otherwise with such maintenance, supplies, equipment, financing, etc. And that he could not and will not be able to do or recommend anything. And the Secretaries of the CC talked some, remonstrated some, criticized some, recorded good appeals and instructions in the resolution, but did not raise the issue in earnest, and it will not be resolved.

January 12th, 1985.

On Thursday, I was receiving the ex-captain of San Marino, who in September received me in her capacity as the head of the government at her medieval castle. Glaudia Raccini, about thirty-six years old. Now she is just a member of the Communist Party PB [Politburo]. Accompanying her was Umberto Barruli, the ex-General Secretary of the CP. They came to try to get special terms from our commercial departments, in order to lower unemployment and to keep the CP in power. I promised to encourage our traders' internationalist communist spirit. [We] had dinner together. Chatted at ease. Barruli knows his way around in relations with us; but she [Raccini] was a little, it seems, discouraged by the “unconstrained attitude” of the Soviets (that is how Italians call citizens of the USSR too) in relations with foreigners.

I had a two-hour-long talk with Chervonenko. In his capacity as head of the department he is going on an inspection tour to the USA and Canada. I told him what the embassy workers were supposed to be doing there, but even that they are doing poorly (except for the missile-strategic range of problems).

Dobrynin¹² (ambassador to the US) was at B.N.'s; he has no habit of visiting me, I am a small fish for him. And he only visits Ponomarev because the latter invites him, and not because he, Dobrynin, needs it for work.

¹¹ Andrei Pavlovich Kirilenko—Member of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

¹² Anatoly Fedorovich Dobrynin—Soviet Ambassador to the United States, 1962-1985

Bovin¹³ and Falin¹⁴ are not being re-elected as deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. Arbatov urged me to provide “moral support” to Sashka “in this difficult for him period.” I told him that I interceded for Bovin with Gorbachev, but the latter did not do anything. It could not have been otherwise. Bovin’s inclusion in the Party elite and as a member of the Revision Commission of the CC CPSU was one of the whims of Brezhnev’s favoritism. Under normal conditions, he is too extravagant for the nomenclature pack. As for Falin, he is a victim of some imprudence—in his words—which became known to Andropov¹⁵ “with consequences.”

And for me, it is time to start thinking about my “future.” There is less than a year before the Congress. I will not be left in the CC. Ponomarev himself, God willing, will remain there. Retire now, when the pension will be significantly higher?.. Or wait for the Congress? To stay at work after you have been “let go” from the CC—[would be] unpleasant, awkward. And for what? For the salary? I will not be able to accomplish much, and not because I cannot anymore, but because the time for “others” has come.

It is interesting, what impulse for life will remain [for me], especially if, finally, sex will disappear too?! Just curiosity? To read, go to exhibitions, watch movies and plays, write... But there will not be too much to write about!

January 13th, 1985.

Insomnia. Started to read. Came upon Vinokurov’s verses...

Well, I too grow older...

Afraid, that in this race of days

I, after all, am not becoming wiser,

But only simply colder.

Last night read the *Captain’s Daughter* again. What a delight! How compact and simple!

January 16th, 1985.

¹³ Alexander Bovin—Central Committee Consultant

¹⁴ Valentin Mikhailovich Falin—Candidate Member of the Central Committee, USSR Ambassador to FRG

¹⁵ Yury Vladimirovich Andropov, Chairman of the KGB, 1967-1982, USSR General Secretary, 1982-1984

For his 80th anniversary, Ponomarev was given the order of Lenin. But Dolgikh¹⁶ (CC Secretary) recently was given a second Star of the Hero for his 60th. Secretaries of obkoms [regional committees] as a group are given the second Star for 60 and 70 years. Against a background of such prolific kindness with honors B.N.'s case looks puzzling. He is upset. When I was with him today, he did not conceal his perturbation: "How will the Communist Movement take it? How will our fraternal states, which awarded me their highest orders, understand this? How will the peace-loving public react to this fact!?" He measures this distressing for him event on these scales.

I asked: "Do you not know how it was done?"

- No, I do not know anything. I was just at Gorbachev's for work matters. [I] Asked him. He stood up. Appeared moved, embraced me, and said: do not worry about anything, everything will be all right; I will come tomorrow to congratulate you myself. And then [he] informed me that he will not go to the Congress of the French Communist Party, although—Ponomarev comments,— he was eagerly awaited there, Plissionie and **Marchais** told our ambassador frankly that they want only him, Gorbachev; they are literally fascinant [sic] with his visit to England. His visit would really support the Party in its present difficult state, etc. Gorbachev suggested Solomentsev¹⁷ instead of himself. [He] added that the General [Secretary] (Chernenko) did not want the Politburo session to take place without Gorbachev (he himself is ill, in the hospital).

One should, obviously, understand all this information reassuring for B.N. in the following way:

a) He, Gorbachev, is not to blame that Ponomarev did not get a second Star.

b) He himself [Gorbachev] (especially after England) is in a somewhat risky position of diminished trust: "do not go too far, know your place."

I sympathized with Ponomarev, agreed that many people will not understand [this], and that in general—this is not being friendly.

Really, even if he is being prepared for the "the hearse," why not give him a second Star before he goes—has this not become a commonplace phenomenon? Certainly, the question is not about real merits; on these criteria no one should accept Stars or decorations in the highest echelon of our leadership. The question is about elementary norms of relations in the "upper levels [of the government]," and about the

¹⁶ Vladimir Ivanovich Dolgikh—Candidate member of the Politburo, head of the General Department of the CC CPSU

¹⁷ Mikhail Sergeevich Solomentsev—Member of the CC CPSU Politburo, Chairman of the Party Control Committee

simple observance of the “decorations table”, which has long ago become the deciding criterion.

For example, for her 50th birthday my secretary Tamara was given a certificate of honor from the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. But this is only because she is on the CC staff and works as the secretary of the deputy head [of the department]. There are millions of women like her in the Soviet Union, employed in similar and even more challenging positions, who receive flowers from their coworkers for their 50th birthday, and nothing more than that. In this context, Ponomarev, of course, deserved a second Star.

Is it possible that even after this he will still make noise, fuss, poke his nose where it does not belong, and act in a way that tires everyone, as though nothing had happened, passing all this as the fulfillment of [his] party obligations?

January 17th, 1985.

The department arranged a celebration for Ponomarev on the occasion of his 80th birthday. The hall was full. Rykin’s (secretary of Party Bureau Department) introduction was somewhat vociferous and high-flown. Zagladin gave a wonderful speech, which touched everyone in earnest and Ponomarev as well. Then the head of the Latin-American sector, Hero of the Soviet Union Kudachkin, was given the platform. Then Svetlana Shadrina, who was considered the most charming of our ladies, presented flowers and read some poetry, stammering like a schoolgirl.

The atmosphere was sincere. Some shed a few tears (I sat in the Presidium and saw it myself). Our people on the whole are good, besides, the authority complex has not completely disappeared from the Russian soul.

I think that this virtuous celebration really lightened up B.N.’s bitterness over not receiving a second Star. Upon its conclusion, for the rest of the day, B.N. was visited and congratulated by universities, ministries, organizations, committees, individuals, etc.

I had lunch with the people from Ireland on Dimitrov Street. I opened up and talked about “realism” as our party’s slogan of the day. And especially [talked] about the fact that we could have worked out some problems differently, for example the food problem.

We talked about the position of the Communist Party in Great Britain.

And once again, we started debating about the Labor Party, which recently sprung up in Ireland: here my friends have been betrayed by common sense, and even by simple logic...

January 22nd, 1985.

Today I was at the Secretariat. Ligachev reported on the course of the election campaign. In terms of organization, he says, everything is in order; but we were not able to get everything to be just practical, without showiness and formalities (and, indeed, what is shown on this subject on the television is repulsive to watch—just like the well-remembered Lyonya¹⁸ in his last days).

There was also a report about the state of the meat-and-milk industry. Three Ministers spoke, and Solomentsev from the Gosplan.¹⁹ Gorbachev conducted [the session], and summed it up: he likened our lagging behind western companies to the “cave age”—that was his concluding estimate to the ministers. At the meat-processing plants, women chop meat with axes, in order to prepare it for a marketable-package form.

Very bad... I cannot reconcile myself with people’s indifference (my colleagues’ at the CC) to work, for which they receive big money and other things. Admittedly, you may despise “this cause.” Perhaps it deserves to be despised because of its meaninglessness, unproductiveness, etc. But be honest. Leave, if you do not like it. But do not be a cynic, for that means that others must do your work for you—others, who get the same amount of money as you, that is, they do twice the work—for themselves and for you!

Take Sharif, my head of the England sector. Already for the fourth year in a row, he is sick three-quarters of each year!

January 23rd, 1985.

Did not see Ponomarev for two days after his birthday. Brutents,²⁰ who received the Chileans together with him today, saw him very confused... But he maintained his ridiculous advice-giving manner. The people came to explain why Pinochet must be forcefully overthrown. And he tells them: Lenin taught that rebellion is an art, but it is necessary to study the NEP [New Economic Policy] as well. It is an illusion that he is not becoming old. He is becoming intellectually decrepit, and his innate traits are becoming more pronounced. I cannot cast off [the image of] his pathetic description of how Gorbachev, responding to Ponomarev’s question of why he was not given a second Star, stood up and embraced him. And our little B.N. almost cried, telling me about it. That is him, who started out despising Gorbachev, and considering himself better in all aspects. And now, with puppy-like gratitude, he mumbles how kind the latter was to him, asked him “not to worry about anything...” No, Ponomarev lacks that Bolshevik marrow, which

¹⁸ Nickname for Leonid Brezhnev

¹⁹ The State Planning Agency

²⁰ Karen Nersesovich Brutents—member of the CC CPSU International Department

is akin to the aristocratism of the Decembrists and the People's Will.²¹ He is petty, even though a direct heir of the Bolshevik cohort!

By the way, today he was slighted once again. It was unofficially communicated from the MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] that Gromyko²² named Shcherbitsky²³ as head of the USSR Supreme Soviet delegation to the USA. And Ponomarev had so counted on it, had hoped so much! Five years ago he went to the USA in the same capacity, and for how many years after that he told everyone—our people and foreigners—about the people with whom he, “just like with you,” talked, what he suggested, and how he influenced them. Even now he still remembers by name all the senators, congressmen, governors, and others, with whom he met there, who had received him, etc. What a disappointment it will be! And a hint!

Could they be planning to send him into retirement at the next Plenum, in April?!

January 26th, 1985.

One more colleague died of a heart attack—Nikolai Borisovich Slepov, who worked on Israel. But work was going on as if nothing had happened. I am composing the international [affairs] sections for the CC Secretaries' election speeches, including the one for Gorbachev.

B.N. drew me to the Program again, despite the [initial] selection in favor of Zagladin. They finished up “at the dacha;” now he has to report his opinion to Gorbachev; so last night I was composing “his” opinion for him. However, I added that the collectivization should not be called “The Great Revolution” in the Program for decades into the future. It claimed too many innocent victims; and brought such material, economic, social, and other losses, that the ramifications are felt to this day. I don't know whether he will accept the addition. In his heart he agrees, but in his textbook, which has been published seven times, for the past twenty years he asserts that the collectivization was “the second great revolution!” And even if he “agrees,” will he dare to correct himself?

Shalaev (VCSPS [All-Union Central Labor Union Council]) insists on the resumption of the million-ruble transfer to English miners, even though Gorbachev told Thatcher: we have not and will not transfer. I made him go to the CC. I am in doubt myself, and that is how I composed the memo. Because our million is a drop in the bucket (less than the miner's week's spending), and [is given] in secret at that (so it does nothing for the internationalism); and if it comes to the surface, Maggie will drag the person, with whom she talked and whom she liked so much, through the mud. It is not

²¹ People's Will—a populist anarchist movement in Russia in the XIX century

²² Andrei Andreevich Gromyko—USSR Foreign Minister, 1957-1985

²³ Vladimir Vasilievich Shcherbitsky—Member of the CC CPSU Politburo, First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party

worth it. We shall see how the CC Secretaries and M.S. [Gorbachev] himself will treat this.

There are nine months left until the Congress. I must decide what to do with my life. The meaning in work is already lost; the ICM has no future: it is vanishing, the parties are falling apart one after another. Apparently it has exhausted itself historically; politically it is still holding on—supported by us. That means that the question of my work is now only the question of my private life.

January 30th, 1985.

Chernenko has been in the hospital for almost a month. The PB is meeting irregularly: he does not trust anyone else to conduct the meetings. The PCC [Political Consultative Committee] (of the Warsaw Pact countries) is delayed for an indefinite time. And what will happen with the election speech? After all, the elections in the RSFSR are on the 24th.

Today in the crowd by the elevator I asked Rakhmanin about the PCC. “What are you saying,” he replied, “it hasn’t got a chance. And the elections as well!” After some thought, he added: “What the devil—we have been knocking about for ten years now!” And that—almost out loud! And that—[from] Rakhmanin!

It seems like B.N. has really lost it after his 80th anniversary. He started to give out even before, but now you can see it “with the naked eye.”

He called me over the other day. Led me to the windowsills. They are heaping with addresses, telegrams, and letters on the account of his 80th anniversary. He tells me: “I am not their boss—that means that these are from the heart. They are sincerely expressing... But what should be done with all of this? Of course, I understand that the more you emphasize your importance the less you are liked. But nevertheless... somehow the hundreds of congratulations and evaluations that are in there it should be brought to attention!”

I offered only to “summarize and systemize.” Got three consultants working on it. They are mocking [him], but doing it. This might be all right, but some of his other actions are disgusting. The Bulgarian Ambassador wrote a letter requesting an interview for a movie about Dimitrov: “What do you remember as the strongest impression from meeting Dimitrov,” and such, in the personal sense.

And so I am assigned to formulate “Comrade Ponomarev’s personal impressions from working with Dimitrov,” (and I, in turn, assigned this to Kozlov and Rybakov).

At the same time, we are writing about the moral character of party members in the draft of the Program. And there is the formula [in it]: the higher the post, the stricter

the requirements for the communist's morals. Such an exploitation of the minds of other people, of subordinates who are on a party salary, is not considered immoral. In fact, it is the norm: the higher executives cannot say a word in public, or write a single line, on their own. The only exception right now is Gorbachev.

By the way, before the 40th anniversary [of WWII] I suddenly decided to find out whether any of the current members of the Politburo, candidates for membership, and the CC Secretaries fought in the war. Checked in a reference book (biographies of CC members). Not one of them had been at the front! Of course, what Brezhnev made of his time in the second echelon is also not right. Still...

I am reading Yesin's "The Imitator" in *Novy Mir*. Brilliantly executed, and excellent in the thoughts on contemporary bureaucratic intelligentsia, even though the piece is about artists = about the moral state of our present-day society.

Today, the fellows from the Polish sector (in the CC Socialist Countries Department), who clearly sympathize with me (sometimes bring Poles for chats with me), told me "whispering in the ear" that Ambartsumov's "revisionist" article was re-printed in Bulgaria and the GDR.

I am reading yet another volume of L.N. Tolstoy. Letters. Turns out he wrote them every day, in addition to diaries and material for the complete works!

February 5th, 1985.

I am again going meticulously through the Program's draft, preparing myself for the verbal skirmishes with the people who regard themselves as its chief authors—Pechenev and others: the fellows whom we, the International Department, "nursed to life," through the journal *Problems of Peace and Socialism* but did not manage to get them in time (i.e. to make them a part of the department).

Once again, even after the draft has been revised in accordance with the secretaries' suggestions and passed through the most thorough group editing, I [still] find absurdities, repetitions, and empty phrases and remove them from it.

As I already mentioned, last Saturday the secretaries approved the text again; but the "proprietors" of the final council—Pechenev and Stukalin, proposed alterations once more. Will they take Pyskhov and me into account at all, considering the whole irritable, vain commotion around our little B.N.?

I will go there (i.e. to the Gorky dacha) Thursday morning. Will see what happens. Most importantly, I must keep calm and not show too much interest.

February 11th, 1985.

For three days, from the 7th until the 9th, at Volynskoe -2. Stukalin, Pechenev, Pyskhov, Stepanov, Solodukhin, Pravotorov, and I were there. We were polishing up the CPSU Program after yet more suggestions from the CC Secretaries and before Gorbachev presents the text to Chernenko.

The main issues are:

1) To “globalize,” i.e. to eliminate the ICM’s popular tendency to fixate on national problems and missions; but also to prevent a relapse to the meaningless and non-productive talk of Program-61. The task virtually came down to borrowing a definition of the epoch: to the paragraph stating that the perfection of Soviet society is an international mission of the CPSU, and that the CPSU should bring up its members in the spirit of communism not only in Russia, but for all of the humanity.

2) Corrections in three aspects, as follows:

- the theory of Marxism-Leninism;
- common sense;
- Russian grammar.

3) A new conclusion (with the images of future communism), making sure that it is not too emotional.

An important detail: the addition on Latin America, which in the previous stages was virtually inserted into the ideology [section] of the “liberated” countries of Africa and Asia, due to an oversight by Brutents and Zagladin. I succeeded in making this correction, even though the text of “my” revision was not accepted.

I was the main source of observations, suggestions, and corrections... as an outsider. Pechenev, who was in charge, tried to be a good sport, but became irritated and sometimes started to object as soon as I opened my mouth.

I resolved from the start not to get worked up about it. I “argued” calmly, sometimes as if joking, and often found support among others. Then Pechenev gave in. Actually he considered me to be Ponomarev’s agent, and only slowly understood that I represented myself.

I truly consider it Pechenev’s merit that he was able to insist on the necessity of breaking Ponomarev’s vain conservatism, and making the text realistic and in general targeted domestically, rather than a precept to the IMC and a model for everyone...

Coming back from Saratov, B.N. tried to infiltrate the process, but he was too late: we really worked to finish up and deny him the opportunity of showing up at Volynskoe and then presenting the text in his name. And this is in his best interests: he is annoying people with his pretensions. His vanity is making him look ridiculous and foolish. One would think it is high time to realize that he will not be able to connect his name with the new edition of the Program. That is how it works out: even a smart man, but lacking an inner culture, genuine intelligence, and aristocratism, seems like a petty fool.

Solomentsev told me (about the Congress of the PCF [French Communist Party]) how at a meeting Marchais took him by one hand, and the Chinese representative by the other, and raised them, drawing thunderous applause. Solomentsev indignantly pointed out that our television, for some reason, cut that scene out. But when I told the story to Ponomarev, he said: they did the right thing [to cut it out]! Here is the unanimity of our leaders on the Chinese question for you!

Meanwhile, our delegation in Paris has “amicably” associated with the Chinese. And this virtually means the renewal of inter-party contacts.

February 15th, 1985.

D’ula Khorn, the head of HSWP’s [Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party] International Department, visited Zagladin and me. We talked for two hours. He really wants to be completely frank, and he really wants us to **openly** agree with him (because he believes that in our hearts we do agree). Maybe it is so, but he is thinking provincially, not politically, even though he is very intelligent. I hear that they want to transfer him to Hungary’s MFA. But not because he is a revisionist at heart, it is just that Sures and he feel cramped in one department (CC HSWP).

In the evening I had to entertain him at the restaurant Smena. There were prostitutes everywhere: around the place and inside. A most vulgar “program” [was performed] with a Russian folktale theme—a la russe [sic], as Zhilin accurately expressed it. Embarrassing. Abominable.

There was a meeting with B.N. about measures related to the Victory day. There are tons of measures, but what’s the use! We will not convince anybody of anything. The West is attacking Yalta—yet another channel of anti-Sovietism. [There was] an astute article by Korotich on anti-Sovietism in England. [There was] a report by the Ambassador from London about a televised meeting between seven of our schoolchildren with their peers from England and America. On average, especially in the area of intelligence, our children are by far more advanced than even the most civilized of their children. We are without prejudices; we submit to the conventions and rituals of a hierarchical society, but that does not penetrate essence of our humanity...

I was at Arbatov's. Downed half a liter. Discussed everyone. His [Arbatov's] chats with Gorbachev. The latter supposedly dislikes Zagladin. Does not sound believable. Facts?—He denounced Zagladin's new marriage and told Yakovlev about it. Arbatov proved to me that the initiator of Ponomarev's not receiving a second Star is Gromyko! Yurka is certain that Gromyko is striving for the [position of] General [Secretary]. The General [Secretary] himself is quite in a poor shape. How will he speak before the electorate? The congress Plenum is in April! Almost every day something is published to hide the [General Secretary's serious] condition: either "his" address to the people, or a foreword to "his" next publication, or greetings, or answers to correspondents' questions. I think he does not read them even after publication.

Arbatov showed me a memorandum he directed to Gorbachev. He contends that we **must wreck** the talks in Geneva (Gromyko-Schultz). I had not expected such naiveté from him. As if he knows what "State" considerations are guiding Gromyko's actions, who has once again demonstrated his range of power by decorating his first deputy Kornienko²⁴ as a Hero of Socialist Labor!!

And, in essence, it is absurd to leave the talks before they are started, when the whole world sees in them the only hope. The most important objective right now is to gain "victory" in the propaganda war; even though it does not alter anything in real politics = in the arms race, which is catastrophic for all, and for us before anybody else.

I am reading the *Public Reading about Peter the Great* by S. Soloviev. He was a historical thinker on great scale. And the reading is instructive too!

February 19th, 1985.

I went to the Gorky museum at the Shekhtel mansion on Kalachov Street. I had never been there, and imagined the interior from pictures. All together—Gorky plus Shekhtel plus the spirit of the epoch, and the fact that the museum was only opened in 1961 after the XX-XXII Congress of the CPSU—it is impressive. Having said that, how would Gorky's library look, with shelves on all the walls, 10,000 books—a good third of which belong in the special department for storage of confidential materials [*spetskhran*]! I walked around the rooms: the hall with the staircase that has appeared in all the architecture textbooks of the world; the dining room with a grand piano and a fireplace; the library with a round table and leather arm chairs of the old days; the study with Chinese things; the bedroom with furniture that Gorky did not like, but said not to bother about (i.e. not to change it). It is rich, in Rococo style.

²⁴ Georgy Markovich Kornienko—First Deputy Foreign Minister, head of the U.S. desk of the USSR Foreign Ministry

For all that, as I was walking around I could not get rid of the feeling that the first proletarian writer regarded himself quite highly; and, as in Sorrento, he was not ashamed to get from the poverty-ridden proletarian government a place fit for a billionaire! It is here that the articles were written: numerous, enough for five or six volumes, about proletarian art, the new culture, the decay of the West, etc. There is something ineradicably eternal in Mayakovsky's reproaches, Mayakovsky, who was only recognized as proletarian after his death, and not at the first congress of the Writers' Union.

I am going through different books, "for want of anything better to do:" Fitzgerald's *Letters, Notes, Journals*; Eidelmann—about Pushkin as a historian; Soloviev; Saltykov-Shchedrin *Loyal Speeches* (absolutely anti-Soviet stuff!); *Marxism 1929-1956*—a collection of different Marxologists; Voznesensky. Prose. Vinokurov's *She* (powerful verses, far from orthodoxy); a collection of modern English writers ("everyday life" as we would say. But maybe this is the final fate of any literature once everyone is well fed, and when the "world problems"—love, hunger, poverty, oppression, etc.—will be solved on a world-scale through computers, the Scientific and Technological Revolution, and the sex revolution).

Reading Fitzgerald, I once again catch myself thinking that I enjoy reading about writers, rather than their work, more and more: there are more ideas.

February 20th, 1985.

Yesterday I listened to Gromyko's speech before the electorate (RSFSR). Today I read his piece on Chernenko in *Pravda*. All the others seem to have guidelines on what to say about him (the General Secretary); I even suspect that an appropriate paragraph about him was approved by the Politburo. This one [Gromyko] however, was original in his word about the "inner and outward greatness of our General Secretary." What is this?

Is Gromyko using Chernenko's helplessness, narrow-mindedness, vanity, in order to secure a monopoly on foreign policy for himself? Perhaps this is even a test for the inheritance? Most likely that is the case. Arbatov, and others as well, are not ruling out that Gromyko is seriously coveting the first place. Can it really be that such a thing is possible here? And the others, the candidates who may possibly be true and earnest, will once again be waiting for their turn at advancement?

Yesterday I was going through my wartime notebooks. Many pages have simply worn away, to such an extent that it is only possible to decipher a few disconnected words. Those that for some reason remain legible are disgusting to read: I was too given to soul-searching; instead I should have simply noted down facts, episodes, last names, names of villages, etc.

The political views [I recorded] are relatively orthodox; was I afraid the notebooks might fall into strange hands? However, there are some comments that would have been a great risk in Stalinist times. After all, it was not without reason that I carried the notepads in my pockets, rather than the field bag.

Someday all this should probably be sorted out. Most likely no memoirs will come from them; but a narrative about me may be possible.

Many things change. However, the protective essence of politics is free only from the extreme, repressive forms. The essence remains.

I read *The Second Meeting*, Lakshin's book. He writes about Tvardovsky, regards him as a great, a classic. And truly, even Shauro & Co. will not object against this, as well as against the fact that this idea has become firmly established in people's consciousness. Yet, for his 60th anniversary Tvardovsky was decorated only with the Order of the Red Banner. And he was buried almost like Pushkin—just about secretly, so as not to stir too much emotion. But the mediocre writer and bootlicker Markov was given the [decoration of the] Hero twice, without much thought for the moral consequences, i.e. as to how the public will see it. And he is either keeping silent, or insolently laughing in his sleeve.

Lakshin has an essay on Mark Sheglov, who appeared in our literary criticism arena at the time of Ehrenburg's *Thaw*, before the XX Congress. This made me remember the following: there was some kind of a Party meeting, or maybe a conference on production in the Department of Science in the CC. It was then headed by Rumyantsev, the future chief of the journal *Problems of Peace and Socialism*. His deputy was Tarasov, a huge, obtuse kind of man, with a pretty, dumb face. He spoke with a gurgling noise, as if something liquid was splashing in his mouth. His report was about culture. All I remember is a feeling of aversion at being in the company of these stranglers of the thaw: how he was reviling Mark Sheglov, with the then fresh, cosmopolitan, *Okhotnyi Ryad* fury!

I read the new chapters of Fazil Iskander's *Sandro of Chegem*, published by *tamizdat*.²⁵ There is an unpleasant sensation, one I did not get from the earlier chapters of Uncle Sandro: I think it comes from the apprehensive anti-Soviet sneer, published in a foreign country.

February 22nd, 1985.

I just read Natta's interview with *La Stampa*. He spoke openly and thoroughly—about the ICM, the “real socialism,” etc. In connection with this, I am thinking about the coming XXV Congress' Program. The section on the Communist Movement... It was

²⁵ Term for Soviet writers' publications in the West; literally means “published over there”

written by Zagladin, twice approved by the [Central Committee] Secretaries, already much corrected at Volynskoe –2. But the essence remains. It is still as before, even the same as it was before the XX Congress. Only the wording changes, and even that not in everything: for example, we insist on the term “proletarian internationalism,” even though at the Berlin conference in 1976 we agreed to substitute it with “internationalist solidarity” (and for a while we used this term in print). The most important is in something else. Natta appeals to the reality, and in this sense rejects the interviewer’s “provocation:” who are you, the ICM, following nowadays—Lenin?—or are you returning to Kautsky?

Since the times of Andropov and under Chernenko, we are also for realism. However, we do not want to recognize that the Communist Movement, in our textbook definition of it, does not and will not exist. And everything else stems from this, namely: the soft, restrained language when it comes to the Communist Movement and to the problems with collaboration and solidarity—hoping that it will be possible to cajole and avoid provoking any severances, to achieve some kind of silent *modus vivendi* [sic] with everyone: with the PCI, and the Chinese; a sort of “communist ecumenism,” as the interviewer from *La Stampa* said, using an expression familiar to a Catholic.

And for what? Obviously, it is to maintain the semblance of the myth’s (the ICM’s) existence—and we, the CPSU, are, so to say, leading it! It is necessary for the worldwide ideological power. But, preserving the myth, we are supporting the existence—pathetic, sickly, impotent existence—of the multimillion fraternal parties, who are behind our back and who will continue to vegetate under the cover of the ICM’s international authority (and intimidation).

And had we “disbanded” the ICM, they would have to start acting. Of course, many would be finished. But others, the ones that still had some glimmer of energy, and where the conditions (of class struggle) were favorable, would be revived. Perhaps!.. And there would be a gain from the point of view of “world revolution.” However, we are thinking in terms of a worldwide ideological power, not in terms of a worldwide revolutionary movement.

Who is “we,” though? Who am I sinning against? I am certain that the same Gorbachev, Solomentsev, Vorotnikov, and Chernenko himself would reject such an approach if we, the International Department of the CC, had proposed and substantiated it. Certain? No, I am not certain. It is the other way around. First Andropov, then Gorbachev had demanded a **frank**, unembellished analysis of the ICM: “without the halleluiah-ness,” as Gorbachev had said. Ponomarev botched this assignment before, and he did it again this time. Again he got a prettified note out of me, which barely shows a trace of reality. He would pigeonhole even such a note. But he could not, the General Department insisted on the note being there—the bureaucratic control demanded a “closing” of the question. However... Gorbachev did not want to bring **such** a note up for discussion. He understood that no sense is to be had out of Ponomarev, as he suspected when he shared his impressions with Chernenko’s assistant Vol’sky in the summer.

And so we return to the familiar circle... Ponomarev regards the ICM as a secretary of an obkom regards his region. Comintern-ness is in his blood, as well as fear that he might be made to answer for his engagements in intentional deception, and upward distortions of results. A pretext for this might be the situation with Finland's Communist Party, which was driven to total breakdown exactly by Ponomarev, with the help of Shaposhnikov and reviews by Smirnov and Fedorov ("brigand brothers" as they are called now even by the rather dull orthodox head of their sector Razdorozhny). Ponomarev embittered SKP's leaders to such a degree, that they are indeed turning into an anti-Soviet crowd.

But let us get off the circle. This is how the matters stand: with intermissions, but for several months altogether, Zagladin sat at the theoretical dachas and composed corresponding sections for the new CPSU Program. Yes, Ponomarev was always looming over him. But already at the first discussion of the Program's draft at the PB Ponomarev was strongly rebuked, his place was made clear to him, his pretension to supervise the Program's preparation was invalidated. Why not use this? Especially since precisely at that time Zagladin had a frank talk with Gorbachev. Here he could have enlisted his support, come to an agreement on a new, brave approach to the ICM, one for which Gorbachev was ready and open. But Zagladin did not want to take a risk. After all, Ponomarev is still a CC Secretary, and could appeal against such liberties to the "shortsighted orthodoxy" of the Politburo's majority.

As a result, we, the International Department, are not doing anything meaningful, idling, and it serves us right that we are disliked at the MFA more and more, and that we are ordered around with our Ponomarev.

I read Tikhonov's²⁶ speech before the electorate in the newspaper. I noticed (this caught my attention at the USSR Supreme Soviet elections a year ago), that our leaders' speeches have begun (after Brezhnev) to differ from each other increasingly. Not in essence of course, but just as it's supposed to be in a normal, Leninist party: where everyone talks about one's own [subjects] in his own way, but still in the frame of the common course. It goes without saying, that they do not write their speeches themselves; but among their assistants and other persons "involved," there are, as a rule, sensible, and sometimes intelligent, people. And, ultimately, the product is accepted by the orator, who will not deliver the speech if he does not agree with the content.

Elections to the RSFSR [Supreme Soviet].

I looked through Akhromeev's²⁷ (the head of the Joint Staff) article in the *Communist*, written on the occasion of the Soviet Army Day. He remarks on Stalin's

²⁶ Nikolai Alexandrovich Tikhonov—Member of the CC CPSU Politburo, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers

²⁷ Sergei Fedorovich Akhromeev—the Chief of the USSR General Staff, later Gorbachev's personal adviser

personal contributions to the war and to the victory. He puts Zhukov on the same level with Timoshenko, as the representative of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief General Headquarters. Everything about the real cause of the 1941 defeats is muffled and obscure, as is the custom nowadays.

I remembered an episode that took place very recently. At the CC Secretariat, Ponomarev was charged with heading a committee on arranging public propaganda in relation to the 40th Victory-Day anniversary. He called together (about two weeks ago) some department heads, deputies, and others; Zagladin, Shaposhnikov, and I were there as well. Near the end of the meeting, Zamyatin again said out of place: "I saw... and some others present here did too, a documentary film *Victory*, about Potsdam, which was approved [for the anniversary]. Everything is accurate in the film, but in the end, the director's text struck me as offensive: Stalin was, he says, capricious, intolerant, and something else. Unfitting. Why is it necessary? It spoils the impression."

Kiselev, deputy head of the Socialist Countries Department and a well-known mastodon of Stalinism, echoed the sentiments. Stukalin (in charge of propaganda), wanted to keep quiet, but Zagladin, who was sitting opposite him, appealed to him and Stukalin ended up halfheartedly agreeing as well.

But Ponomarev reacted as follows: "I tell you! Capricious. You are jarred by it, offended. It does not jar you that before the war he ruined the bloom of the armed forces, and company commanders had to lead armies?! What did this cost the people? How many people perished because of this (only this one aspect)!?"

The discussion ended with that.

... However, the review of the movie was preliminary, at the department level. They, of course, gave notices to the right people. Zamyatin decided to appeal to a CC Secretary for support, in case the question would be decided "at the top." He did not get any understanding from Ponomarev, how about others?..

February 23rd, 1985.

I read Chernenko's speech in a newspaper. The speech is very good; it was not for nothing that the best specialists in the field worked on it for two months. And involuntarily you begin to feel defiant: why do we need our leaders at all? Perhaps it really would be better if they played the parts of representative puppets, and the work was handed over to professionals? But it would have to somehow be in the open, without the stupidity, hypocrisy, and Pharisaism that makes everyone sick.

Yesterday, for example, there was a meeting of the electorate, but the Deputy candidate (i.e. General Secretary) was absent. Grishin²⁸ conducted the meeting. His speech is unctuous, servile. Then we observe the audience, where every other face, if not more, is familiar: the staff, the ministers, etc. Grishin gives a testimonial to the candidate, concluding with words about “personal modesty...” etc. No, the “love of authorities” (from Saltykov-Shchedrin) is ineradicable in Russia. Not the German-style love of authorities, but Russian-style, when in reality no one loves it, except for the literal idiots. Instead, a barely concealed social and political hypocrisy is thriving; the evil of which is in that it creates a huge gap between social consciousness and power, stripping it of any moral authority.

I re-watched (how many times already!) a documentary about the Leningrad blockade, from the 20-episode project *The Unknown War*. And once again (alongside with an emotional response) I had mixed feelings. After all, under Stalin, we ourselves had worked to forget and even trample the memory of the war. Stalin knew what he was doing, he played on the people’s natural impulse to turn away, “drift into forgetfulness,” to leave the wounds in peace. I remember how I myself rushed to take off the military uniform. I convinced my mother to make a silly jacket from a good soldier’s shirt. Of course, Stalin had another of his crafty plans in mind. But it was probably also a sign of the country’s healthy state of mind: it did not want to grieve over the fallen for too long, because one “must continue living.”

But now, many times already—under Brezhnev and after, we are galvanizing the memory of war. And this is most likely evidence of the decrepit state of the government, which must (consciously or not) exploit the memories of “greatness” in order to maintain the nation’s ideological and moral potential.

February 26th, 1985.

Schultz appeared in San Francisco, with another audaciously anti-Soviet speech. How B.N. panicked yesterday morning! “It is inconceivable, a new total crusade, a threat to all revolutions and all nations, we must do something immediately, they are completely impudent,” etc. in that vein.

Lisovolik, my American sector deputy, reported that there is already an order to rebuke [the speech] in *Literary Gazette* and in *Pravda*.

In Politburo today there was a distribution of the *Pravda* article: an abusive reprove with insulting epithets addressed at the US Secretary of State, with whom we are going to have to work at the talks regarding—no more, no less—whether humanity is to be or not to be (the talks are starting on March 12th).

²⁸ Victor Vasilievich Grishin—Member of the CC CPSU Politburo, head of the Moscow Party Committee

Menshikov, our chief consultant on the USA, has stated that we cannot act in this manner; it amounts to a declaration of war. Lisovolik, on the other hand, is calling Menshikov's position capitulation; and suggested we remove only the most offensive, personal attacks, without changing the "conception" of the article = a rebuke. He maintains this is the only manner in which one can speak to them. I took the middle ground. I corrected the page-proofs and sent them to Ponomarev, who, by the way, on the one hand raised a panic in the morning, but on the other hand criticized me for leaving "rudely critical passages" in Shcherbitsky's speech drafts (in a day or two, Shcherbitsky is going to the USA as the head of the parliamentary delegation).

As soon as I sent off the text, Aleksandrov—"the Sparrow"—calls me. "Have you read it?"—Yes, I have. And off he went—along the same lines as Menshikov. Railed against Afanasiev (the chief editor of *Pravda*): who does not understand elementary things and composed a text as if we were on the verge of war and not talks with the USA, silly insults... What if something like this was written about Gromyko? I kept to myself, even though I should have answered him, that *Time* [sic] prints memoirs of the deserter Shevchenko, whose career had been nurtured by Gromyko and who was his protégé, and who now writes such things about our Minister that any of our insults of Schultz seem like light irony. He writes about Gromyko's extortions and bribes during visits to America (actually Yakovlev, when he was Ambassador to Canada, also told me about this). [Shevchenko also writes] about Gromyko's wife, who, when coming to the States, went to all the jewelry stores, markets, etc., buying up gold and jewelry at the expense of the government treasury, and gifts from the Embassy workers and trade representatives; about Gromyko's ignorance and his other qualities... But this is a propos [sic]. In a word, Aleksandrov—former assistant to Brezhnev, former assistant to Andropov, current assistant to the already non-existent Chernenko—was horrified by such an article and sought my support.

I replied that I tried to convince Ponomarev that Schultz's speech is just another anti-Soviet trick, and not any kind of "philosophy;" that it had quite a pragmatic purpose: to intimidate Nicaragua and to justify before the "Western democratic" allies Grenada--like policy towards this country; that we should not raise such a clamor over every one of such tricks; that our overly sensitive reaction will only please Schultz and the Americans, convincing them that this is the way to deal with us, since we react so nervously. I said that the best course of action for now is to shrug it off through some topical satire, through a contemptuous, deprecating retort: i.e. to conduct ourselves respectably, and not show that they made us lose our temper. These arguments had no effect on B.N. He declared: "I do not agree with you." Aleksandrov did not agree either, finally saying that he is counting on me to "make my contribution and make sure the article does not appear in such a form."

I asked for the text to be returned, went through it once again and eased up some offensive and panicky strains. I wonder, what will B.N. say tomorrow? And in what form will the article finally appear?

Ponomarev's pretensions regarding the "theoretical conference" on the Victory, with the participation of foreign guests and with his report. What an illusionist! And what a steadfast sense of self-importance!

This Sunday, there is a worldwide sensation: Chernenko's voting on TV. Turns out, his hospital ward was "transformed" into an election center. A man half-dead. A mummy. I know from experience what suffering asthma can bring, making a person totally unable to function. This was when I was thirty-forty years old! And he is seventy-five! Meanwhile, he "appears" every day with addresses, replies, forewords, and memoranda!

The televised performance, of course, was staged with his consent. It had a reverse effect on people though. One thought was on everybody's lips (or in their heads): what the thirst for power must be like, if people sacrifice their self-esteem (if anyone has any left), their formal authority, and even their last remnants of vitality for it.

March 2nd, 1985.

I do not know how this happened, Ponomarev probably insisted on it, but I was included into the group preparing the CC summary report for the XXV Congress. On Monday, Ligachev (he will head this group, and Zimyanin will head the group writing the political report, Zagladin is in that group) will assemble us and define how we are to live until August 15th—the deadline for the text.

Continuation about Schultz. The *Pravda* article actually was "calmed down" significantly; all my propositions were taken into account. But B.N. did assemble the deputies, and proceeded to scare them. He did not like my doubts or my skepticism. He assigned [deputies] to prepare a letter to fraternal parties and social democrats with "arguments" and appeals.

Yakovlev was present (the director of IMEMO [Institute of World Economy and International Relations], former Ambassador to Canada, and former deputy of the CC Propaganda Department). He was shown much consideration in the past year: [he was made] Deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet, a corresponding member of USSR Academy of Sciences, member of the Program committee, etc. But, he is still maliciously-critically predisposed. He spoke briefly about the Program: we are not ready to compose a real Program. We will not act in accordance with it, and even if we include good propositions it will once again become a propagandist brochure for teaching to students. Again, no one will propose before each Plenum that we check the Program and ask ourselves: what about this line? Are we fulfilling its objectives?

[He] criticized the story with the "anti-Soviet group" at the university, which was unmasked and put in jail under Inozemtsev, the preceding director of the Institute [IMEMO]. Besides the fact that Andropov amnestied them, all the people involved have

been restored to the Party, all were given jobs. And, most importantly, according to his information, the whole affair was staged through a ploy with a stool pigeon, which was pointed at by some University employees—greenhorn intellectuals.

Moscow is full of anecdotes and laughter, and the Western press of terrible caricatures and articles, about Chernenko's illness... And, of course, they are "discussing" who will inherit, who has what chances: Gorbachev, Grishin, Gromyko, Romanov... Some are even discussing the possibility (as they are saying, you can expect anything from the Russians) that Chernenko is dead. And that is exactly why the Kasparov-Karpov [chess] match was stopped—to clear the Hall of Columns for the installation of the body.

Gromyko is quoted a great deal, and **Zamyatin** as well—praising the merits, contributions, and outstanding qualities of the General Secretary, which, *Expres* [sic] adds, will be forgotten before the candles by the casket burn out. Obviously, it is because of these rumors that the decision to show Chernenko was made. He has been on television twice—while voting at the so-called election center, and when he was presented with a Deputy of the RSFSR certificate; on the latter occasion he even tried to speak. It was a terrible show: people in Moscow regard these actions as a premeditated ideological diversion.

B.N. assembled all the deputies and staff of the Politburo on the occasion of another CC resolution on the campaign against alcoholism. He cited some numbers: four million are in compulsory treatment for alcoholism, hundreds of thousands of young people are in colonies and camps for crimes committed under the influence. Twenty-five percent of alcoholics are women.

As to the situation in our department, he spoke mostly about time, even though one of the direct causes for the Party bureau's assembly was the fact that the other day Zhilin stumbled into B.N.'s office completely drunk... Straight off, one could name ten to twelve people who habitually walk down the corridors drunk. And Shaposhnikov is among them; he, however, simply does not come to work after a drinking binge—a day, two, half a day, using his deputy standing... and the drinking binges take place no less frequently than two to three times a week.

March 8th, 1985.

On Monday Ligachev called together the group preparing the CC summary report for the XXVII Congress. He divided it into four subgroups: Razumov—the Party, Medvedev—ideology, Vol'sky—economic and social politics, Sharapov—international questions. I dared to ask, who would instruct Gromyko to give us materials on foreign policy. Ligachev was irritated: at first he promised to call Gromyko about it, but then changed his mind: get it yourself. I again reminded them that unlike the other departments represented in the first three subgroups, we, international affairs specialists, have a relationship with the Ministries that is essentially different: the MFA is not subject

to the authority of the CC International Department. This caused even greater irritation, though it also surprised those present: for many, such a situation was unexpected.

Later I spoke to Ponomarev about the same issue: we can, of course, in our subgroup write a report on the CPSU foreign policy during the interval between the Congresses, but this would be material for the MFA's mockery, and an excuse to discredit the International Department in the eyes of the same CC Secretaries even further: that our preparation of the materials is unqualified.

B.N. replied by saying that he would call Ligachev. And so it still remains unclear, who will assign the MFA to write a piece about foreign policy between the XXVI and the XXVII Congresses. One involuntarily remembers Suslov: he used to pick up the phone and say: "Comrade Gromyko, prepare such-and-such a material by such-and-such a date," and, without waiting for a reply, would replace the receiver! Today, no one at the CC can do anything of the sort: Chernenko gave complete control over foreign policy to Gromyko. And Gorbachev does not yet wield Suslov-like "power," he cannot make up his mind to do it...

Thus, on March 15th, we, the group preparing the report, as well as the group preparing the political report, will sit down at Volynskoe and begin... the deadline—August 15th.

On Tuesday, I was at the Secretariat, [and] once again observed with what defiance people regard Ponomarev. Other [participants] argue among themselves, get excited, disagree, raise objections, defend their positions several times over—Zimyanin especially is loud and people often disagree with him. But they are all friendly among themselves, this is discussion and arguments among comrades, they can put you in your place, but no one is offended.

But as soon as our B.N. opens his mouth, as if on cue, everyone is immediately on guard, with ironical smiles on their faces: what else will the old man utter?! And even when he talks sense, they reject his ideas lazily, without argument, and sometimes act as if he did not propose anything at all. He turns white, then red, in the face, stays silent, takes offense, but in a minute—it's like water off a duck's back: supreme training! And he tries again to get into the discussion and the same pattern repeats.

There was discussion of the CPSU Charter corrections. In the paragraph discussing the duties of each communist, B.N. proposed to remove the note that each [communist] must struggle for "the consolidation of the international communist and labor movements' unity." Not the entire phrase, but only the "labor" part. "Communist" is all right, but labor? Firstly, there is no unity, there is nothing to consolidate. Secondly, consolidated with whom? With the Christian trade unions, with the ones who vote for conservatives, with the American AFL—the inveterate anti-Soviets?..

Gorbachev replies: "But until now this was in the Charter and did not raise any questions from anyone?.." And moved on!

Incidentally, I am watching Gorbachev. At first I thought he was being careful, did not show himself too much, but was nevertheless working his “novelty,” under the cover of the old. Now it seems to me, that he has already become accustomed to the bureaucratic mechanism of leadership, and slips more and more often into the “automatism” that has been fine-tuned through the decades.

And what about Ponomarev?.. Had the authors of journals like *Problems of Communism* or other such articles, known about the CC International Department, and about our leadership mechanism in general; had known that the one whom they portray as “the Gray Cardinal,” as an omnipotent hand, which determines the work of the KGB, of the MFA, and of all the rest of the CPSU foreign policy activities—was only a minor official, who stayed “near the top” only by chance, that up there he was an old man held in contempt by everyone, whose opinion no one took into consideration, who made a fuss before us at the department about the necessity for new initiatives, etc., but was afraid to show himself at the Secretariat, not to mention the Politburo—for he might be snubbed again!

So we wrote the letter to the fraternal parties, to the Labor Movement and to the Social Democratic parties about Schultz’s speech in San Francisco. Turned out very expressive! Presented it to him. And he, who urged us on with this, placed it at the bottom of the pile of his numerous official papers! And certainly, as I said at the deputies’ meeting, everyone has long forgotten about this speech.

March 10th, 1985.

I am still reading *Loyal Speeches* by Shchedrin. I choke with laughter, and cannot stop marveling at the lasting power of the word under the pen of a genius.

March 11th, 1985.

Somber music at seven a.m. instead of the program *Opyat’ Dvadtsat’ Pyat’* put me on guard... And indeed, Chopin, once again, as more than once before, was the first informant of the Soviet people and of foreign countries of the fact that the USSR is facing a “change of epoch.” Chernenko died last night. Everyone saw it coming, sneered and sniggered at it, told anecdotes about how our leadership and propaganda, by demonstrating the complete vitality of the General Secretary on the screen, at elections and numerous statements, talks and interviews, made us the “land of fools.”

Zagladin, Aleksandrov, Lukyanov, and Medvedev were pulled out of their beds at night and summoned to the Kremlin, Gorbachev instructed them to prepare a draft of the speech for “the person, who will be elected General Secretary” by next morning. (I must

say that the work they came up with was not quite outstanding. But that is beside the point.)

Ponomarev assembled the deputies at 9:45 a.m. and was very surprised that everyone already knew.

At 14:00 it was announced on the radio.

The Plenum took place at five o'clock. Everyone stood up to honor [Chernenko]; Gorbachev said (without excess) the appropriate words. But there was not a drop of sadness or distress in the air, as if to say, you suffered, poor bloke, for accidentally landing in a position inappropriate for you... and made a pause in the acceleration that Andropov had almost given the country. A suppressed "satisfaction," if not joy, then reigned in the atmosphere—as if to say, the uncertainty has come to an end, and the time has come for Russia to have a real leader.

Gorbachev read the agenda: the election of General Secretary; and reported that the Politburo has entrusted comrade Gromyko with presenting the proposal regarding this question. Not Tikhonov, who shriveled and turned red in the face when this was announced, not Romanov, or Grishin, who, by the way, was assessed by the Western press as a candidate at the same level as Gorbachev and Gromyko.

The latter came to the podium and started to speak without notes, freestyle. When he named Gorbachev the hall exploded in an ovation, comparable to the one at Andropov's election (and nothing like the sour applause at Chernenko's). The ovation went in waves and did not abate for a long time.

Gromyko spoke in a way not customary at such occasions: he gave a testimonial (in a relaxed manner, not hackneyed) to the qualities of the "Politburo comrade" that were deemed necessary and sufficient to unanimously ("I emphasize this," he repeated) elect him.

I would like, he said, to convey to you, the Central Committee, the atmosphere in which we consider the candidacy of Mikhail Sergeevich. There were no doubts, complete unanimity. Why? [Because] he has a vast experience of party work, at the obkom level and here at the headquarters. He has really shown his worth. He has a profound and sharp mind, an ability to separate the essential from the minor. An analytical mind. He breaks down every question so as to see all its constituent parts. But he does not allow these parts to collect dust. He can generalize and draw conclusions. His adherence to principles makes him distinct. He is a man of principle and conviction. He can defend his point of view, even if somebody may not like it. And he states this point of view clearly, without beating about the bush. But [his views are] always in the name of the party policy, and for the realization of that policy. This is what is called the party approach—all evaluations made from the point of view of the party.

He is straightforward with people, and, if you are a true communist, you come away from him satisfied, even though he might have said something that was not to your liking. He knows how to find a common language with different people—for the sake of the cause. I will tell you, Gromyko continued, about my own area. Mikhail Sergeevich, as soon as he entered the Politburo, immediately drew attention to himself through his ability to see to the heart of the matter in that, which, seemingly, was not his area of expertise at all, with which he was unfamiliar (i.e. international relations). His evaluations indicated that he was not one of those who see in only two dimensions: black and white. He has shown that he can find the intermediate colors in order to reach the goal.

And one more thing. In the West, they are dreaming of finding cracks in our leadership, of setting members of our government at loggerheads... they are whispering, gossiping, slandering. But we will not give them the pleasure of seeing something like this. The election of Gorbachev is proof of the indestructible unanimity in our government.

Defense and vigilance are very important objectives for him. In today's state of affairs they are the holiest of the holy.

And one more thing. His erudition, drawn from his education and experience, is also very important. It will be very useful to him as a General Secretary. In a word, we have before us a statesman worthy of taking this post at such a crucial moment for this country.

Then there were more ovations.

Then the presiding Romanov gave the floor to Gorbachev. (His speech will be in the papers tomorrow). Then Gorbachev closed the Plenum, and invited all the people present, including the first secretaries of obkoms, who were at the Plenum but who were not yet (!) part of the CC, to the Hall of Columns to pay the last respects to Chernenko.

It remained mystery to me (and I think to many people)—why Gromyko? He seemed to have gradually laid down the program for the new General Secretary. But that is nothing. Most importantly, he was presented to the party as the **initiator** of Gorbachev's advancement. What did they want to say by this? Or—what did Gromyko want to get out of it, by organizing it so that he, and not the Prime Minister, and not one of the “party” (as opposed to the State) members of the Politburo, took this part? To strengthen his standing? To keep the monopoly on foreign policy that he secured under Chernenko? To test the waters for an “advancement”—for the post of Prime Minister or Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium? Or just to be an “elder colleague,” to patronize the young General Secretary... Maybe just for the sake of vanity?

Probably it is a combination of these incentives. But something must be the main factor.

However, I do not think that he will be able to live at Gorbachev's expense. He got the wrong guy for that!

According to much information, the people are happy that it was precisely Gorbachev. Even before Chernenko's death, people on the metro, in trolleybuses, in cafeterias, were not shy about clearly expressing such a "wish." People are tired of the social stagnation, of the demonstration of official stupidity, when a leader is turned into an honored puppet, through which, however, some people wield great influence on the course of events.

But... much is expected of Gorbachev, just as was once expected of Andropov. Will he have the courage to justify the expectations? He has great resources. The new personnel of the party apparatus and the real intelligentsia will support him. The Congress is just around the corner, which he can make the turning point in the country's history.

In a word, again, as at the beginning of the Andropov era, which in a report at a party meeting I called "the November [era]," I am "full of hope and anticipation."

The first tests will be:

- 1) the reshuffling of immediate personnel—assistants, the thief Bogolyubov – deputy of the General Department, some other people;
- 2) whether he will allow praising of his person... Gromyko has already pronounced the sacramental "outstanding statesman of the party?"
- 3) will he delay (as it happened with Andropov) with the major, socially-formative scale, reforms, or will he already at the April Plenum make himself known as a true innovator in the improvement of society?

March 13th, 1985.

When I was going home for lunch, half an hour after the ceremony on the Red Square, the flags of mourning were already being taken off the buildings on Lubyanka, off the Hall of the Union, etc. In the crowd of the CC members on the Red Square (the coffin had just been carried by), Gostev, who was standing nearby, said to me loudly: "He was at this post by some accident. But, you see, it was necessary for someone like him to have the post for a while... he seemed to be neutral. [We needed it] in order to look around. Even though everyone understood that he would not last long." Nobody turned around, even though many had clearly heard him. I assented.

In the crowd of members and candidate members to the CC, as they were gathered by the exit from the Hall of Columns half an hour before the coffin was to be carried out, the atmosphere was like in a market place: people laughing loudly, discussing

different issues, exchanging all kinds of “unrelated” remarks over each other’s heads, mockingly greeting each other, discussing whether it would be cold: since there is still an hour and a half to be spent outside. In a word, the “nationwide sorrow” has in no way touched the staff of the Central Committee.

Only foreigners took off their hats during the “peak moments” of the ceremony. And on the background of the relatively reserved eulogies—the tone set by Gorbachev at the Plenum and again in his speech from the Mausoleum—Fedoseev’s speech sounded silly and out of place, as he contended that Marxism-Leninism had lost a prominent theoretician, whose merits in this area were recognized by the Academy of Sciences with the Karl Marx Order, etc. He was the only one from the people close to Chernenko who did not “get his bearings.” Meanwhile, for some reason, it was precisely him, who was moved to the funeral committee and given the podium at the Mausoleum.

In a word, we have entered a new era. What will happen? And we need a “revolution from the top.” Nothing less. It will not work otherwise. Does Mikhail Sergeevich understand this?

March 14th, 1985.

Gorbachev had a marathon of meetings today—from Bush to Natta, there must be at least twenty, if not more. The Western press is brimming with praise and hopes: for the first time they will be working with a leader who has in no way been connected to either Stalinism or Brezhnevism!

Sukhodrev (interpreter for the General Secretaries, starting with Nikita) told me about the meeting with Thatcher. She, being acquainted with Gorbachev from 1984 (London, Chequers), fawned, charmed, engaged [him], and he answered with the same. It seems that this is how she “does politics,” and with the help of M.S. she wants to surpass all kinds of Kohls and Mitterands in world affairs, and maybe even the Reagans. And she likes to play in the feminine way precisely with Gorbachev.

Ponomarev was invited only to [the meeting with] Natta; the Arabs and other Africans (B.N.’s home turf) made do with Gromyko.

I was at B.N.’s talks with McLennan (General Secretary of Great Britain’s CP). B.N. agreed to berate him for Johnston’s article in *Marxism to day* [sic]. As a result, Gordon wanted to continue the talk with me. I stopped by his hotel in the evening. Conducted an edifying conversation about this “anti-Soviet” article: said that, since we are fraternal parties, we must observe some code of propriety. We are not against criticism, but not one-sided: what if we had written in the *Communist* something similar about your party, what would you say?! There was nothing he could say to that. And in general, he is no expert at debate, plus he has not completely parted (like the Italians have done) with the “principles of the ICM” in the traditional interpretation.

Out of all the communist parties, Gorbachev met only with the Italians. And even though B.N. did not object, he grumbled to us: saying, how is that—so many good (!) leaders have come, and we meet only with the Italians, the bad ones!

When I was coming from McLennan, I was called over to meet Natta: my friend Ruby had noticed me. We sat together for around fifteen minutes, talked. I was not acquainted with Natta, but apparently Ruby had described me as one of the few at the CC who think of the PCI “with understanding.”

March 16th, 1985.

From early in the morning yesterday I continued to “discipline” McLennan, trying to get a clear response from him, as to how he understands fraternal relations—does he recognize at all, unlike the PCI, the specific character of the relationship between parties? He got confused, said that he thought about that all the time himself, and that I had now arranged all these problems in a systematic way. But I continued to press on him: how can fraternal relations be combined with an ideological war, which you are virtually waging against us (the CPSU)?

I am sure that this is all in vain: he is too weak a leader to make internationalist sentiments prevail at the CPGB; even though the basic sense of justice is on our side: the CPSU has, in fact, recognized most of its major flaws and omissions, and has undertaken their correction, begun work towards the “improvement of socialism’s image.” The new leader has clearly stated that he came from the Andropov camp and that he would continue the work with greater energy, and maybe even with the help of truly radical changes and reforms. And you, the Eurocommunists and others like them, continue to say that this is an impossible task unless we introduce a second party and altogether accept the British system of parliamentary democracy, i.e. you “criticize constructively” on the basis of dissidents’ gossip and the work of Sovietologists, without a real understanding of the reality.

In this connection, I contrasted the Italian Giuseppe Boffa’s book on the history of the USSR to the writings in *Marxizm to day* [sic]. There are many points, on which we disagree with his evaluations and conceptions, with his explanation of our history, but nevertheless we have carefully studied the book. Not only because it was written from a favorable perspective (in the selection of words and formulations), but also because it was done in earnest: the man worked in Moscow for ten years, knows the Russian language, knows the Soviet people, studied our history from our sources, etc. That it why there is much of instructive and truly constructive material in it.

With that I saw the General Secretary of Great Britain’s CP off; he has an extraordinary congress in mid May, where the minority of so-called “pro-Soviets” will be dealt the final blow.

I met with the Irishman O’Riordan. Here everything is simpler. Even though I am tired of the sectarian caprices (in relation to the Labor Party).

I am reading the renowned Mikhail Lifshits’ (now deceased) “The moral significance of the October Revolution” in the *Communist*. A brilliant essay. But only now there is the courage to publish it (from a personal archive). There is real “realism” there... and let us continue this way in everything. But, but, but... Are the “cadres” ready to perceive the Lenin-Shchedrin self-criticism as an instrument for a real renovation of our minds and public relations?

March 17th, 1985.

Everywhere people are happy and pleased that it is Gorbachev. The chauffeur, who drove me yesterday, told me with great enthusiasm how his fellows, the chauffeurs, are happy that we finally have a real leader. To lead our country, he tells me, one needs to be healthy as a horse, and that one (that is, Chernenko)—you could tell right away that he was a sickly one. In his place, I would have said: “Fellows! Spare me, I will not pull it through!”

If only Gorbachev would not succumb to the trumpery of “foreign policy activity.” Nikita started the tradition, Brezhnev pushed it to the level of parody, and Chernenko surpassed even that. Especially since these daily statements, interviews, addresses and answers do not achieve any real purpose, and do not carry any weight in politics. Let someone like Gromyko, or maybe the Minister of Defense Sokolov, appear with such statements...

There is a danger here... One seems to be in full view, it seems like it is for the sake of the most important, for the people. But the most important thing right now is to think—how to reform the country, and **where** to lead it.

Whom will M.S. appoint to head the Secretariat as his replacement? Grishin, Romanov? Or will he lead it himself until the Plenum, and then make Dolgikh and Ligachev members of the Politburo?

Much will depend on this. And not even on the action itself, but on the impression from that action—whether he will justify the universal happy expectations, or slip onto the beaten path and start spinning the well-adjusted bureaucratic machine. And the question of “comrades-in-arms,” of course: [if] Grishin and Romanov will be “representing” him, his image and the “capabilities” (the level) of the new leadership will be interpreted through them.

It is evening. In a week, history has erased Chernenko from its pages. Last Sunday at this hour he was still alive.

March 18th, 1985.

This is the first normal day of the “new era.” Nothing special at work. But there are good rumors: B.N. told me the following: the CC Secretaries got together on Friday—not a Secretariat, just to “exchange opinions.” Grishin and Zimyanin suggested holding obkom Plenums “about the March CC Plenum... to discuss the resolutions and the General Secretary’s directives.” Gorbachev responded derisively and definitively: “What Plenums? What for? We have too much to do to busy ourselves with meetings again. And what resolutions of the Plenum [do you propose to discuss]? That I was elected General Secretary? What’s to discuss there?” Ponomarev proudly told me, that as this point he loudly said: “That’s right!” thereby irritating Zimyanin.

This is a good sign. B.N. added that a similar episode took place after Andropov was elected General Secretary, only the initiator at the time was Kapitonov and the reply was abrupt and harsh: “I am not Brezhnev. I do not need this. And you, Ivan Vasilyevich, have many important matters to attend to, as do we all!”

It is curious that even before I was at Ponomarev’s I had heard a slightly different version of an episode from Zhilin: he was in some non-CC company on Sunday. Already legends are forming.

Reports from ambassadors are full of enthusiasm about Gorbachev. Okketto, a member of the PCI leadership, told our Ambassador: “Since the war, there has not yet been a moment when the West felt such a complete wave of goodwill towards the Soviet leadership, and Soviet Union as well!”

Besides all the favorable judgments of Gorbachev’s qualities and all kinds of high hopes, everybody—Kohl, Shultz, Mitterand, Thatcher, and people of this level, have noted that Gorbachev speaks “in a conversational style” (i.e. not reading from notes). For them (and for everybody!), this is a sign of intelligence, competency, of being well informed, knowing your subject, and of having ideas and convictions!

These hopes and expectations are too enthusiastic! And the mountain that must be shifted is enormous; the temptations to go down the beaten path are plenty; the problems that must be solved, as well as the obstacles already objectively pointed out, are countless!

I was at the Conservatory. Listened to the renowned Spivakov. Bach. It really does impress, only the faces in the choir are all—one sillier than the next, this hinders the listening. But the music made me tremble. I forgot that this was Spivakov and his renowned orchestra, and such. Probably this is the great level of the performance of the greats—when you forget who is playing. The oboe was magnificent, by the way, a very handsome young man...

March 21st, 1985.

The following is rumored as the explanation for why Gromyko presented Gorbachev at the Plenum. When Andropov died and the PB convened to elect the successor, Ustinov²⁹ was presiding. The story is that he and Gromyko had previously agreed to advance Gorbachev's candidacy, but as soon as the meeting began, Tikhonov asked for the floor, "for an introduction," and said: "I propose Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko!" The others, so as not to appear divided, agreed... But this time they had tried to "circumvent" Tikhonov.

It is said that Gorbachev prohibited putting up his portraits (in place of Chernenko's). He declined to greet a convention of the Friendship Societies in Vienna, somebody from the Council of Ministers was sent. "The resolutions of the March Plenum" rather than "directives of the General Secretary" are discussed in the press and at the obkom Plenums. He conducted the first session of the Secretariat after the General Secretary election himself. Gave a speech—mainly against showiness, bureaucracy, and meetings: we have to do our work, especially since February had no rise in production and the yearly plan (of the five-year-plan) is stalled again.

From Chernenko's assistants, he kept Aleksandrov and Sharapov: the first because he is indispensable at his post, and the second most likely because he is part of the Andropov legacy, and M.S. is honoring that. Pechenev was dismissed "with a fuss:" he was given the position of deputy editor of the journal *Political Self-Education*. Obviously, not only because M.S. has no plans to pose as another Marx or Engels, and does not need theoreticians like "curly [Pechenev]." But probably also for other reasons, he [Pechenev] most likely overdid things, it seems that way—he made himself out to be "a little Napoleon." First, assistant-coordinator Pribytkov was delegated as a deputy to the *Glavlit*. It is understandable: Gorbachev was not in any way indebted to Chernenko, and he has his own assistant-coordinator—Lushchikov. Vol'sky was returned to the position of first deputy of the Heavy Industry Department, from where he had once been taken by Andropov.

It was decided to return the date of the Congress to its regular date as indicated in the Charter—February 1986, in order to collect the harvest and finish up the plan rather than give speeches at conferences at the end of the current year.

There are rumors that the domestic (economic) sections of the new Program draft have already been returned for alterations: "so that we do not have propaganda presentation of what has already been said by Brezhnev and Chernenko about improvements" of everything possible, but propose real sweeping reforms. Can it really be so?! It's so good, that I find it hard to believe... even under Gorbachev!

²⁹ Dmitry Fedorovich Ustinov—Member of the CC CPSU Politburo, USSR Defense Minister, 1976-1984

Ponomarev is in good spirits. It seems that Gorbachev was kind to him out of politeness. And his sacred wish—to become a Politburo member—has once again shown signs of life. He is really giving out (as they say—before your eyes), especially his memory, which has always been excellent. Now he confuses everything with everything.

Yesterday he called me over pretty late. Asked me to “think” by morning, give him a speech for the PB, where the plan was to discuss the results of Gorbachev’s meetings with foreign leaders. I composed three pages, but, considering the Gorbachev atmosphere, without the sighs and the epithets. I do not know what he really said there today, but it is unlikely that he took my suggestions.

I am very worried that the routine of international affairs will take hold of Gorbachev; and in the eyes of the people, who are tired of the window-dressing, and in the eyes of the world community, his image would begin to wear away, the hopes would tumble.

And, remembering what happened in Andropov’s first months, it is especially important not to delay with the key changes of staff... and to definitively show that he is prepared to introduce proper order a la [sic] Andropov, whom the people remembered primarily in this quality.

March 23rd, 1985.

All day long I have been editing the chapters about the ICM for the VIII volume. It’s going slowly. The “Western” sections are written by synthetic minds like Galkin, Diligensky, and some young ones. But the sections on socialism are turning out badly, since here every Ceausescu is high science, but specialists such as Ambartsumov are among the revisionists. Nevertheless, the twenty-ninth is the final deadline for submission to the printing-house.

Ponomarev, the chief editor, of course will not read the volume either before or after it comes out. He will only read the paragraphs that the orthodox pensioners or fraternal parties will read and protest...

What can one do? However, I think that the text we created is the maximum of what is not embarrassing to publish (for a thinking and informed person) in 1985.

B.N. told me yesterday that on Thursday at the PB it was decided to conduct the Congress “according to the Charter.” Chernenko’s idea to create two documents—a written report about the CC and a political report for the Congress—has also been revoked. There was a preliminary notice that the draft of the Program will require substantial additional work. And the draft will not be “handed out” for a pre-Congress discussion at the April Plenum.

Gorbachev called me yesterday morning and asked me for information about the Sorsa group (the committee of the Socialist International on disarmament), whom he was supposed to receive in an hour. Turned out I was in low water, because I had not been present at Ponomarev's meeting with that group, and did not even know who else of our people had been there. He spoke with me without a trace of "friendliness" that distinguished our rare previous contacts. Maybe he did this on purpose, so I would not begin "to take liberties" on these grounds. He spoke coldly, overbearingly, condescendingly.

I found Shaposhnikov, who was supposed to be well informed about this, asked him whether he had spoken with Gorbachev. From his first words I gathered that he was wasted, too drunk to make sense. He must have spent the night drinking with his Finnish "friend" Sorsa. I do not know whether Gorbachev noticed this... but it turned out that he gave detailed information to Aleksandrov, not Gorbachev.

In the evening, Aleksandrov told me that at the reception Gorbachev "successfully improvised" and made a great impression on the Social Democrats.

March 30th, 1985.

There are rumors going around Moscow that the General Secretary election at the PB was "not without a fight." I heard about this from Gililov (he is at the Lenin School and has many acquaintances among the "formers" in the nomenclature and of the resentful). Brutents also told me about this—during the entire time he was at Barvikha and talked with different obkom workers, including first secretaries. There does not seem to be such talk in our department. So: it is said that there "was an opinion" that Tikhonov should be made General Secretary, and Shcherbitsky should take Tikhonov's place. Grishin and Kunaev supported this idea. Thus, if Shcherbitsky (who, of course, wanted to be Prime Minister) had made it back from the USA in time for the deciding PB meeting, the scales would have been... etc.

Nevertheless, every cloud has a silver lining. If all of this really took place in some form, then the position of the current General Secretary is much stronger than it was, for example, with Andropov. In that situation, there was a trio that held him under its thumb: Chernenko, Tikhonov, and Ustinov. Now there is none of that: Gromyko pronounced before the whole world at the Plenum, that he has no claims. Thus, Tikhonov is written off. Kunaev and Shcherbitsky are not even in Moscow. So Gorbachev can act much more (almost absolutely) confidently and decisively, which is exactly what he is doing. He has cleaned up his personal staff, by reducing it by a third. He eliminated two sections of the CC; liquidated the proliferated committees in the Politburo: on China, Afghanistan, the Near East, counterpropaganda, Poland, and others, I cannot even remember them all.

He brought back the Andropov schedule for himself—works on Saturdays. He already gives assignments to Gromyko, and not simply a scrap of paper with his signature: he writes notes, explaining how he sees the question at hand. Time and again, when international policies are discussed, he includes Ponomarev along with Gromyko in his orders... I think it is not because he values Ponomarev so much, but so that they know at the MFA that there is the Central Committee and that it also deals with foreign affairs.

Yesterday Ponomarev finally discussed “the situation in the Communist Party of Finland,” which he had been planning to do for a long time. Actually, I had reminded him by reading a telegram about the outcome of their extraordinary Congress. The following people were assembled: the deputies, plus Balmashnov, Kutsoban, Zhilin, and Fedorov, a reviewing consultant on Finland. Shaposhnikov made a report. It was some kind of pitiful medley, including some totally irrelevant information, for example: that we can get support from the business circles for the overthrow of Aalto (General Secretary of the SKP), and so on. His “intellectual poverty,” as well as the disintegration of his person owing to alcohol, was brilliantly demonstrated. I took the podium right after him and made a devastating speech, the essence of which was: if in the past fifteen years “the CPSU has been consistently and firmly following the line based on principle toward the SKP,” but the state of affairs has grown worse through the years and is now coming to a virtual schism, so it is time we look at this line—how sound it is, and to what extent it is based on principle. And why do we have such a double standard: with the “Eurocommunists” we’ve found a *modus vivendi* [sic] and overlook [their] outrageous behavior, including blatant anti-Sovietism, of which there is not even a trace in the Finnish CP; but for the SKP’s little sins, which indicate a deviation from Lenin’s orthodoxy, we are heading for an overthrow of the party’s official leader? We are stirring up Sinisalo against him, in essence encouraging factionalism. For years, we have been told that Aalto was anti-Soviet and almost a CIA agent; but [where are] facts, quotes—there is not one, not once. No one can present even one anti-soviet statement comparable to what has been said by our best friend Marchais, as well as Berlinguer, Carrilio, the Japanese, etc. And in general, what are we afraid of? There are plenty of all kinds of “historical compromises,” “third ways,” “self-governing socialisms,” and such, in other (and many other) Parties with whom we are friendly. They say: Aalto will lead the party away... Where? To anti-Soviet positions? What is he, an idiot, a madman? In Finland, with its Social Democratic government, president, bourgeois parties, who are in favor of friendship with the USSR; with the people who get a direct benefit from proximity to the Soviet Union, in such a country it is impossible to have an anti-Soviet Communist Party. And whatever Aalto has in his soul (and we have done everything to make him our enemy), he is no fool and knows that if he declares himself as anti-Soviet, he would sign his death warrant as the party leader.

Yes, Saarinen could not withstand the test of our unmannerly interference; he betrayed the confidence of the CPSU-SKP relations. But there was an interference, and in what a rude, almost Gauleiter-like interference. And the whole world knows about it. Fraternal parties (including socialist countries) are looking sideways and chuckling, watching our “operations” toward an even more fraternal SKP.

I reminded [the people at the meeting] of the delegation headed by Romanov, who went to Finland last spring. Read, I said, the memorandum you prepared for him, which he, judging by the consequences, delivered there. I was horrified. Not one, even the most insignificant, party, like “my” Maltese or Irish parties, would tolerate being addressed in such a tone. But the Finns grumble and sometimes snap at us, but tolerate it. If we had tried such a tone with the Italians, Japanese, or the French, they would have raised hell about it.

I proposed the following conclusion: we must change our course of action, the bet on Sinisalo & Co. has exhausted itself, we should try to restore the trust of SKP leadership, to set up friendly, equal relations.

Later in the evening, when I stopped by B.N., the discussion about the Finns was brought up and I got worked up again, saying: “Either we save the party and our prestige, or we save two friends—Fedorov and Smirnov (reviewing consultants on Finland). We must end the setup through which they have for fifteen years monopolized information about the SKP and the evaluation of its position, thereby virtually controlling our line of action. It has come to the point where Shaposhnikov was not uncomfortable about reading the Ambassador’s telegram on the outcomes of the SKP Congress to us, which was practically written by Fedorov before the Congress, even before he was sent to Finland. And this paper has been enciphered and went through the higher levels; it is now a political document. This is the kind of information we’ve been feeding to the PB for fifteen years, and we are ready to believe it ourselves!” B.N. shook his head.

At the deputies meeting I was supported by Zagladin, but in a roundabout way, with curtseys to Vitaliy (Shaposhnikov). Brutents supported me, but also with equivoques and reservations. Then he came to my office and said: “Tolya, that was bravely done! I just exchanged thoughts with Vadim Zagladin. He says, Tolya spoke with fortitude, etc.” Kovalenko (one of the deputies) spoke against me, but displayed such ignorance in this subject that even Ponomarev laughed about it. Zhilin kept quiet. Kutsobin supported me indirectly, with one remark (later he called me and said that he agrees with me absolutely, but he felt uncomfortable saying anything because he is a specialist on India, like Kovalenko is on Japan). Shaposhnikov, of course, was infuriated, but he had nothing to say; and even if he does [have something to say], he really does not know how to.

Concluding the meeting, B.N. did not rebuff me, but neither did he support me. On the other hand, he did not support Shaposhnikov either. [Ponomarev] assigned him to prepare “proposals for steps to be taken” for the PB. It seems that it will come down to what it had been. However, I suspect that under Gorbachev, if he gets around to it, it will not continue this way for long; especially since Solomentsev, who was at Finns’ Congress about a year and a half ago, expressed that he “could not understand and had doubts” about the way we are conducting our affairs there.

April 2nd, 1985.

The Western press is brimming with reports on the resumption (after Andropov) of the purging of the state-party apparatus of corruption, bribery, favoritism, venality, etc. It is true that many people are being removed, judging by the records from the Secretariat and the PB CC. However, in the resolutions there is rarely a mention of the fact that it is for abuse of power and such sins. Mostly the [stated] reason is—retirement.

There was another session of the CC Secretariat. Gorbachev was leading it again. He does not want to hand over this role to Romanov. And he is probably preparing Ligachev and Dolgikh for PB membership. You can judge by their boldness and activity that, together with the General Secretary, right now they comprise the core triangle in party leadership.

Brutents told me about his conversation with B.N. Said that he advised him to go straight to the General Secretary with the issue of the style of our relations with developing countries and fraternal parties. We cannot, he says, keep holding them on pauper's rations. Karen supposedly said that each step of Marshall Sokolov costs us hundreds of times more than all our aid to the ICM. And we should start seriously working on the Middle East before the Americans push us out of there.

I don't know whether he was as colorfully frank with B.N. as he told me...

April 3rd, 1985.

I am busy with the delegation of American senators, headed by Cohen. Nobody wants to receive them. All these democratic games are not for us, and we do not have the people for it. Yesterday, the Congress passed a resolution to increase the exchange of delegations and parliamentarians. Their every congressman is good for the job, but out of our entire Supreme Soviet we have, God willing, a dozen. Not to mention that their senators and congressmen have real influence on politics, but the people here merely applaud, and only some are capable of "explaining" our politics and of upholding a position in a debate.

April 4th, 1985.

I was told the following today: that the CC and *Pravda* receive literally a torrent of letters about Afghanistan, mostly from regions of Russia and from Siberia. Unlike before, there are very few anonymous anti-Soviet letters. Almost all of them are signed. The main message: why do we need this, and when will it end?! Women are writing, pitying the young men who are dying and suffering mentally there. They are writing that if "this is so necessary," then send volunteers, at least the commissioned, but not the recruits; because being there and doing what they must do mutilates their souls.

Soldiers are writing, sincerely and simply reporting that they do not understand “why we are here.” Officers, and even one General, who signed his name, are writing that they are unable to explain to their soldiers, subordinates, “why they are here;” and that only from the outside it can seem that they are “fulfilling the international duty,” but being there it is impossible to believe.

There were two letters from the crews of a tank and a helicopter. These are reproaching *Pravda* for writing untrue accounts: you recently described a battle in which Afghan warriors supposedly fought heroically, they say, but in reality—“we were the ones fighting and everything was completely different [from your report].”

Later we discussed this for a long time with Karen. He thinks that three people: Sokolov, Gromyko, and Chebrikov, must present the General Secretary with statistical calculations: what this war is costing us, and what the prospects are. It is obvious that there are no alternatives. We must pull out.

I objected: no one from that group will come forward with this voluntarily. There must be a resolute decision. The General Secretary assigned them to produce considerations “about the consequences, pluses and minuses” of our retreat, and in any case to make the decision to—withdraw!

Gorbachev should not delay this. I cannot imagine people in the USSR, who would be against it. Such an action would provide him with a moral and political platform, from which he could later move mountains. It would be equivalent to Khrushchev’s anti-Stalinist report at the XX Congress. Not to mention the benefits the withdrawal would give us in foreign policy.

[There was] a wonderful conversation between Gorbachev and Raul Castro. I read the transcript. In all the important fields, “his” approach is one of freshness of understanding, broad and lively thought unrestrained by any cliché or dogma, real political realism... including in relation to Natta, the PCI, i.e. the ICM, and the Chinese. But alas! argued about Afghanistan—“we will not abandon our brothers in need” (???)

April 6th, 1985.

On Thursday the PB again discussed alcoholism. Solomentsev was reporting. Nine million [people incapacitated with alcohol] have been collected on the streets. A million and a half are in compulsory treatment. Women constitute over a third of drunkards and alcoholics. Youth [constitute]—a half [of alcoholics]. But in the tsarist Russia, there were practically no women alcoholics, and no youth alcoholism. By the amount of alcohol consumed per capita, we have surpassed the pre-revolutionary Russia by two-and-a-half times. The straight loss is thirty billion rubles per year, and if we count the indirect consequences, then it is all of eighty billion [For example, the personnel of

the sobering-up stations alone numbers at 75,000 people. But nothing is achieved by their work]. Meanwhile, the profit from the sales of vodka is five billion [rubles].

Gorbachev said that we are not talking only about the major social problem of the present, but also about the biological state of our people, about the people's genetic future. And if we do not solve this problem, communism will be out of the question.

When Dementsov (deputy of the State Planning Committee) tried to "ask" for the vodka revenue clauses not to be repealed immediately, saying that it would be difficult to cover for it, Gorbachev derided him: you want to ride into communism on vodka!

Measures have been planned out: the manufacture of "*bormotukha* cheap fruit liquor]" is to be completely abolished; the amount vodka produced is to be sharply reduced; the fines for home-distilled vodka will be not one or two hundred rubles, but one thousand rubles on first incident. All the subsidiary restaurants by the raikoms [regional committee] and obkoms are to be liquidated—for the leadership. Banquets are to be prohibited for many occasions. The punishment for coming to work inebriated for leaders at all levels should be an immediate and relentless dismissal, up to the expulsion from the Party. And all such cases are to be published in the press.

However, many at the PB (the question was discussed for two hours) reminded each other, that in 1973 a no less stern resolution was passed. Something was done for a year or two, but then the situation became even worse: the consumption of alcohol has since doubled.

By the way, something was said about the CC staff and about the international affairs specialists, who "in the performance of official duty" must engage in this activity. A warning has been made.

But what are we to do, when deputy head Shaposhnikov—the Chancellor of the staff!—leads all the department's drunkards and sets almost daily records, at work as well!

In the evening I was unexpectedly summoned to work. Zimyanin did not like something in the document about the visit of the American Senators. I complied. He is a man with striking complexes, even with us, staff-members: all the time two principles are struggling within him—the desire to appear as a democrat (rather than a bureaucrat), and a suspicion whether his opinion is taken as something beyond any doubt. As a result, he always speaks with "a nervousness."

Kosolapov (chief editor of the journal *Communist*) asked me to read the lead article after the March Plenum and on the threshold of the Lenin days. He attacks commodity-money relations. I will object. This is all his orthodox-"creative" fantasies (he is, incidentally, also an adherent of the dictatorship of the proletariat). We shall see how he reacts. It is not the time to shun the New Economic Policy-Leninist approach, we do not have any other way to enter the world-standard level of labor productivity. And,

appealing to realism, one must be a realist, [one must] not glance back at the theoreticians, who by their own ideological nature cannot stop being scholastic propagandists.

April 7th, 1985.

For some reason, I remembered that B.N. referred to me [my report] at the deputies' conference, when he was telling about the PB meeting, at which the outcomes of Gorbachev's mid-March meetings with foreign leaders were discussed. But he mentioned only that I had given him a comment by Okketto (one of the leaders of the Italian Communist Party), saying that never since the war has the USSR been regarded so favorably as now, in connection with Gorbachev's election.

I am curious, what did in general B.N. used from my four-page draft for the talks with Okketto. For example, that the most important aspect in foreign relations for us right now is work in the West European direction. By the way, in his conversation with Raul Castro, Gorbachev strongly emphasized this thought. Understandably, this is not because B.N. "prompted" him; he adopted this thought as a result of his December visit to England. But... B.N. could have "hit the current." However, he does not feel the realities of politics. Unlike M.S., he is too weighed down with the old clichés and dogmas, dating almost from the times of Stalin.

April 11th, 1985.

Makaluso's address (through Kiesa) to Gorbachev: our (*L'Unita*) Beijing correspondent spoke about you with Xu Yaobin, we published this. Would you like to do the same? Gorbachev (through Aleksandrov) passed Makaluso's answer to me: I wouldn't like to, but what I said earlier about striving to improve Soviet-Chinese relations remains valid and we will undeviatingly continue [towards this goal].

My attempt to prevent the release of Rakhmanin's publication of the "interkit"³⁰ (conducted still under Chernenko) in the inner-party report was unsuccessful. Aleksandrov, saying "ask for something simpler," suggested warning Rusakov (that in tendency and tone such a publication differs from what has been publicly announced by the new General Secretary). It turned out Rusakov was out sick. I called Rakhmanin. He objected, saying that he does not see the "difference" and is not inclined to withdraw the material. I replied: my duty is to warn; you are the one who will be responsible for it...

I was at Arbatov's. He said that he still associates with Gorbachev often: writes notes, sometimes calls. [He says that] in the past two weeks he has "given him forty-one

³⁰ *Interkit* [is a compilation of] yearly collected meetings of the Warsaw pact Communist Parties CC International Departments' deputy heads (without the Romanians).

pages...” Saying that we need to show Americans more often that we will manage without them, but with Western Europe. And saying that [Gorbachev] should not appear too frequently with public announcements and initiatives—not to fall into the tracks of Brezhnev-Chernenko. And saying that we need to make up with the Chinese more energetically. And—that we should give two, if not all four, islands to the Japanese, because otherwise we will not get anywhere with them.

And—that we must cease with Afghanistan (supposedly Gorbachev replied that he is “thinking it over.”) And—that we must, finally, stop treating socialist countries as satellites, and must set our relations on truly equal terms. And saying that we must give the collective farms open access to the market, and about much else.

For some reason, Arbatov believes that Gromyko will soon become chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet; and that Katushev, for example, should be made Minister, and by no means Kornienko.

[Arbatov claims that] supposedly he, Arbatov, prompted the idea of Gorbachev’s meeting with the “captains” of our industry and agriculture; not with five thousand of them at the Hall of Congresses, but with only about twenty of the most able and brave people, from whom one can obtain useful information. And that was how it was done.

At today’s PB Gorbachev spoke very frankly about the sowing and storage of agricultural produce, as well as about order in the trading system. He concluded by promising the Ministers to take away their “feeding-place” (a special eatery on Granovskogo street), which hinders their witnessing (with the help of their wives) the real state of affairs in the supply and quality of produce.

He took away his assistants’ “Chaikas,” and returned them to “Volgas.” And, people are saying, a similar fate will befall the first deputy heads of the CC departments.

Ambartsumov came to visit me. We have not seen each other, I believe, since that “incident.”³¹ He brought a letter addressed to Gorbachev, in which he hints at Bugaev’s (deputy chief editor of the *Communist*) incompetence and not being up to date. But he also virtually complains about Zimyanin. It is brilliant and irrefutable. I advised him to change the addressee, since Gorbachev will not deal with this, but Zimyanin will be vengeful. [I advised him] to send the letter either to Zimyanin himself, or to Kosolapov, who will show it to Bugaev: let him be furious for a while.

Ambartsumov is composed, says that he does not regret anything (neither do I); that Trukhanovsky lost courage, and if he had not “stripped” and repented, perhaps he

³¹ About three years ago in Italy he lost his passport for traveling abroad, I had to rescue him... and his Party membership card

would have been made an academician.³² Now it is too late for him; it is obvious (i.e. after Gorbachev's election) that he did a foolish thing, but it is too late.

Ponomarev called from the Crimea. Regrets that he is away: "such developments!" What are those?.. A joint Plenum of creative unions, to which everyone, led by Gorbachev, showed up, and he, Ponomarev, was not there! And that is the extent of his concern about the affair. Also... he is again raising the subject of a conference with Communist Parties invited for the 40th anniversary of Victory Day. He bade me to compose a telegram! It is ludicrous. On the other hand, it is somehow awkward to stick his nose into this vain folly—after all, he is going on eighty-one!

Yesterday I sent him a memo regarding a document for the CC about the situation with the CP in Finland, and what we should do. The memo turned out even a bit rough: I repeated everything that I said at the aforementioned deputies' conference at Ponomarev's. I concluded with the following words: we cannot allow the friendly attachments between Shaposhnikov, Fedorov, and Smirnov and their Finnish wards to be placed above the demands of real politics. And, finally, we should not be behaving in a way that will result in having us (the International Department) "set straight;" and under Gorbachev that will be inevitable, and soon.

B.N. called today, but not a word about this memo. But, it is possible that he has not received it. Balmashnov could have opened my envelope and secreted the note "until Shaposhnikov's return," to whom he will show it. He is capable of it—this little Judas Golovlev at the post of assistant to the CC CPSU Secretary!

At the PB meeting on April 11th Gorbachev announced the following statistics:

In the processing of goods, 50-60% of the work is done by manual labor.

The productivity of labor in the processing of agricultural produce is two and a half times lower than in the capitalist countries.

1300 milk, cheese-making, and butter production factories, 200 meat processing and packing plants, 103 canneries, 60 starch-treacle factories have been built without refuse clean-up cycle. As a result, there is enormous damage to the environment.

The weakest part [of produce processing] is storage. The existing storehouses for fruit, vegetables, and potatoes provide for 26% of the needed volume; and even those do not meet today's standards.

Out of the 11.2 million storage tanks, only one third has cooling systems and only 19% have ventilation systems.

³² we are discussing Ambartsumov's article, where he proposed returning to the NEP [new economic policy]. He presented the article to the journal *Questions of History*, where I was a member of the editing staff and turned out to be the only one arguing for its publication.

In the sugar industry, only 20% of beets are kept in appropriate storehouses.

Many regions do not have enough grain elevators. 140 meat processing and packaging plants do not have refrigerators, 42% are in pressing need of major repairs.

The demand for up-to-date machinery in the processing of agricultural produce is met only at 55%.

As a result of the abovementioned conditions, the losses of agricultural raw materials reach up to 25%.

In trade alone, in storage and transport daily losses amount to: 1 million tons of potatoes, around 1,300,000 of tons vegetables, 3-4 million tons of sugar beets.

100,000 tons of meat is lost in the preparation and transport of cattle.

8,000,000 tons of milk is fed to calves; 18,000,000 tons of skimmed milk and 6,500,000 tons of whey are used as cattle feed.

Up to 1,000,000 tons of fish spoils due to insufficient capacity in processing.

The food industry's demand for up-to-date packaging methods is covered at 50%. In industrial packaging it is 30%, and for fruit and vegetables only 10%. The lack of packaging leads to the spoiling of fruits and vegetables and to enormous losses.

Gorbachev concluded by saying that if workers of the co-operatives had a sufficient number of high-grade transportation vehicles, they would increase the purchase of produce from the population by 15-20%, i.e. by 1.5 billion rubles.

April 12th, 1985.

I read the transcript of Gorbachev's conversation with congressman O'Neal and his delegation. Brilliant. The conversation was vivid, potent, lively, and confident, with competency and conviction, and, as the Italians said in the old times and say still—a dialectical mind. And [Gorbachev has a] composed, cheerful (Nietzsche-style) ability to maintain the reputation of a great nation. He stupefied the Americans. Their replies to his arguments were childish prattle. Afterwards, in a talk with his journalists, O'Neal said that this is a man of talent and sincerity, a statesman on a world scale.

There is an article by Z. Dumange, a French landowner, multimillionaire, communist, about "his friend Mikhail!" Zagladin translated it and, it seems, sent it to the "object" of the enthusiasm.

Forty Jews from the USA and a New York rabbi, who was once saved by our forces from a Hitler concentration camp, would like to come to Moscow for the 40th Victory anniversary. It is interesting, what the USFS [union of soviet friendship societies with foreign countries] will think of it.

Two Jews from emissary Bronfman (president of VEK, a billionaire) are coming to Moscow and will have talks with our different committees. I called Bobkov (deputy chairman of the KGB), he is fine about it; but Arbatov is demanding orders from the CC to have talks with them... he is worried about being sullied by giving the “Jewish” preference.

Today I read a great deal on Gorbachev’s emergence in world politics, specifically, a transcript of a discussion between Sorsa committee (Social Democrats) and our delegation (Arbatov, Chervov, Primakov, and others). How much intellect and artfulness is put into this. But behind the scenes (and from the Social Democrats’ side even in the open) there is always a perplexed voice saying: what is going on is madness—the politicians of world powers and their allies are doing everything to ultimately, and in the near future, bring mankind to an end. Meanwhile, “you and I,” and the major politicians themselves, are all talking, talking, talking, convincing and believing each other (!) that we are for peace, for saving the world from nuclear war.

April 16th, 1985.

There is nothing interesting at work. Together with Zagladin we received two Dutch Social Democrats. Nice guys, tactful. But their main idea was: what would it be for you (the USSR) not to increase the number of SS-20 over 372? Then our government will not allow the Americans to install cruisers [cruise missiles]. In the military sense it is a trifle for you, but the political consequences for all of NATO are innumerable.

Really, what would it be for us?! Why do we need these SS-20s, aimed at Western Europe?! Their installation was as foolish as Khrushchev’s missiles in Cuba in 1962.

B.N. returned from his vacation, called together a deputies’ meeting. Told us about the Bulgarians’ resentful reaction to our announcement that we will no longer give them half a billion in “credit” for the development of vegetable-growing (in reality they used it inappropriately). Zhivkov is raging and has already nearly doubled the prices on exported fruits and vegetables.

April 18th, 1985.

Early in the morning, people from the MFA sent me a draft of Gorbachev’s message for the “meeting (of veterans) at Elba”—our and American veterans. He made a note: “No comment!” but asked Kovalev³³ to nevertheless run it by me. As it turned out, if it had been sent as it was, there would have been protest from the Romanians, the Greeks, not to mention the communist parties—our friends who were not mentioned at all.

³³ Anatoly Kovalev—First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, Head of the First European Department

Yesterday Mikhail Sergeevich was in a proletarian area, at the Likhachev factory, in a school, a hospital, a store, in the apartment of a young family—he interacted with the masses. But they say that “Potemkin villages” were already arranged (beforehand).

There was a two-hour-long discussion at the PB today, as a result of Gorbachev’s meeting with industrial and agricultural specialists (there was a thorough account of the meeting in *Pravda*). Tikhonov showed some displeasure, saying that this impromptu disrupts everything that had been calculated for the plan of development up to the year 2000. However, Gorbachev politely deflected the reproach, and told the Ministers to “take into account” what had been said.

April 21st, 1985.

I read about August Stindberg [sic] [Strindberg] in **Block**. I became curious, took two of his plays from the CC library (“Field of Ashes” and “Miss Julie”—with his own extensive foreword on the essence of his contemporary theater). I read it. Excellent mastery of dramatic composition, it is effective despite the absolutely foreign and in general absurd for today’s reader material (the plot). It appears that all the Vakhtangov-Meyerkhold, the Tairov and such innovators of modern theater go back to his [Strindberg’s] “theory” and practice. However, all our Zakharovs, Lubimovs, possibly, don’t have a clue about this. Who knows about Stindberg [sic] nowadays? He was never even published in the Soviet times.

For me, this reading was a flashback to one of the plaintively romantic moments of my youth, when I read Ibsen, Hamsun, Hauptmann, Kellermann. There was a strong air of them in Stindberg [sic].

April 23rd, 1985.

There was a CC Plenum: preparation for the Congress. Gorbachev was relaxed, confident, reserved, and sometimes made remarks. He spoke to the Plenum without constant reliance on a piece of paper.

The subject was organizational issues. This time no one had any idea what would happen. I met Arbatov and Bovin at the Savior Tower. Naturally, they asked me if I know anything. I did not, but speculated that Ligachev and Dolgikh would become PB members. Arbatov added Chebrikov, but rejected Dolgikh: saying that he is on very bad terms with Gorbachev, something came between them under Chernenko.

At the session Gorbachev took a notepad out of his pocket and proposed all at once: [promote] to the PB—Ligachev, Ryzhkov (!), Chebrikov; to candidate members—Marshal Sokolov; and RSFSR Minister of Agriculture Nikonov--as the Agricultural [Department] Secretary!

After the election, he asked the new PB members to come to the Presidium; he called up Ligachev and seated him close to himself, at the chairman’s place, and

Ligachev conducted the entire Plenum. It is clear to everyone that he [Ligachev] will conduct the Secretariat as well. And this is a month and a half since Chernenko's death—Gorbachev did not allow Romanov to conduct the Secretariat, but conducted it himself! (Why could Romanov have a claim at this post? Because he is the only one in the Secretariat, except for M.S., who is both in the PB and a CC Secretary)

Now he [Gorbachev] has an absolute superiority in the PB, with three quite loyal friends “against” (if they have the courage to do it) possible opponents: Tikhonov, Kunaev, Shcherbitsky, Romanov, Grishin.

Gorbachev's report was energetic on domestic policy, though with the same main ideas as at the March Plenum. But on foreign policy it was flat, ordinary, a standard report. Either he does not want to divert his attention to this “material” right now, or, (which would be worse) he has given everything over to Gromyko again. Arbatov, who was sitting next to me, was grumbling, saying: he did not accept anything from what “I submitted to him (upon his request).”

His “train of thought” can be seen from the report and from his remarks during the discussion: order (in the factories, stores, on the street, in the administration—in the widest sense of the word) and independence. In this last aspect he greatly supported the Estonian Secretary Vaino and Shevardnadze. Independence, willingness to take risks, resolution of problems on the spot, a kind of “autonomy” in the realization of strategy, a deep adaptation of the strategy for (local) resources and conditions.

In the address before the discussion, he said that the discussion should not be rushed through, that the potential (and experience) of “our body”—the Plenum—should unfold and exhibit the work and example of the highest party organ, etc.

But alas! The discussion did not rise to his expectations, even though afterward, in the conclusion (not prepared by the staff, rather read from the notes in his notepad) he said in the beginning: “the discussion was heading in the right direction and we should develop this style, this nature of Plenum work.”

The first speeches, by Shcherbitsky and especially Grishin, demonstrated utter inability to adjust to this new style. These were models of general phrases, empty words, which Grishin had himself condemned in vain. But, it seems, Gorbachev is inclined to tolerate this jerk, inveterate courtier and ass kisser, who is hated and despised by all of Moscow at the helm of Moscow.

However, there was no glorification of the General Secretary, even though everybody still rose and applauded when the Politburo went up to the Presidium... Even after the intermission. However, Gorbachev quickly “intercepted” [the applause] by resolutely sitting down.

The clever, smart, and talented Shevardnadze managed it after all: he said that for a long time there has not been such a reaction in the world to the events in the USSR, as

there was to the Gorbachev election. He quoted *The Washington Post* with praise addressed at the “new Soviet leader,” with an addition, saying: “for us, capitalists, this is only for the worse!” Shevardnadze added his own comment: they are afraid of “the joining of socialism and strong leadership.” And, apologizing, he specified: “I know that Mikhail Sergeevich does not like it when people say [praise] about him, but it is not me, the Americans are saying it!” Laughter in the hall.

Out of ten speeches, only three or four were more or less in Gorbachev’s style.

I do not think that a more or less clear conception has formed in Gorbachev’s mind of how he is going to bring the country to the level of world standards. Only fragments of a methodology can be felt, in particular: order, contractual discipline, fairly perceptible decentralization of administration and planning (which will be restricted only by strategy). Right now he is executing the replacement [of personnel], and he is inclined to do a real clean up of the party (which Shevardnadze openly called for). He is shattering the Brezhnev-era dogmas, conventions, the fetters of showiness, bureaucratic stagnancy, self-conceit, grabbing more than one deserves. In a word, he is breaking the norms of the monarchical restoration, which had so harmed the economy and morale under Brezhnev, and which had almost been revived under Chernenko.

(By the way, during the five hours of the Plenum Chernenko’s name had not been uttered once, as if he never existed!)

April 27th, 1985.

There was a party meeting yesterday, on the preparation for work with foreign delegations at the Victory Day celebrations. Up to ten delegations are coming. Shaposhnikov is reporting. He is quite pathetic after all. And he could not restrain himself from indirectly offending me, saying: in England (which I am supervising) the 40th anniversary is poorly celebrated. Everybody noticed this and he looked foolish.

In front of the hall, where the meeting took place there is a stand of veterans’ photos on display, paired pictures—how one looked during the war, and how one looks now. People say that I’ve changed the least. By the way, from our thirty veterans I had the highest rank during the war—captain.

In the morning I received a postcard from Felix (a school friend). [He] congratulates me with the Victory Day, reminisces on how we used to write to each other when I was on the North-West front and he was in Central Asia (he was deported from Moscow under suspicion that he is German, ([his last name is] Ziegel after all!). Yes, I remember that, as well as the fact that I never had a feeling of superiority, or scorn, or resentment (anger) towards my school friends because they were almost all on the home front, and I was in the war.

On these “victorious” days I am going through my scant war photographs. They are stirring [my emotions]. I was quite handsome. [I was] an officer even before the Red

Army commanders were called officers. And I was not even a full twenty-four by the end of the war.

Comrades from the party bureau, who organized the aforementioned photo stand [sic] of the veterans, came by to ask what post I held at the end of the war. I said: “Deputy chief of staff of an infantry regiment. Why do you ask?” “You see, Anatoly Sergeevich, we asked the same question of all the other veterans. We asked Kudachkin (he is a Hero of the Soviet Union) how old he was when, as senior lieutenant, he was in command of a battalion.—I was twenty-one,—he replies. We ask him: ‘Would you entrust a battalion to the command of a present-day twenty-one-year-old young man?’ And he replies: ‘Are you in your right mind?’”

Indeed, a strange change in generations [happened] since that time.

May 3rd, 1985.

Whatever I am doing, whomever I interact with, and whatever I talk about, one thought is present all the time: what am I in the Gorbachev sense? What am I capable of? Would I be professionally useful (in a task), if I were entrusted to conduct it [the task] Gorbachev-style? I am not sure of that. But I want to try, especially as Ponomarev is absolutely not the man for the job; Zagladin would not have the party spirit (courage, honesty, and readiness to take risks); Brutents would have enough intelligence, but not character—the Russian character is needed here... Well, and so forth.

It is interesting, what will become of our establishment (the Ponomarev establishment) at the Congress and afterwards?

May 5th, 1985.

Yesterday I read Reagan’s letter to Gorbachev (a reply to Gorbachev’s letter from March 24th). The text is cheekily and intelligently composed. His team is cynically championing their interests. But that is not the point; the point is that we look weak against the background of this letter, because Gorbachev is still going on the path beaten by Gromyko (and he is losing control of foreign policy).

We conducted ourselves not in the best way possible with the matter of Nicholson’s murder, and Reagan pinned us down on it.

Our involvement with [military] space exploration—the demands for the cessation of it as a condition for productivity in Geneva—was without foresight. And here as well they are nonplussing us. Gorbachev has now become engaged in this demand, and if he is to save Geneva he will have to go back on his (and not Gromyko’s) demand.

Reagan also caught us on a ridiculous suggestion about the unacceptability of “two languages” in mutual relations: one for propaganda and another for internal use, for

example, in correspondence between the President and the General Secretary. He parries: were you not always for an ideological fight?

In a word, it is not coming out very strong... All because here [in foreign affairs] it is even farther from a revolutionary approach than in domestic affairs... from the renunciation of the propagandist approach to politics. Also, the uncertainty about our international capabilities remains.

May 6th, 1985.

I read the report that Gorbachev will present at the Congressional Hall on May 8th. A very strong text, simply stirring in places and very carefully adjusted from the standpoint of politics as well as the standpoint of taste and style.

I wrote a memo to Ponomarev: "Very strong text." He calls me. He, of course, did not like my evaluation, since only he can have "strong texts," and if they are weaker than somebody's then the following people are at fault: the consultants, myself, the executors who realized his ideas and observations poorly. I foresaw such a reaction and wrote this on purpose—"for a gloating delight."

Ponomarev was also interested in something else: how Gorbachev's report will agree with his, B.N.'s, article in *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, which he pushed with such persistence and feeling self-importance. I reassured him, saying that they do not differ in ideas, but in the structure and the character of the text there are some substantial differences. I wanted to sting him here as well by saying that Gorbachev was more polite with Reagan and American imperialism, that he does not busy himself with predicting an inevitable victory of socialism in the entire world (I had suggested easing or even taking out all of this, but he ignored it). However, if I mentioned this he would have immediately made me "mark" the places that cause doubt. But I had to run to a date, so I kept quiet.

May 11th, 1985.

[About] meetings with international delegations: the English communists leave an oppressive impression. [They are] indifferent, occupied with their little affairs (to be sure, a truly "trade-union [sic]" mentality, strictly by Lenin). And no matter how I scoffed at Plotnikov all evening at the ceremonial dinner, trying to arouse in them some interest toward us, toward the newness of Gorbachev, even went into excessive self-criticism—their reaction was limp and shockingly primitive.

On the other hand, the complete opposite was Dennis Healy, the shadow minister-Laborite [sic], an old acquaintance, a major national and international figure. He was looking for contact, conversations; he joked, was sarcastic, took pictures (his hobby) with me, and with Arbatov and Zagladin, and "prepped" us on how to conduct affairs with Reagan in order to achieve something. Towards the end [of the evening] he assured me that the celebration of the 40th [Victory] anniversary (in England, and Europe, and here)

is proof of the fact that people can have an impact on their government. After the reception at the Kremlin he went to the Park of Culture, had a good look at our “public character,” was in rapture over his meetings with the most ordinary folk, who came up to him, touched the crosses on his chest (he served in the Navy), questioned him, told him about themselves (Viktor Kubekin was with him, the former advisor in London, from the KGB, a most intelligent fellow, and a handsome man).

At the airport, where I came to see him and Priscott (from the leadership of the Great Britain Communist Party) off, I found him writing an article for *The Observer* about the 40th anniversary in Moscow. I had to say goodbye to both of them at the same time and we sat in the guestroom with some cognac. I delivered all kinds of speeches, tried to joke, to egg them on. Healy spoke in response and towards the end suddenly remembered and blurted out, addressing Priscott, something like this: “I think, that **comrade** Priscott will not bear me a grudge for speaking for both of us and taking up all the time before the flight (the other nodded his head, with a pitiful and servile smile). Though, I beg your pardon, after the events in your party, which will soon end with the extraordinary Congress, perhaps I will not be able to call you comrade any more, I will have to use “*gospodin*” (mister!) [sic]”

Everybody laughed. But this was an excellent move against the CPGB’s descent into anti-sovietism.

At the reception I made acquaintance with Sharipo, a laborist [sic] from New Zealand. [She is] a lovely, sweet woman, first time in the USSR. She looks at everything with “charmed” eyes, even though she came from almost the most anticommunist, respectable, bourgeois country. We spoke “protocol-style,” but very nicely. I also tried to “charm” her. At the end of her visit she declared that her most important impression is that the Soviets are just as ordinary and normal people as everyone else. She went to Leningrad, embraced Tereshkova, will pay her a visit, to our other committees. And by the way, she was described to us not only as close to Houk, but also as an ardent Zionist³⁴ (even though she is Sharipo, she is not a Jewess but an Englishwoman).

The reception at the Kremlin was chaotic, and for me also a fuss. There were only two translators for my eleven delegations (and one of them was Kubekin, who was always with Healy). The majority of the accompanying delegations (members of our department) were not allowed to the reception. So, with a wineglass, I had to go from one to another, at intervals running across somebody who was not “my own” (people from Luxembourg, Germans, Filipinos, Italians, not to mention Moscow acquaintances)—and I had to say something “meaningful” to each. But, I think, I did not please everyone, including Winston—a blind African American—the chairman of the CPUSA.

And, finally, I was able to celebrate Victory Day with Kol’ka Varlamov, my friend from the front. We talked about Ligachev. When the Academy of Social Sciences offered him an honorarium for a lecture that he read (in the fall) before an audience, he

³⁴ Zionism and anti-sovietism were synonymous for me at the time

became furious. And he did not leave it “like this”—he forbade giving honoraria to members of the staff, who come there every now and then to give speeches. And he sternly put his wife in her place when she tried to take advantage of his official status.

We discussed Gorbachev—I am so enthusiastic about him that I am even willing to forgive him the mentioning of Stalin in the Victory Day speech. However, he should not have done it (I seemed to be the only one in the Kremlin Congressional Hall who was not clapping during the moment of the wildest applause at these words). Gorbachev (one can understand this) gave in to the momentum, to the common mood. He did not want to encourage the grumblers. But he should have defied [them]. [He should have] shown his character, let it be known that Stalin cannot be forgiven for that, which can have no forgiveness (for those twenty million people we lost in the war, especially in 1941).

May 15th, 1985.

I had a talk with Kashtan (General Secretary of Canada’s Communist Party) the other day; we had lunch at *Oktyabr’skaya*. The officially assigned P. Smol’sky, whom we recently sent to Canada as the head of a delegation, also tagged along. He is Ligachev’s arrogant deputy in the Party Organization Department and secretary of the party committee of the entire staff. I don’t know about what and how he talked with Kashtan and others in Canada and here in his capacity as assigned by the CC, but this time for the duration of two hours I had to talk alone. I do not mean this as a self-compliment, but, alas, only we, the international specialists, know how to speak with foreigners properly, i.e. how they need to be spoken to (!), even about our particularly internal affairs. But there are very few of us, and Ligachev and the Party Organization Department are imposing provincial obkom secretaries on us... it is lucky if it’s a smart one, otherwise... I have seen and endured a great deal from many [of those] in these past twenty years.

The Victory Day celebrations went by very well. And overseas as well: Reagan helped that. But the main reason was that we forced the West to react to our conception of the Victory. Reagan went into a counter-attack, and anti-Sovietism led him to the remembrance of the SS.

The Western press is beginning to think that Gromyko’s monopoly on foreign policy is continuing. Of course, we should let them feel the continuity, and we should work in Western Europe properly, before we start on Reagan. However, it is dangerous to drag out the Gromyko situation: people could become disillusioned in the capabilities (and intentions) of our new leader. Still, he continues to gain points (in the West as well) regarding the internal affairs.

Arbatov informed me today, that “you can congratulate yourself and everyone around: Bogolubov got the boot. Yesterday at the PB Lukyanov was made chief of the General Department of the CC.” Indeed, one can congratulate everyone—the entire apparatus; after the thief, gentry, and swine Pavlov, this one [Bogolubov] was second in rank (and in some places even higher), Brezhnev-Chernenko’s minion and watchdog, a Scrooge...

M.S. is doing everything persistently his own way. And he is not losing time, like Andropov did, even though he had much less of it.

May 17th, 1985.

Bogolubov really was dismissed at Wednesday's PB. And—[he was dismissed] without the customary in such cases “gratitude from the CC” for many years of service (recently for his 75th anniversary he received the Hero), and without setting him with a merit pension. People say that even though his removal was decided a long time ago, i.e. with Gorbachev's accession, the suddenness is explained by the fact that in connection with the 40th anniversary of Victory Day he obtained for himself an Order of the Patriotic War, in which he did not take part. [He did this] in the same way as a couple of years ago he forced the Academy of Social Sciences and VAK³⁵ confer a doctorate upon him, and earlier—became a recipient of the Lenin and State Awards, the same way he had a car without a license plate, etc. In a word, a swine, who should have been removed a long time ago...

So this is another sign of Gorbachev's cleansing wave... After all, this is the “main” department of the CC.

I am working on Latin America's “debts” and the danger of a currency and financial disaster (Gorbachev's assignment, which involves the following institutions: the Academy of Sciences, Gosplan, Minfin [the Ministry of Finances], Gosbank [the State Bank], Minvneshtorg [the Ministry of Foreign Trade], and others).

May 18th, 1985.

I forgot to note yesterday that Ligachev assembled all deputy chiefs of the staff. He gave us notice that the resolutions and decrees about alcoholism and hard drinking will be published tomorrow. (It seems we will soon be celebrating the 400th anniversary of the fight against drinking in Russia: begun by Boris Godunov.) He spoke very sternly, saying that twelve years ago we made an attempt, but at the same time we passed a resolution to increase vodka production and turned a blind eye to all kinds of scandalous behavior. “It will not be this way anymore! Will not be! The times have changed... (he paused)—as in all other respects...” We will fire people caught “in this” in twenty-four hours, regardless of either merits, or status (sitting next to me was Shaposhnikov, quite smashed, probably from yesterday's or last night's drinking bout).

[Ligachev] cited some statistics: 107,000 communists per year end up in sobering-up stations, and 370,000 members of the Young Communist League. Since 1950, the consumption of alcohol has quadrupled. Two-thirds of crimes are committed by intoxicated persons. The rise in crime is directly proportional to the rise in the consumption of alcohol. The life expectancy of men has gone down. Future generations

³⁵ All-Union Authors' Committee

are imperiled. The main cause for the rise in alcoholism is the rise in the production of alcoholic beverages (and not the “remnants” of capitalism).

Yesterday the orders and resolutions were published. They strike one with their frankness (without fear for “the image of real socialism.”) However, the measures [taken] are not draconic: mostly fines. But what can one get from drinkers?

May 20th, 1985.

The CPGB Congress is over. The “Eurocommunists” won, “our guys” were driven out. Either they are fools, or the [intelligence] agents really made an impact, or they are such vehement anti-Soviets that they have lost common sense. Because under the English conditions there is no space for a social-democratic (anti-Soviet) Communist Party, and especially now, when we’ve begun embracing with Kinnoke and Healy. Their Congress virtually means a self-liquidation course. Formally, its substance is Eurocommunism, but the reality in their situation is something completely different... Particularly when Gorbachev is creating a different image of the Soviet Union as a world power and the fears of the Soviet threat are beginning to dissipate.

May 22nd, 1985.

I met Sures and his team, plus Nadya Barta, who retired from the post of Kadar’s assistant and interpreter. Right now Sures is Secretary of the CC HSWP (Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party).

We had dinner at the hotel on Dimitrov street, for the first time under the “prohibition.” The Hungarians chuckled about it, and we made excuses; of course there is no toasting, and the conversation drifted to irrelevant topics. It is lucky that they are [our] old friends and we can talk frankly on any subject. They tell us: we were bringing you presents, wine sets as usual, but we decided to drink them ourselves on the plane, “so as not to violate [the new laws]...”

Lagutin has returned from the extraordinary Congress in Great Britain. The Eurocommunists have absolutely defeated the faithful, i.e. the people faithful to us. This is a demonstration of the fact that in countries like England there is no need for a Communist Party; the Communist Movement has become obsolete. And the Communists want to modify themselves into something totally new, to cut the umbilical cord, and even if they become a club, at least it should be a club with original ideas; one that is listened to. They do not need us, the CPSU; do not need us at all. They see in us neither a model, nor an example, ideal, brother, trusted friend, not even someone who would save them from a nuclear catastrophe. Alas! Many Communist Parties are on this path.

I read the record of B.N.’s conversation with Cervetti. Ponomarev is adjusting to Gorbachev’s approach to the ICM. He is even making excuses about the international Conference: why are you attacking us as if we were insisting on it, he says. Quite the opposite, others are reproaching us for resisting, sabotaging the idea [of the Conference].

And we really could not have insisted on it: look at our circumstances—we've lost three General Secretaries, we were preparing for the Victory anniversary, the Congress is just around the corner, do we have time for it?! Turns out that's how the matters stand!

Zagladin told me how B.N. reacted to my protest about the Finnish Communist Party: he told Shaposhnikov off in obscene language, saying that he does not understand anything and is ruining the whole matter.

Lagutin told me about how Clark, Kinnock's assistant, evaluates Maggie Thatcher: no one will bring her down and she is not inclined to turn the power over. Her only possible downfall is that she might not be able to endure it herself. Firstly, she has eye problems, but wants to read everything herself. Secondly, and most importantly, is the psychological stress: morning to night she plays the role of a great political figure with everyone—her friends, enemies, comrades-in-arms, ministers, foreigners, mass media [sic], and with herself. This is, of course, terribly difficult. She is devilishly smart, and in fact is a great actress, but she is not on stage, where regular actresses sometimes manage to live long. Clever!

People are literally dumbfounded with yesterday's television broadcast of Gorbachev's speech in Leningrad. All one hears is: "Did you see it?!" Finally, we have a leader who knows his subject, who is interested in his work, who through his language can express what he wants to convey to the people, who is not afraid to interact with them, who is truly not afraid to appear insufficiently grand; and he produces the impression of being a person who truly wants to move this load, which is stuck in the mud, to rouse people, to make them be themselves, to act with courage, to take risks, to rely on common sense, to think and to act. There is something of a Lenin-Kirov quality in him, bravery and competency, along with confidence in himself and in people, or, more precisely, in the fact that there are people, who can act the same way as he does.

May 23rd, 1985.

Yesterday, while I was working with Sures, there was a party meeting at the department. In the morning, with masochistic curiosity, I inquired about how it went. The red-tape artists all praised it (I am an authority figure for them after all). The department heads close to me appreciated some speeches, but were appalled by Ponomarev's report; everyone else was too. The report was dedicated to results of the year's work. Brutents described it in detail: it was cud that could have been presented under Brezhnev and Chernenko. There was nothing of the April Plenum, or of the Gorbachev style, or of the new atmosphere, or of the general expectations. It was an hour and a half of dispiriting nonsense. The old die-hard is not giving in. His position is: we shall see what comes from this new style. I think he cannot, is not able to, have a realistic look even at himself. And concerning this "time will tell" approach, I think he has too little time left for that.

I found a draft report for a theoretical conference on the ICM, which I prepared still under Andropov. It is a very critical and furious text, and it would have caused a

shock. I completely forgot about it. It's too much like an article; it will not work for reading out loud.

All of Moscow is cursing Lapin (chairman of the Radio and Television Committee) for not giving notice of Gorbachev's Leningrad broadcast. This is all people are talking about: hope and cheerfulness have sprung up.

May 28th, 1985.

All day yesterday I was studying the transcript of the Gromyko-Shultz, Howe, and Genscher talks in Geneva. If one forgets about the initial treachery of the Americans, then the arguments used by Shultz are more convincing to a normal Western person than our persistent repetition of arguments that we do not want to either subjugate, or conquer anyone, and that we do not plan to attack anyone, etc. No one believes these declarations, and the root of the Geneva deadlock is in this. Revolutionary approaches to talks are needed, identical to the one Gorbachev demonstrated in Leningrad.

I think since the times of Stalin there hasn't been such an occurrence: people racing to obtain a copy of a pamphlet with his [Gorbachev's] speech (one million copies printed). That's not one of Brezhnev's or Chernenko's compositions for you, which lay about in all the news-stalls from the moment they were issued until the death of "their authors."

Yes, this is the opening of a truly different stage in Soviet history. Probably something big will come out of it. Gorbachev does not seem to be one of those who stop a quarter of the way through, as it happened with Khrushchev, who became frightened by his own daring.

May 30th, 1985.

Yesterday morning I had a disgusting conversation with Ponomarev. Either the age is showing, or the narrow-mindedness of a dogmatist is too great, but he does not get it anymore, does not get that he will have to adapt himself to the new style, and in a way like never before: because for the first time in his almost sixty-year-long career, the question is about elimination of Stalinism from everything, not only from work matters but also from views and behavior.

I read a transcript of Gorbachev's meeting with Brandt. Our man appears much stronger. In particular, in the fact that we do not have a problem of seeing the German people as [one] nation. Gorbachev's handling of the material is strikingly skillful and crafty. Particularly [impressive was] the way he presented the issue of missile installations. I have become proud of the way our new leader represents our country and of the way he appears before such an inveterate world-class politician like Brandt.

May 31st, 1985.

Today Ponomarev was once again slighted, and once again it served him right. In the morning they brought a telegram from Dobrynin: eight hundred scientists, fifty-seven Nobel Prize winners among them, are addressing Gorbachev and Reagan with a petition to ban space weapons. B.N. assigns me to prepare a response draft to the letter. I go over to him and begin to explain that this is not a propaganda measure; that this should be dealt with by the Ministry of Defense and the MFA, because the scientists are proposing to shut down the Krasnoyarsk radar station [RLS]. When I began to insist, B.N. became angry, but I kept on: we cannot associate the lies about Krasnoyarsk (saying that this radar station has nothing to do with anti-missile defense) with the name of our new General Secretary. You, B.N. tells me, believe Arbatov, for whom everything that is here is bad, and everything that is in America is good. He'll finish badly with that! And I reply to B.N.: then why did Gromyko in Vienna, when Shultz and Howe asked him a direct question about the Krasnoyarsk RLS, avoid this subject as if the words "Krasnoyarsk RSL" were never uttered, as if there was no question. Even Gromyko does not want to connect his name with these lies, which will not stand for long. But for our little B.N., all this is nonsense. The most important thing is to fire one more propaganda shot.

I went to my office. And two hours later I was told that Gorbachev assigned Gromyko and Sokolov, not Ponomarev, to take care of this, about which I proceeded—not without an inner gloating—to report to him.

Today I read some information about the massive anti-Soviet "displays" in Prague, in connection with a hockey championship and a bicycle race under the slogan "peace-friendship." And this is against the background of Husak's recent "friendly visit" to Moscow. One Czech told me about a discussion at the CC CPC [Communist Party of Czechoslovakia] on whether the victorious Czech team should be awarded decorations. Opinions differed, and this is what took place at the stadium: Moscow favorites Bilyak and Lenart (members of the CC CPC Presidium) stood up and walked out when the anti-Soviet rioting began, and Premier Strougal went to embrace the Czech players. At the CC Presidium, Husak resolved the question, saying that "in the present case" it was awkward to give awards in front of the Soviet comrades.

This is 1968 for us! We will be paying for it for a long time yet!.. If it will ever be possible to revive the atmosphere of 1945, when we were liberators rather than interventionists.

June 5th, 1985.

Dobrynin is again insisting on Senator La Garza's visit (he really took a liking to him). But the Supreme Soviet (Kuznetsov, Tolkunov, Vysotin) does not want anyone at all: "We do not need them (i.e. senators, congressmen). Moreover, they are violating reciprocity—they ask for invitations, but do not invite us."

And this is true, too: over there every congressman is at least some kind of politician, but here? Arbatov, Tolkunov, about five others and no more than that. All familiar faces that the Americans are growing tired of.

Berkov secretly sent a letter from Ottawa, where he is at a conference for human rights. He is complaining: the MFA people are afraid of the concept itself, they demand to discuss it behind closed doors, and Americans are laughing about it. Zagladin took it upon himself to “advance” the complaint through Aleksandrov and Vorotnikov, who was just in Canada as a RSFSR representative. I will follow the developments.

June 9th, 1985.

After Vorotnikov’s PB report on his trip to Canada, Gorbachev gave orders to finally start working on this matter and raise “our own banner of human rights.” Berkov’s letter also figured in the decision, in the context that our representatives, by hiding from the people at the conference, gave the matter over to the hands of the Americans, who are eagerly proceeding to exploit the theme of human rights.

Ponomarev got very angry that Zagladin and I got around him with this letter from Berkov, which went straight into the hands of the “Sparrow,” and from him to the General Secretary. But if we had gone to B.N. with this letter, he would not have dared to mention it, and would have forbidden us to do so.

Now I am composing a “realization plan” for Gorbachev’s order. But it turns out that exactly a year ago, on the initiative of the now liquidated PB Committee on Counterpropaganda (Gromyko), there was a CC decision about strengthening our assertiveness in the struggle with the West over human rights. It is the typical empty word composition of: “strengthen,” “increase,” “achieve,” “improve,” “broaden...” Naturally, it was forgotten, but if one asks now, they will be able to report that yes, we’ve strengthened, increased, etc.

A document came that was signed at the Gosplan, Minfin, Minvneshtorg, the GKES, etc., about the indebtedness of the third world to imperialism (a form of its pillage), Fidel Castro’s *idée fixe*, which has been taken up by Gorbachev. The matter turned out to be much more serious than material for propaganda and exposure of imperialistic pillage. The developing countries owe us twenty-six billion dollars. Also, the crisis, as everything under the present monopolistic State capitalism nowadays, is not catastrophic, and the West will work with the debtors to find a resolution. If we meddle in this fight we will receive the blows, as is always the case in such instances.

I am reading a book about Carlyle. I’ve been interested in him for a long time and more than once; I’ve read some of his works. And now I feel like I am interacting with myself—with myself, as I was when I read him before. I have a similar relationship with Nietzsche. But I cannot do the same with Tolstoy: all the time he turns into something new, something not mastered, and maybe even unnoticed in the past and not understood in youth.

It is interesting to now and then read and even look through books on the current social processes in the West, about the STR, unemployment, the changes in the social structure of society—there is very serious literature coming out. And reading these books,

whose authors are, as a rule, employees of the IMEMO [World Economy and International Relations Institute], of the IMRD [Institute of the World Labor Movement], you become distressed by the shortcomings of everything here: after all, all this output absolutely does not reach the political tops, has no influence on the forming of politics. Even Ponomarev, whose position requires him to know what is written about the mentioned subjects, has no idea about these works.

However, we shall see: at least about the matters regarding the STR—the day after tomorrow there will be a conference on this subject at the CC, with a report by Gorbachev. How will our lagging behind be accounted for, and what will be proposed in the case we catch up—how to avoid the consequences (the sharp increase in superfluous people)... Here our socialism will meet with Marx' *Hic rhodus, His salta!* [sic]

Yesterday I leafed through Byron's journal again. There is a scale of his personality in every line, even when it's about a trifle... but maybe it is magic and mythology that force us to perceive each word like that. Nevertheless, his prose, in clarity, precision, and brevity is on the level with Pushkin. I wonder, did Aleksandr Sergeevich read any of Byron's prose?

I took Dez'ka's (David Samoilov) volumes from the shelf. There are oceans of all kinds of feelings, personal in the first place, but in general too: he is a major poet and could have said meaningful things about our times... if he could?? He is ruining himself by drinking.

June 11th, 1985.

I am taking much trouble with the project on human rights. Ponomarev did not like the proposition to create a Soviet committee on human rights: "How is that? A committee on rights in the USSR? What, do we infringe on human rights?! No, no, I am against it."

I argued with him rather rudely. He irritates [me] more and more with his senile whims and follies. I have not achieved anything, distressed him, upset myself by my tactlessness in relation to the old man.

June 15th, 1985.

Yesterday I was at the CC Secretariat. For the first time, I saw how Ligachev conducts it. In general, he does it in the Gorbachev style, sharply and sensibly. The questions discussed were as follows:

- the laying-in of fodder. Looks like it's a big mess: because of the terrible spring and once again the lack of skills, indifference, and unwillingness to work. For example, they cut down clover and alfalfa when they are already beginning to wither so the gross output would be higher, but the quality of the fodder decreases by 30%;

- about trade. It's a completely dismal picture. Stores are turning into warehouses and at the same time there are always shortages. It is an antediluvian system. The trouble is in the absence of computer science, computers, and most importantly in that the manufacturer, and not the consumer, prevails. All this was discussed very sharply and with facts by Ryzhkov, Vorotnikov, Dolgikh and Ligachev. We must make a turnaround in trade especially because vodka and wine are being taken off the shelves, and the financial plan is under the danger of not being met;

- about the condition of housing and communal services in RSFSR. Very bad. The available housing is becoming obsolete; the poor quality of the new housing construction is now costing us billions in major repairs, in accidents in communications, in supplying networks. This has become a regular occurrence;

- about the abuse of living space. There was a note from the people's control committee. Ligachev was at a loss about how to react: for a year and a half we have been dealing severely with people, who were found to be abusing [living space policies], we expel them from the Party, dismiss them from work, but again and again, it's the same saunas, dacha-palaces at the government's expense, the same favoritism in apartment distribution, etc., etc.

There was another unpleasant conversation with Ponomarev. Velikhov and Arbatov sent a record of a conversation with one well-wishing American from Geneva. He says: you, the USSR, have to put concrete proposals on the table at Geneva. Let them be formulated in terms of renunciation of space weapons, but let them be concrete: the number of such-and-such missiles will be reduced by so much, this kind by so much, this is to be done with submarines, this should be done with this kind of airplane, something else is to be done with other kinds of airplanes, etc. etc. And this, the academicians are writing, is sensible. Because in Geneva we are having "philosophical" discussions that space weapons are bad, and the Americans argue that they are good, we are chewing over ancient joint initiatives, which have already become a topic for propaganda, rather than having a practical discussion among of experts.

I tried to join the Arbatov-Velikhov arguments, tried to explain them to Ponomarev. In response he said that I, obviously, do not follow our initiatives. My colleagues, he says, prepared a "summa summarum" (B.N.'s favorite word) of our initiatives for my trip to Spain. Have a look at it, he tells me. I told him that I read newspapers, and more than that, I read ciphered communications for the MFA, the GRU,³⁶ and the KGB, I am also familiar with PB resolutions, I've read transcripts of the Geneva sessions, and I know by heart our initiatives under Andropov, Chernenko, and Gorbachev. But that is not what we are talking about right now. The question is about the fact that we must stop treading water, as the arms race is about to shoot out of control.

My venomous explanations made no impression on him. The essence of the question is of no interest to him at all anymore. Physically, gerontologically [sic], he

³⁶ Main Intelligence Department

cannot see into the heart of the matter, he does not have time left for this as his whole nervous system is working towards mere self-preservation in his seat. It seems that the winds of change are quite painful for him.

There are rumors about staff changes. It looks like Zamyatin is being sent to Vienna as Ambassador. His CC department (of International Information) is going to disappear altogether. Like a bolt from the blue—Stukalin is removed and will be sent to Budapest as Ambassador. These [people] are all Chernenko's staff. Sashka Yakovlev—who was returned, not without my help, from Canada, and made director of IMEMO, replacing the deceased Inozemtsev—will take his [Stukalin's] place in the CC Propaganda Department.

In hallways there is talk of what will happen at the nearest Plenum and at the Supreme Soviet session: Gromyko will become Chairman of the Supreme Soviet; Kornienko [will become] Minister of International Affairs; Vasily Vasilievich Kuznetsov will retire, his place as first deputy under Gromyko will be taken by Zimyanin; the premier Tikhonov will retire. It is said that Gorbachev will take upon himself the position of representative of the Council of Ministers. It looks like Dobrynin will be returned to Moscow, his place will be taken by Vorontsov from Paris, where he is Ambassador right now; Troyanovsky is assigned to London, to replace Popov.

There was a scene by the elevator: in the third entrance of our building there is a special elevator for CC Secretaries, it is next to the regular one. In the morning I was standing [there] waiting for the regular one. Rusakov (deputy of the Socialist Countries Department, a CC Secretary) comes to his elevator and calls me to come with him. We go. The elevator stops, we come out. Suddenly Rusakov puts his arm around my back and says: "Find me a good replacement!" Taken aback, I promise him. Who is in question? Rakhmanin? Shakhnazarov? The always-ill Kiselev? Smirnovsky, who is a nonentity from the start? Yes, I thought, the wind of change is blowing ever stronger around our International Department.

On Wednesday I met with Ziegel (a school friend) and his Klava. He was loose, cynical, philosophized peevisly. We got into an argument about why one should believe in God. I tell him: "You are a believer, I am a nonbeliever. What's the difference if we both seem to be honest men, and nine times out of ten (commandments) we both in general follow Christian morals? Even though I don't care that it is Christian." Either he was out of shape, even though we did not drink much, or he is putting on an act—messaging around with this religiosity, but he did not give any worthwhile explanation. And it is impossible to convince a normal person about life after death anyway.

June 16th, 1985.

Felix (Ziegel) gave me a picture of our class (The first pilot Gorky school). I do not have this one, maybe it is mislaid somewhere, and maybe I never had one. The year is 1938. In the center [of the picture] is Petrakl (Petr Yakovlevich Dorf, our mathematics

instructor, our favorite teacher, who was our friend and taught to just be citizens, without the demagogy and the Stalin cult).

I am looking at the photograph and interesting “statistics” come to mind. We are twenty-six people, eight were added to [our class] already in tenth grade, i.e. in 1938, when we were moved to the new building, a standard one, in contrast to the former one, which was built by the renowned architect Zelenko in the Modern style in the beginning of the twentieth century. In her time, my mother went to school there [in that building].

So, until the tenth grade we were eighteen people (the norm in standard schools being thirty-four). Among the twenty-six, there were thirteen Russians, including one girl with some Polish blood—Natasha Stankevich, the beauty and goddess of our class. The rest were Jewish, some half-Jewish. Such were the times. No one would have thought of making such calculations then. For me, and for everyone, there were no distinctions of who is of what nationality. From the twenty, I think, seven have died already. From the twelve boys no one was killed at the front. And only four of us were at the front: I, Dez’ka Kaufman (now the great poet David Samoilov), Levka Bezymensky, and Natasha Stankevich.

There is an exhibition of amateur painters’ works dedicated to the 40th Victory anniversary on the Krymskaya embankment. This was a foolish venture: it ruins people’s taste, lowers standards for professional art. Although some things can be touching... the badly written, but passionate squabbles on the pages of the visitors’ book.

The GDR artist Haisan was also there... the continuation of German expressionism of the nineteen-twenties, surrealism. The drawings show a lot of talent and are impressive. In the paintings, there is an excess of one technique. If there were three or four paintings of the kind they would be memorable, but when there is almost a hundred, spare me the trouble: a production line is evident here, which means a trade. The themes: the war, fascism, consequences.

June 20th, 1985.

Brutents told me a most interesting thing. Yesterday, while waiting together with Kornienko for an hour and a half in the reception room on the occasion of Gorbachev’s meeting with Assad, Kornienko suddenly opened up and told him the following (in response to the question whether anything is going to be done about Afghanistan).

The initiator of the intervention was... Gromyko, who was enthusiastically supported by Ustinov. Four people talked over the “project” of presenting Brezhnev with this, the people mentioned above plus Andropov and Ponomarev. Yu.V. [Andropov] was “evasive [sic],” he did not object, but talked about possible complications. Ponomarev also mentioned several doubts, but then adjusted quickly. A decisive objection came from the military people, who were assigned to prepare “their considerations [on the matter].” Ogarkov, Akhromeev, and Varennikov submitted a written report, in which they argued that it is impossible and inconceivable, first and foremost from the political standpoint.

But Ustinov summoned them, made them stand at attention, and reprimanded them on the subject: since when do military men undertake the job of deciding politics; ordered them “not to discuss [orders]” and to present a detailed plan of the operation.

Now, Kornienko (who told Brutents that he himself was always against [involvement in Afghanistan]) concluded, we received an assignment from the General Secretary to prepare a proposal “on resolving the Afghan question.”

This is confirmed from another source as well: I was at Arbatov’s on Tuesday, we talked about everything, and he told me again that almost every week he either meets with Gorbachev or speaks with him on the phone. Recently, he says, I (Arbatov) sent him another memo, in which I went over the major issues—from the meeting with Reagan (Yurka believes that we will not have anything to gain by it) to Afghanistan. When he received it, [Gorbachev] called and especially noted Afghanistan, and said that he “agrees.” What exactly Arbatov proposed is clear without explanation.

Besides, the day before, the Pakistani Ambassador visited Arbatov and “begged” him to take some action.

So, some progress will probably be made in this matter. This morning Yurka called and told me that on Wednesday at 8:30a.m. the phone rang: he was told to be at Gorbachev’s at 9:30a.m. He caught a taxi and appeared [on time before Gorbachev]. The talk was “good,” according to not only Arbatov, but also to Lukyanov... from Gorbachev’s words. Over the phone Yurka could only tell me that again the primary topic of the conversation was Afghanistan and that Gorbachev confirmed that this is a “paramount issue” for him.

Today at the Politburo a memo about the STR (from the results of a CC meeting) was discussed for two hours. Everyone spoke. In conclusion, Gorbachev said that the most important is in the fact that the intention, the idea, the purpose [of the STR] is not understood even by many Ministers. Their suggestions are attempts to go down the beaten path, using new slogans as a cover without radically changing anything either in the form of government or in the manner of operation.

But Zamyatin, who reported all this to me, supposedly felt a justificatory tone in the General Secretary [his speech], saying that: we must inform the people, that from our (i.e. his!) side this is not extremism, not leftism, not something artificial, not something subjectively imposed. The issue of a qualitative reformation on the basis of the STR arose a long time ago, it was raised already at the XXIV Congress (he even quoted Brezhnev), but for two entire five-year periods we’ve been treading water, despite the fact that life demanded decisive, revolutionary changes.

One cannot show weakness, even if there is grumbling. The more so, as “the people” are enthusiastic: today I read a selection of letters to the CC from all the ends of the USSR, with evaluations and “advice” on the General Secretary’s first actions. [This selection] was sent around the PB. It moves one a great deal. Tongues have been

loosened, people are writing frankly, strongly, without looking back, about the fact that only now can one speak of a real revival of the Lenin style in relations between the “leader and the people, the party.” And there is not a shadow of the affected cultist emotionality, nor groveling, nor glorification. People are unbosoming everything they stored up from the Brezhnev and Chernenko eras.

This must inspire M.S. However, there is also a danger of finding oneself isolated, as Lenin was in his last years. That is why one must boldly, even more boldly than now, cleanse and replace the staff. The majority of the old personnel will resist [the new changes], even if not out of selfish reasons, but because they cannot work otherwise. Ponomarev is the most glaring example of that.

I also found out from Kornienko that the MFA was assigned to prepare a note of agreement for the Gorbachev-Reagan meeting in Geneva. I am not sure that any strategic sense will come from it, but there will be the moral-political use: Gorbachev will “outdo,” and “intimidate” that cowboy-actor. And one way or the other it will become known to the whole world.

June 22nd, 1985.

By the way, among the letters to Gorbachev that I mentioned above, there are also some of this kind: as soon as you decorate yourself with an Order, they say, as soon as you make yourself laureate of some kind of award, your will in a moment lose all the authority, all the respect that the people feel for you right now!

Gremetz (Secretary of the French CC) summoned the Paris-based Ambassadors of socialist countries and forbade them to have any kind of relations with the PCF! I had to cancel a long-planned colloquium with French socialists, “on disarmament” at the scholarly level, since our consent was considered at the PCF PB and on behalf of Marchais, Gremetz made a protest to our embassy, threatening that otherwise he will cancel the meeting with Gorbachev (which is planned for August). They’re crazy with impudence! Thorez is probably turning in his grave!

June 26th, 1985.

Yesterday at the theoretical conference at the department I reported on the ICM in the zone of developed capitalism. I spoke for about an hour. I was frank and presented myself for what I am, although of course many questions (for which we do not have answers... real answers, I mean) were left untouched. To me it seemed that [the report] aroused interest and even moved people.

Today came a shower of responses. Larisa announced: “Anatoly Sergeevich, all the colleagues were amazed by your report, they say that this moment marks the beginning of a new approach to the Communist Movement in the CPSU.” Lisovolik said that the truth, in the end, is triumphant. Rykin was reserved (he seems to be glancing back at the partkom [party committee] representative, who limited himself to saying that I

made an unusual report), but, shaking my hand, said that the report was interesting. Brutents said that frankness and realism, which we have not heard from this tribune, won people over. There are many serious questions, he says, but we do not know what to do with them.

Speaking at the discussions today, Ivanitsky announced that the conference “continued” yesterday in the hallways, and this morning at breakfast, and in the work rooms, and in the cafeteria at lunch. Some, he says, are saying that Chernyaev dramatized the situation, “exaggerated it.” I do not think so. In our close circle it makes sense to speak only like this.

There were six speeches. All of them, excluding the presumptuous jerk Kudinov’s, were at a very high level, in my opinion sometimes surpassing the level of the report. There was a hidden polemic as well: the person reporting was biased toward objective reasons. But the majority spoke in the spirit of my tone, agreed with my formulation of the main questions. Our people are quite competent and in the majority of cases they have long ago overcome the dogmatic orthodoxy. In a word, I am pleased at the way everything went. But the ripples will go through the partkom and through the other departments, and through Ponomarev, who, of course, would not have liked my report, especially since it appears to be in almost defiant contrast to his report on the outcomes of the April Plenum at the party session at the end of May.

Aleksandrov taunted me a little (over the phone) for the material for Gorbachev’s talks with Trudeau (the former Prime Minister of Canada). Perhaps I deserved it, even though he obviously did it for personal enjoyment. Zagladin warned me that Gorbachev needs a collection of thoughts that he should say to the person, not written instructions to be read out [at the meeting]. I knew that the text, prepared in the American sector and finished up by me, was not the right thing. But what thoughts should we convey to Trudeau, who is God knows what nowadays—not the leader of a party, not the Prime Minister, just... a distinguished tourist, who had the good fortune of knowing Gorbachev in the old days. So we substituted thoughts with “pretty” phrases. It will be a lesson for the future!

June 29th, 1985.

I thought about all of last week: our theoretical conference took place, which excited everyone because we spoke frankly about that which is the main subject of our work, that for which we receive our salary at the CC, and that in which we are professionals. At work, however, we work with this main subject, i.e. the ICM, only about ten percent of the time, if not less. The rest is taken up with servicing Ponomarev’s pretensions at being “the theorist of our party.”

There was an article by Glazunov³⁷ (artist) in “Pravda.” He denounced the nineteen-twenties, including Pertrov-Vodkin, in almost the same way as it was done under Stalin. [This is] vulgar and foolish.

In issue No.6 of *Nash Sovremennik*, there is an insolent article on the state of drama by the *pochvennik* Lubomudrov. It’s written in the 1949-52 framework: all Jewish authors are bad, all Russian ones are good. He mixed Meyerhold with shit. He warned of the infringement on Russian classical literature by all kinds of stage interpreters of it ([interpreters] with Jewish last names, or “known to be Jewish”). So with all the almost uncontrollable “pluralism” in our newspapers, when such insolent things come up, everyone understands where it is coming from and who is encouraging it.

Some people think that someone is interested in estranging Gorbachev from the intelligentsia, while he is busy with economics and such. It is possible! It’s interesting how Yakovlev will act in this situation, if he will really be made head of the Propaganda Department.

Gorbachev makes appearances almost every day. It is true, they are **his** appearances, not ones written for him. But “the people” are beginning to grumble: they are too tired from the profuse speaking of the “preceding orators...” (that is how Bovin called the previous General Secretaries).

It is curious: I am “passionately” awaiting changes, in my heart I urge Gorbachev on—[do it] bolder, sooner. But for me personally the changes do not hold promise of anything good! The trampling and removal of Ponomarev will most likely mean my retirement. Nevertheless, I sincerely want these changes to take place, and I feel contempt for people who grumble about Gorbachev’s bravery, moreover when they do so in confidence and seek an ally in me.

July 1st, 1985.

I was at the Plenum, which lasted for half an hour. Gorbachev, without taking the podium, began to speak in a free manner, saying: tomorrow there will be a session of the Supreme Soviet, we will have to discuss questions about the session, including questions of organization. The first is about the head of the Supreme Soviet Presidium. You know that since 1977 this post was combined with the post of the CC General Secretary. Perhaps it was justified then. The times have changed now; separate organs have different tasks and responsibilities. The General Secretary must concentrate on the role and work of the party.

And, without any kind of transition, he suggested Gromyko as candidate to the head of Supreme Soviet post. [Gorbachev] characterized him with much reserve, did not repay Gromyko’s March Plenum speech, showing once again that the “personal” aspect does not matter to him. He only said that Andrey Andreyevich has been in the party for a

³⁷ Ilya Glazunov

long time, has always consistently followed the party line, is devoted to the principle of collective leadership... And that was all! He spoke neither of his mind, nor his knowledge and abilities.

He moved on to the Supreme Soviet tasks, and tasks of soviets in general; spoke about the need to raise the role of permanent Supreme Soviet committees, right there and then endowing them with the right to not only discuss the Ministries' work, but also to evaluate the Ministers' work, even to censure whether they are fit to occupy their posts.

He spoke of the Public Prosecutor's Office, whose "work leaves much to be desired;" [spoke] about the fact that the Public Prosecutor's Office must keep the law **for everybody**, and must stop the Ministries' and departments' practice of not only interpreting the laws to comply with their needs, but even correcting [the laws to fit their needs].

He named the candidates to the posts of committee chairmen and the deputy chairman to the chairman himself, by the way—without saying a word about his (Gromyko's) role in foreign policy. Everybody took notice of this.

Then [he spoke] about the [post of] Minister of Foreign Affairs. We, Gorbachev says, discussed this question thoroughly at the PB and propose comrade Shevardnadze for this post.

For us, the staff members, this was like a bolt from the blue.

As Ponomarev told me in terrible secrecy, this is what happened at the PB. Unexpectedly for all, Gorbachev named Shevardnadze, making the following comments: we do have major diplomats, who are worthy of being ministers, for example, Kornienko, Chervonenko, Dobrynin. At this point Gromyko interrupted and named Vorontsov, but the General Secretary gave him a sidelong glance and did not respond. The allotted work, he went on, must be directly in the hands of the party and that is why we must nominate a comrade from the party's leadership for this post. Ponomarev also added about Vorontsov: M.S., he says, "did not notice" this name because to give the MFA to Vorontsov, who is practically a relative of Gromyko's, would be to let everything remain as it is.

At the PB session [Gorbachev] gave a testimonial to Shevardnadze: he was able to manage a most difficult situation in Georgia, he is characterized by a sense of the new, by the courage and originality of his approaches.

The Plenum, of course, promoted Shevardnadze from candidate member to full membership of the PB.

I consider all this very indicative of the end of Gromyko's monopoly and the power of the MFA's staff over foreign policy.

Furthermore, Romanov was removed from the PB and dismissed from his CC Secretary post “in accordance with his request, due to declining health.” Gorbachev did not give any explanations as to whether there was any reason [for his removal] or whether it was just decided to get rid of the good-for-nothing swine.

Zaikov, the Leningrad obkom secretary, was elected CC Secretary. He will replace Romanov in dealing with the defense industry. Yeltsin, recently the secretary of the Sverdlovsk obkom, was appointed CC Secretary with a post in the CC apparatus—as deputy of the Construction and Capital Investment Department.

July 2nd, 1985.

It was nice to find out that my report at the theoretical conference was dubbed “the Leningrad speech” after Gorbachev’s speech on May 17th in the department.

July 5th, 1985.

I am exhausted with working on texts for Ponomarev and with the memo assigned by Gorbachev—“on human rights...” We have been composing and coordinating it with the departments for a month and a half.

- [The texts include] letters to Communist Parties about the underdeveloped countries’ debts. Yesterday B.N. raised the draft at the deputies meeting. There is discordance stemming from a lack of understanding. Even Zagladin mechanically proposed to send them to revolutionary democrats. But Brutents and I said stop [sic]: that would be like firing at ourselves, they owe us twenty-six billion. We want to write off debts only in respect to America & Co.

- [The texts include] instructions and other papers for a meeting with English parliamentarians (Kerkshaw). But this is all routine work.

There was, however, a “musical moment” as well, about which Ponomarev told with must pleasure at the same deputies meeting. Firstly [he enjoyed telling about it] because he does not like Rakhmanin. Secondly, for Zagladin’s edification, who publishes articles without Ponomarev’s knowledge pretty often.

And this is what happened: on July [sic] 21st *Pravda* published an article by “Vladimirov” on the socialist commonwealth; an edifying article and with obvious critical implications in relation to Hungary, GDR, not to mention Romania. It mentioned the “nationalistic movements,” and even “phobia of Russians,” and the “models” and “reforms,” and even “discipline,” not to mention the proletarian internationalism in its classic form!

The article was immediately noticed by the American, English, FRG, French, and Italian press. What, they say, could this mean? Are these Gorbachev’s true thoughts, or

opposition to Gorbachev? He allows himself reforms, but for his vassals—no way, [they must] toe the line. The feeling of bewilderment was felt also from Berlin and Budapest...

And so on Saturday (July [sic] 29th) Gorbachev said at the PB: what is this turning out to be! We say that the consolidation of the socialist commonwealth is our first priority, we display maximum resourcefulness and tact in order to consolidate this orientation, to eliminate misunderstandings, to strengthen the trust, etc.; and all of a sudden all this goes to nothing. I already had to come up with excuses—made up a pretext to call Kadar and Honecker, and among other things let them know that “this article does not reflect the opinion of the leadership.” That is how I have to extricate myself.

- Did you—M.S. asks Rusakov—know about this article, about the fact that it was being prepared in your department? Do you know that its author, “Vladimirov,” is your first deputy, CC member Rakhmanin?!

- No, replies Rusakov.

- And did you—M.S. addresses Zimyanin—know that the central CC organ—*Pravda*—was given such an article?

-No, replies another CC Secretary responsible for the press.

- And you—he says to Afanasiev—did you not understand what you were doing? Why didn't you send this article around the PB, or at least around the secretaries?

The chief editor of *Pravda* mumbles something, referring to Rakhmanin's go-ahead power and to the fact that he is first deputy of the Socialist Countries Department and that he should understand what he is doing.

- So, Gorbachev counters... Firstly, it is an absolute disgrace that the department deputy (Rusakov) does not know what is going on in his department. Secondly, why do we need such workers in the CC apparatus, who act as they wish on the most important political questions, and we have to clean the mess for them afterwards. Such behavior deserves immediate dismissal from the CC... However, since this is the first time (here M.S. wasn't telling the truth... he cannot not know that Rakhmanin leads “his own” policy in, for example, issues with China—countering the CC and harming the state interests!) ... we will limit the measures to a strict warning.

I think if it was anyone else but Rakhmanin, he would have been dismissed immediately. Something, somebody is backing him...

Still, one thing is clear: now there is no chance for Oleg Borisovich of becoming not only a CC Secretary, which, judging by his actions, he clearly aimed to do, but even a department deputy instead of his ailing chief Rusakov.

Also the latter's appeal to me is clear now, when in the elevator he so intimately asked me to "find him a good replacement."

There is justice after all—the presumptuous have gone too far. The ideology stemming from our Great revolution, from Lenin, is still alive, despite the fact that it has been persecuted in every possible way, it has been drowned, twisted, and turned into its very opposite... It is alive in the pores of the party, of society... And it is bursting through at the breaks in its [the society's] development, the break we are living through right now.

At today's PB session Sashka Yakovlev was made deputy of the Propaganda Department. He revenged all his enemies... Demichev³⁸ especially lost out in this. He [Yakovlev] called me. Spoke of "collaboration," even asked for help during the first stages—he is being cunning, flattering, and generous because he is glad; however, I also did something to help justice triumph in his case.

But the work he is going to have to face is—oh, so difficult.

July 6th, 1985.

I played tennis for two hours in the morning. On the way home I stopped by a grocery store to get some vegetables. Everyone there, from the manager to the saleswomen, is drunk. The anti-alcoholism law is nothing for them. Try to fire them. Who are you going to find to replace them?

Another time I went to the grocery store on Gertzen Street. I stood in line for half an hour. The produce, even though locally grown, looks terrible. The women are having a row with the manager, but she is not to be trifled with, and besides, she is drunk.

July 11th, 1985.

Almost every day brings an overabundance of information that is very interesting for a political journal. But a whole "all-nighter" would be necessary to write everything down. For example, today Rykin (head of the German sector) got back from West Berlin and the GDR. He tells: Herbert Miss definitively turned up his nose at Honecker, he shouts: "Am I a party or GDR's puppet?"

Marchais is coming. Gorbachev will have to receive him, even though he is a useless animal. By supporting him, we are harming the party—he became a symbol of its breakdown in the eyes of the left, the right, and everyone, in his own party as well as in the ICM in general. Moreover, he is going to demand that Gorbachev reject Mitterand's invitation to visit. Gremetz is coming tomorrow, I will have to come to co-ordinate the communiqué with him. I can imagine it!..

There are new transcripts about the conclusion of the second round in Geneva. The Americans are easily duping the public. We, on the other hand, are repeating the

³⁸ Petr Demichev

same thing over and over again, which looks like a deadlock to everyone interested in the heart of the matter.

I speak more and more irritably and fretfully with Ponomarev. He even said: "It is difficult with you..." He proposes foolishness, counts on making an impression on the English parliamentarians. But they don't give a damn about him and his lectures; they now want Gorbachev and Shevardnadze. He makes me compose meaningless papers: memoranda for the English, concluding remarks for himself, etc. They will wipe themselves [with these papers], if they ever care to touch them. That's why I'm rebelling. He wants to appoint a "political commissioner" to the delegation. To the English, who keep even their embassy workers at a distance! All this is imitation of participation in big politics.

Peccioli (PCI Secretary) told Lun'kov (ambassador) a whole lot about raging anti-Sovietism in France and about the right's plans of making million-strong protesting sessions for Gorbachev when he comes to Paris. I suspect blackmail. Did the Italians and Marchais & Co. make an agreement to thwart Gorbachev's visit? The same Peccioli, who had expressed enthusiasm about Gorbachev's work, now reproaches the International Department and its leadership for calling Italian Communists opportunists through Lun'kov's mouth, even though they themselves "count it as their duty to make a point to their Soviet comrades about the lag, the retrogression, etc. of the Soviet society, and the negative consequences of this for the entire Communist Movement." Lun'kov, of course, is putting pressure on the International Department; maybe he is even making it up. There is something in that.

Ambassadors are already writing though "higher channels" about the washing-out of the working class under the STR. The Fedoseev-Trapeznikov campaign against me ten years ago comes to mind.

June 13th, 1985.

Gremetz has arrived. He met with Ponomarev. I showed him the draft of the communiqué (a review of the forthcoming Gorbachev-Marchais meeting). There is a list of questions on which the PCF disagrees with the CPSU. To my surprise B.N. did not object, and said: "Set it all down officially for us, we will think, and, maybe, will take it into account at the highest level."

However, I then had to "concretely" go through the text with Maxime. It's funny but annoying: instead of arguing for the major claims which he presented to Ponomarev and about which I, unlike him, did not keep quiet, he impudently stated the exact opposite of what he and Marchais had announced about a year or two ago when they warned us not to come into conflict with "revolutionary international solidarity" with our state interests. I mockingly presented all this to him, comparing what they said before with what they are saying now. We grappled over the Bonn meeting of "the Seven" in May 1985. He even said: either the CPSU will agree with their evaluation, or Marchais will not visit. We're so scared! I say to him: Maxime, do you understand what you're saying?

We agreed to this meeting with your General Secretary before Gorbachev's official visit to Paris solely for reasons of "international solidarity," even though right now we do not really need this [meeting]. He changed his tune, and we sat until seven in the evening and in general were pleased with each other, perhaps because I never tired of praising him.

There are writers' testimonials for The Children of Arbat. I would have written one myself. We must, must press for the publication of this book "in the name of moral health." I think I might slip the book to Yakovlev, in his new quality as deputy of the CC Propaganda Department. We will see what kind of an anti-Stalinist he will be, when he has to take the responsibility for it! I have a feeling that Gorbachev will allow the publication. It would be something like "the moral XX Congress"—to completely finish with Stalin.

Adzhubei called my consultant Kovalsky (they were acquainted before). He said that he wrote a letter to Gorbachev, saying that he is not being published, he has been in a spiritual exile for the past twenty years, etc. Four days later he received an answer from Gorbachev: it will not be like this anymore, write, get published, and work. Does this signify a new look at Khrushchev, a kind of rehabilitation of [Adzhubei]?

I am reading some information on the RSFSR. 200,000,000 square meters of housing are in need of urgent repairs or must be torn down. Barracks have not been liquidated yet. The water supply and sewage systems are overloaded; over 300 cities do not have them at all. Almost half the streets and passageways in Russian cities have no hard road surfacing.

July 15th, 1985.

The Communist commissioned an article from Gremetz, but when it was discussed at the editorial board it was rejected. The fact is that Gorbachev's visit to Paris is coming up, and Gremetz's article calls president Mitterand "a reactionary."

The final meeting with the English parliamentarians is tomorrow. My God, how much trouble there is with them! For them, this is the usual political talk, but I have to prepare memos for B.N. considering all the possible versions of discussion. And each [of the memos] must have a quote from Gorbachev. For him [Ponomarev], the Brezhnev-Chernenko style is continuing strong.

The play *Tevye the Milkman* by Sholom Aleichem is being shown on television. The fact that this is being shown worldwide, and the fact that Ulyanov is in the role of Tevye is a social event, progress; it is possible that we are really beginning to understand the Jewish problem. It is in the heart of Russia, you cannot put an end to it without breaking free of everything in the past. As a protagonist of one novel said about this: "We are not some kind of Germans!"

July 17th, 1985.

I read an astute article on the significance of history by Yuri Afanasiev (a historian, member of *The Communist* editorial board). A short time ago it would have been impossible to imagine such an intellectual discussion about history in a CC organ.

I did not go to a lunch at the FRG embassy on the occasion of Horst Ehmke's (deputy chairman of the Social Democrats faction in the Bundestag) arrival. I was promised a private conversation with him outdoors. I should have gone, since tomorrow I will have to talk with this Ehmke at an official meeting. So far I don't know what I'll talk about.

There are hundreds of ciphered memos, including memos about the end of the second round in Geneva: the chitchat is continuing, the same thing for fifteen to eighteen pages.

Reagan had a cancer removed from the rectum; the doctors announced that they weren't sure that there wasn't something left. Not only the Americans', but even my interest for the highest level talks has weakened somehow.

I gave Yakovlev *The Children of Arbat*. I wonder, what will it come to?

A working group has concentrated on the Party Program at the dacha at Volynskoe. The preparation of a "picture of the world" (the introductory section) is assigned to Afanasiev (chief editor of *Pravda*), Kosolapov, and Fedoseev. It's enough to make one's sides split! It's easy to guess what kind of picture they will present. It's a pity and a bore, since "for Gorbachev" they could have depicted a truly serious picture... framed in the philosophy of the new domestic and foreign policy.

August 9th, 1985.

B.N. called me back from my vacation (I was at Yurmala) to finish the CC summary report material for the XXVII Congress. At the Gorky dacha, I found four of my consultants and four fellows from the MFA, headed by Kovalev. They were supposed to finish preparing the basis for the foreign policy section [summary]. What my boys did, and what the MFA guys did is primitive and traditional. It was easy to cover for my guys, but with Kovalev's it is more difficult, especially since they were placed in an autonomous position in their section and formally I cannot impinge on their text. Unknown to Kovalev, I asked three of my consultants—Yermonsky, Sobakin, and Sokolov—to prepare our version. What the CC Socialist Countries Department prepared is something like that "Vladimirov" article that was subjected to annihilating criticism at the PB. [They presented] the socialist commonwealth as a besieged fortress, and the zeal of the section is to pipe all hands on deck before various imperialistic threats. There is emphasis on the consolidation and uniformity of thought and action. There is not a word on sovereignty and independence. There is equality only in the part on China, which is about five lines out of the fourteen pages. The whole text has a tone of lecturing and formulating tasks for the fraternal countries. Almost every phrase contains the words "must," "necessary," "ought to," "should," "requires," etc. Rakhmanin even ordered the

word “creative” (in the context of using Marxism-Leninism in the national conditions) to be thrown out.

Zagladin and I do not have the authority to correct it, but we agreed to send Ponomarev a word of our bewilderment regarding this section. Together with Vadim, we also decided to set forth our complaints about Kovalev’s section: the absence of new material, timidity about boldly stating the issues with Afghanistan, with Japan, with Israel, and even concerning England, not to mention the missile arms control. And there is no West-European direction as such. In a word, the text is written Brezhnev-style, not Gorbachev-style.

Zagladin told me about a hallway conversation at the CC apparatus: Rakhmanin is weaving intrigues against the International Department. He is saying that this is the nest of revisionism, [that] they are untying the hands of the social democrats, they have opened the doors to socialist countries for it [social democrats], they are undermining the Marxist-Leninist unity of the ICM, and they’ve created an ideological mess in their department. Etc.

August 13th, 1985.

B.N., who is on vacation in the Crimea, fell into panic upon receiving our texts. He addressed a polite memo to the three of us—Zagladin, me, and Kovalev, but over the phone he broke out cursing. I tried to interrupt him, in the sense that I said that it was his fault for thrusting the MFA people over us and for giving them the authority over the foreign policy section. Again, I said, you do not believe in your employees and expect genius from others. It could not have been otherwise. This is the result of MFA people’s slow, tedious, bureaucratic work; with an enormous loss of time, because Kovalev, in his soft, shy manner, with breathless politeness holds on to every phrase. So we had to either be rude, or compromise. You—I said to B.N.—are aware of his devotion to lacy words, in which only a terribly experienced person can detect some newness. To make a long story short, I said, working with Kovalev threatens failure to fulfill the assignment. I promised to prepare my own version in two days and to send it to Crimea for him.

August 19th, 1985.

It became known that B.N., using the fact that Gorbachev is also on a holiday in the Crimea, tried to slip him our text. But M.S. said: “Don’t do that, let’s do it in the general order” (i.e. through the General Department).

All right... the deed is done. In our executor’s opinion—it’s not bad. The text will probably not come back to us, but will be given to a group that will be set up and most likely headed by Yakovlev. By the way, about Yakovlev: he is slowly rising above the others. Brutents was present at his first clash with Zimyanin. The latter started to tell him (something like a certain Lubomudrov’s article in *Nash Sovremennik* it seems) that the Jews (the critics) are attacking Russian literature and that this should be “fixed.” But Sashka objected: “Not only the Jews are attacking, and not the Russian authors, but the

pochvennik tendency, the modern reactionary Slavophilism.” The exchange of opinions ended with that. And then Zimyanin began calling Yakovlev on other occasions, which Sashka described like this: he’s fawning!

Brutents told another story as well, about what kinds of dachas some people have. His daughter and son in law met Primakov’s daughter and visited their dacha, in the Barvikha area. They came back shocked, they could not have imagined anything like it, and would not have believed it if they hadn’t seen it with their own eyes. A bungalow, villa, manor... they could not find the right word for it. Twelve rooms, everything in imitation oak, imported home appliances, not to mention the furniture, a Peugeot in the garage, a Zhiguli for the children... No salary, not even an academician’s and an institute director’s, would be enough for these unheard of riches. Should a representative of the party control commission, or even a raikom representative show up there, our Academician—Brutents concluded gloatingly—would right away become a candidate for expulsion from the party.

Meanwhile, he is a candidate for a transfer from the director of the Institute of Oriental Studies post to the post of Director of IMEMO—a position with much better prospects.

August 27th, 1985.

The results of the youth festival in Moscow were being discussed at the Politburo. Everyone spoke on the subject, including Chebrikov, who told that there had been a terrorist attempt: five Afghan nationals turned up among the delegates (from Paris). They wanted to arrange explosions in the metro and in the TSUM [central department store]. But, naturally, they were neutralized by “vigilant *chekists* [KGB officials].”

Gorbachev, although somewhat surprised by the nature of the discussion, derived some lessons from it:

- The importance of contacts between foreigners and the Soviet people for an accurate perception of us. We should not be afraid—let them come here as much as possible. Let them look, let them see what we are like in reality. We are not so bad.

- The contacts between the Americans, who after the festival took a trip down the Volga, and regular Soviet people have produced a better repealing of “the Soviet threat” than all our foreign propaganda. Propaganda that for so many years cannot convince the West that there is no Soviet threat is worthless.

- We have adopted a resolution on creating a satellite TV [sic] system “Moscow Global” for foreign countries. But what are we going to broadcast??

- We must learn to discuss, debate, to defend our ideas and convictions. We have forgotten how to do it. We must prepare specialists for it. MGIMO prepares a caste, not

specialists: people are eager to get in there in order to buy themselves stuff abroad, not in order to fight for our ideas.

- On making films about the festival: it is not enough to show the opening and closing [ceremonies]. This is nice, but it's a show. We have to show the discussions, and we must not be afraid to show it like it was: the arguments about Afghanistan, about Jews, about everything. We must get the people used to debating.

- Ideological work. It is a very difficult pursuit! This work should make people sweat, but our ideologists are in general idling.

- About youth. We've developed a user's attitude towards them: need someone to work in potato fields—send a youth group, need someone to sort vegetables at the warehouse—send another youth group, need someone to build a shed for free—again a group, etc. But we should entrust the youth with real participation in the political process. Then the infantilism will disappear, and culture will emerge—not bookish culture. A society that cannot prepare a replacement for itself is an immature society.

- About the leisure time for young people. Lectures are good; however, the substantial ideological work with youth usually ends with lectures. And the lectures mostly consist of dressing-down and exhortations. We have to put our thinking caps on and come up with interesting activities and interesting pastimes, which our youth would agree to and which they would organize themselves, thus educating themselves.

- The specialists will be the deciding factor. We must start to work seriously on preparing ideological specialists; and should place people who will be able to lead this most difficult work in appropriate positions.

This was all implied criticism of Zamyatin and Zimyanin. But also of Grishin, who, it seems, doesn't have much time left...

Gorbachev raised the question of supplying Moscow with fruit and vegetables, although it was not on the agenda. He called up Kozlov—the fruit and vegetable Minister—from his seat. He, as usual, began to shower us with numbers. Gorbachev called up Dementieva (second secretary of the Moscow City Committee—Grishin is on vacation); she talked profusely, contending that they are doing enormous work, etc.

Gorbachev let them take their seats. Then he put his hand on a pile of letters and said: everything that you've been saying is nonsense. Here, at the PB, you must say only the truth. And you, even if you are not consciously lying, simply do not know where the truth is, where to look for it. Here are letters from all ends of the capital. Even if this is about "isolated shortcomings in isolated places," then you are still not doing your job well. We are discussing this question for the third time: once under Andropov, once under Chernenko, and now. So, let this be the third warning. If the situation does not improve, then other people will be dealing with this question.

People say that the stores already have everything, right up to eggplants.

I read in the Secretariat protocol about a “delay” of a military train going from Bataisk to Mari (Turkmenistan, on the border with Afghanistan). The men were drafted from the North Caucasus republics. [The conflict] began with arguments, then turned into the beating of Russian men while the officers, one and all, were habitually drunk (meanwhile, the train kept going and going for thousands of kilometers). It concluded with anti-Soviet screams and rows on religious grounds, among others. At Mari the train was surrounded by troops... with the appropriate consequences. What idiot came up with the idea of sending North Caucasus Muslims to the Afghani border! But not only this: in 1936-7 boys had to be taken off trains, they were bursting to fight in Spain. And now we virtually have a revolt by Soviet young men, who are being sent to carry out “international duty.” No, Mikhail Sergeevich! Something needs to be done with Afghanistan. This is a moral problem... Your explanations to Kunaev—I don’t know whether you told him everything or had something else on your mind—are not adequate to the seriousness of the situation.

Arbatov told me that the KGB has taken up the question of *The Children of Arbat*. His friend V. A. Kryuchkov asked him: they say your signature is under the collective appeal in favor of printing the novel? Arbatov, confused, answered: no. At this moment, Kryuchkov gave “a sigh of relief,” saying: “Thank God!” So, it seems, this is how the whole affair will be presented to Gorbachev. Zimyanin, at least, will really try for it. What about Yakovlev, to whom I sent the manuscript a month ago??..

August 29th, 1985.

Yesterday I finished and distributed to the deputies a thirty-nine page long memo on the Communist, Revolutionary-Democratic and Social-Democratic movements. This is the International Department’s report for the XXVII Congress.

I finished a memo to the CC on the 100th anniversary of May 1st celebrations.

[There is] information for Gorbachev about Rotschtein’s letter to him, about the situation in the Communist Party of Great Britain and about our line.

[There are] remarks on the October anniversary editorial for *The Communist*. I argued about the scholasticism a la [sic] Trapeznikov in portraying the experience of the CPSU and of the principles to which it supposedly always adhered ideally, which means also under Stalin, and under Brezhnev...

[There was] a talk with colleagues from *The Communist* about what should be done with the Gremetz article, which they commissioned but now do not want to keep some of its elements: the rejection of the dictatorship of the proletariat (which the chief editor Kosolapov is in love with), the mentioning of Stalin, and the criticism of Mitterand.

Through reading different CC reports and telegrams I gathered a great deal of information, which must again and again be considered in what we are doing at the Gorky dacha.

I spoke with Ponomarev over the hot line about the fact that we should emphasize, but in a smart way, the West-European direction of our policy. He agreed, but today sent me such nonsense! It's about the revolutionary movement, and he wrote it himself. And this is for the social-democratic leaders, before whom he is going to speak in Vienna! He still wants to speak with them in the language of the "labor movement" to which we both belong; he's railing against imperialism, etc. But they do not want to relate to us on the platform of the labor movement, they do not consider themselves representatives of it, and they definitely do not want the CPSU to qualify them as such. In essence, they are representatives of the "realistically minded circles," and they speak with us as with a superpower, not as labor movement representatives. But all of this is above Ponomarev's level of comprehension, he is up in Dimitrov-Comintern clouds. And he is confusing all our work. He should just be a talking machine from the CPSU leadership, and not have a claim to "his own," which reeks with oppressive stagnancy and is only detrimental in the current situation.

I insisted that Bronfman (leader of the World Jewish Congress) be allowed into the USSR. This multimillionaire seems to want to "shift" the situation of enmity between the Jews and us... and to start with, [he wants to] prevent the anti-Gorbachev demonstrations during his visit in Paris.

I read PB materials, including [information] about civil aviation. It turns out we have over a hundred crashes per year, including very serious ones. This year already, accidents with just three planes have brought 459 deaths: [they were] due to technical problems, the backward work of the control tower; the [lack of] discipline, the drunkenness, the unqualified flight personnel.

The interview with Gorbachev prepared for *Time* is very impressive. One can sense the touch of Yurka Arbatov (he hinted to me that he was working on "a special assignment"). Against the background of this text—done in the characteristically Gorbachev style—our vain attempts at chasing rainbows at Gorky look pitiful.

I spoke with Yakovlev. He brought up *The Children of Arbat* himself. He said that he finished it, that he read it at night (he gave himself away)... and immediately began with distracting moves: said that there is a lot of sex, everyone is fucking all over the place, I don't remember, he says, that it was like that in our time (the 30s). I reminded him of *The Diary of Kostya Ryabtsev*, by Panteleimon Romanov, and expressed my surprise: is this really the most striking element that caught your attention?! He gave himself away once again when he began telling that in 1937 his father went through something similar to what Rybakov describes: at the time of the plan "of liquidation" of people in such and such positions (for example, each region had an order to liquidate so many kolkhoz leaders, so many village soviet leaders, etc.).

And, finally, the author presents the matter as if Stalin killed Kirov. But this question has not been cleared up! And then, isn't it early for us to examine Stalin's psychology (even in the form of artistic analysis?!) In response I reminded him that fifty years after the Patriotic War Lev Nikolaevich also "spoke" on behalf of Aleksandr I, Kutuzov, and Napoleon, delving deeply into their psychology and not restricting himself by the fact that neither he nor anyone else can support through documents what exactly they were thinking and how they were reasoning.

That was our conversation. And I understood that Yakovlev will not be "for" the publication.

September 1st, 1985.

It was an interesting week at work. Firstly, there was the printed *Time* interview with Gorbachev, and, of about the same length, a conversation with three Americans. Once again the frankness and clarity of positions was striking: in foreign [policy] the position is—to live and let live (that is how we now understand peaceful coexistence), in domestic [policy] the position is—complete openness, the kind of "discussion" of our shortcomings, weaknesses, and lagging behind, which scares the West more than any boasting that we have been doing for so many decades. And all this is directly in the face of "the imperialistic den."

Last night Arbatov and I took a walk through the Arbat alleys. He told me [about the preparation of the interview]: at first the text of the responses was submitted for Shevardnadze's signature (which Yura considers to be "justified"), and Zimyanin's. He characterized this text with one word: "Crap!" Upon receiving the text, Gorbachev called Arbatov and Yakovlev, seated them separately and told them to read it and comment. They read it, and said, as Arbatov told me, another word with one voice: "Garbage!" In four days Yurka wrote another text, Yakovlev studied it, nipped at it, Boldin edited the middle sections a little. PB members made comments upon distribution; that's their method, as Arbatov, who is inclined to use barrack-style terminology, described it: "as soon as they see something they click with the scissors, and one testicle is gone!"... So each cuts off a testicle. But the essence, the spirit and the style, remain. And this, of course, is an event, at least in the ideological fight; if, of course, our ideologists will be able to not only understand it, but also to "reform." Because right now the trouble is not only in the resistance from the staff, who were brought up on post-Stalinism, but also in the fact that they do know how, do not have the ability, to work in the Gorbachev style.

On Friday Gorbachev called me, too. But it was for a less important reason: [he asked me] to think about the program for Raisa Maksimovna's stay in Geneva during his meeting with Reagan there. I thought about it, sent my "suggestions." And in general, he is taking the role of his wife seriously, besides the fact that he is by nature a family man and she suits him in every respect. And it is lucky for us that our leading man has an intelligent wife in an age when wives have begun to play a certain role in international life.

We, poor sinners, must once again reconstruct the text at the Gorky dacha—in accordance with the spirit and content of Gorbachev’s interview. Our one difficulty is Ponomarev. He cannot accept the very spirit of Gorbachev’s self-critical optimism, which is right now really becoming a factor in our influence on the outside world.

I am reading V. Rasputin’s *The Fire*. He is among those of our most notable writers continuing the traditions of the Great Russian literature, who, in depicting characters and events, can artistically take out of context not only the leading role of the party, but its very existence, even the presence of the Soviet rule in our society.

September 7th, 1985.

Zagladin, snatching a moment in Gorbachev’s talk with Marchais, asked M.S. whether he would mind if Ponomarev would lead the delegation to the Socialist International in Vienna. The other [Gorbachev] laughed and said: let him go, let’s not disappoint him, just do not let him lecture, moralize, and try to convince them where they’ve already been long convinced! So the General Secretary has a very precise idea of the “essence” of our chief.

The Program draft was discussed (Ligachev led the discussion, CC Secretaries and the working group were present). There are curious divergences of opinion: for example, Dolgikh, following Afanasiev, is against writing about the lagging behind and the mistakes—in the 1930s, 1940s, under Nikita, and under Brezhnev. “It sounds like there was nothing but mistakes,” he says. Zimyanin, apparently better sensing the mood at the top, did not join them, but called for moderation. And Ligachev said in conclusion that we must note the mistakes; and concerning the end of the 1970s and 1980s we must also talk about the reasons: the personnel selection, the decline in discipline and responsibility, the discrepancy between word and deed.

In general, the draft was complimented (except for Afanasiev, who said that the middle part is simply weak). It is bad that it was complimented. It does not live up to the expectations.

Gorbachev departed for Siberia: Nizhnevartovsk, Surgut, Tyumen, Tselinograd. Yesterday I watched his speech before the party activists in Tumen. He is doing a good job. His approach to the way a General Secretary should behave with people is different in essence. He participates in lively interaction, decides right away what may and should be said and how it should be said... His staff does not prepare it, the “orator” chooses what is more appropriate...

He has taken on oil and Siberia! All the best to him!

September 21st, 1985.

Gorbachev-scale documents are prepared in three to four days. But we (Ponomarev’s people) are, under his leadership, fretting for months over some report that

is not worth more than an ironic smile from a serious politician. We want to instill the spirit of the times and the political common sense into him (Ponomarev), but he keeps leaning towards cheap propaganda.

The West is charmed and staggered by the emergence of such a leader here. They are enthusiastic, but also rather afraid. He is acting boldly. To the Americans he proposed (besides two moratoria) a considerable reduction in strategic and Euro missiles... instead of the Strategic Defense Initiative. They won't go for it, but we will be in the win: the stereotype of "the Soviet threat" is being torn down.

September 25th, 1985.

Our new major disarmament initiatives will be given to the Americans only on October 2, and on the 4th they will be proposed in Gorbachev's speech at the National Assembly in France.

Well, as usual, Ponomarev turned out to be "right." Shevardnadze's speech at the UN was published today, and in structure and content it reminds one very much of what B.N. is imposing on us with his anti-imperialistic obsession.

I signed a request (Drabkin's, from the Institute of General History) for a book called *Revolution in World History*. It's an original try. I am not sure that something will come of it. And I am sure that I cannot myself participate in this as much as I would want to: I want to, but can't, and not only because of a lack of time and laziness. Talent is needed here, in order to realize this (properly speaking, my) original, unusual project.

September 28th, 1985.

There was a discussion of the Program at the Politburo. The major idea that Ponomarev derived from it is that Gorbachev does not want to trample down the 1961 Program (for reasons of international prestige, the Lenin tradition of handling party documents with care, and because, after all, much has been done since then). This is the last consolation for B.N.

Among the interesting [events]—there was a reprimand for keeping information about nationalism and other inclinations in socialist countries in the Program. Gorbachev ordered to decidedly throw it out: this way we will fall out with all our friends. Of course, "they have something." But, he says, he just spoke with Kadar: he assures that 97% of the economy is in the socialist sector, and that the CC has complete control of the situation, "the fears are groundless." Why, he [Gorbachev] says, shouldn't we believe that?

He said that the Social Democrats are intercepting the initiative from the Communist Parties, and the latter are drifting toward social democracy. And [Gorbachev said] that the perspective of the Communists is not clear (in the draft). What did he mean to say by that?

October 7th, 1985.

Gorbachev's week in Paris: yet another try in Russia's centuries-long attempt to brotherly embrace Europe. And once again the response is irony, coldness, polite arrogance. This is again a Dostoevsky-Danilov-Blok type situation (Mitterrand's mean and haughty face during the entire time of a joint press-conference with Gorbachev was the face of Europe in response to our cordiality). And once again, we are on the eve of a historic bitterness (especially if nothing comes from the Gorbachev-Reagan meeting, and most likely nothing will come of it).

However, something has been done to change people's ideas about us. Most importantly, we tried to be appealing to Europe, or rather tried to openly show Europe our good intentions; we are changing. I don't know whether Gorbachev is doing this consciously because he is a realist and wants to consider "the realities" in everything? Because if you read carefully everything he has said in the past six months, and especially in Paris, it is easy to discern a rejection of ideological intolerance. And this is a good start, if, of course, this is a start and not just diplomacy, "ideology for export," as my B.N. is convinced. Propaganda will not pick this up on its own: the ideas must be instilled into it. It is important that this "shift" be secured at the Congress. (I spoke with Arbatov on this subject; it's his job to satiate foreign policy texts with philosophical content). But we must first resolve the "Jewish question" and the issue of relations between the new (Gorbachev's) leadership and the intelligentsia, which he has not gotten around to yet.

October 15th, 1985.

There was a CC Plenum on the new wording of the Program, the Charter, the main directions through 2000. Gorbachev spoke about the unity and diversity of the world and about coexistence, which is a law (and not tactics) of development that we must submit to unconditionally.

There was an interesting moment—Demidenko's, the first secretary of Kazakhstan's Kustanai obkom, speech. He, as some of the "previous speakers," began to speak of the "Bolshevist style" of comrade Gorbachev, about the "Lenin approach," and about how we are "fortunate, to have such dynamic leadership," etc. Gorbachev was becoming annoyed when he was listening to the preceding speakers, and he was patient with it, but this time he could not stand it any longer: "Comrade Demidenko! We can understand why in the West there is talk about "the Gorbachev style," "Gorbachev's dynamism," "the character of the new leader," etc. It is accepted there and they need it. But why do we need this at the Plenum: Gorbachev, the style of Gorbachev? Why should we delve in this?"

Demidenko mumbled the rest of his speech in confusion. People applauded when he said the compliments, and exploded in an ovation when Gorbachev checked him. That means that everyone understands, but the momentum of the cult and of subservience is inexorable!

Well, bureaucracy and verbiage in solemn form is the image of today's thought. Thought and political culture do not exist. No one, except for Afanasiev, could speak intelligently about the Program content. Again the usual self-reports are presented—about achievements in one's republic, oblast, factory, etc. Just like under Brezhnev, Chernenko...

From the 8th to the 14th of October I was in Toulouse, France, at the Congress of the French Communist Party. By the way, there was not a word about the nuclear threat and the arms race. Then we are winding ourselves up. And people in Europe aren't thinking about it!

And "our friends?" At their conference at Nanter (on the same days) there was not a word about Gorbachev's visit to France. For the Communists to praise the visit is to praise Mitterand. Province! It is funny. Ridiculous. And we had thought, that from now on France would live only by this visit.

October 16th, 1985.

I read the transcript of Gorbachev's talk with Karmal, who was secretly called to Moscow on October 10. [The situation] is critical indeed: ten of our boys die every day. The people are disappointed and ask how long our troops will remain there. And when will the Afghans learn to defend themselves? The most important [issue] is that there is no popular base. Without that any kind of revolution has no chances. It is recommended to make a sharp turn back—to free capitalism, to the Afghani and Islamic values, to sharing the power with oppositional and even the currently hostile forces. This is a sharp turn! It was recommended to seek compromises even with rebel leaders, and, of course, with the emigrants.

Will Karmal agree to this, and most importantly—is he capable of this? Does he have sufficient control of the situation for the currently hostile forces to meet him halfway?

I met with Kashtan (General Secretary of Canada's CP). Walt and Bisel are with him. Returning from [a meeting with] Kim Il Song they made a special stop to meet with me. As usual, I enlightened them on all the issues: to be sure, their Congress is coming up early in November, they have to bring at least something home from Moscow. Kashtan acted like quite an important person, but he understands that he will not be allowed [to meet with anyone] above me.

Like the other CPs (including the PCI) he complained that right now the CPSU is on better terms with the socialists and social democrats than it is with fraternal parties.

It turns out that on Sunday, when I was still in Toulouse, people from Gorbachev called my house: he wanted to invite me to his dacha to watch films that Ermash and I selected for showing at Geneva. This is a lost opportunity to have a frank talk, among other things about what is to be done with the ICM.

There are terribly many things to do. I am left to finish up the International section of yet another CC summary report for the XXVII Congress (the deadline is 11.25). But the entire day I could not even start on it because there is a heap of routine work, hundreds of ciphered memos and other documents that I have to know, and calls, arrangements, orders. By the way, today I saw the CC (PB) resolution on the results of the Paris visit—it is [done] almost entirely on the basis of my draft.

October 17th, 1985.

I was at the Politburo today. There was a historical statement about Afghanistan. Gorbachev has finally made up his mind to put an end to it. [Gorbachev] outlined his talk with Karmal. He, Gorbachev said, was dumbfounded, in no way expected such a turn, was sure that we need Afghanistan more than he does, and was clearly expecting that we will be there for a long time, if not forever. That is why I had to express myself with the utmost clarity: by the summer of 1986 you will have to learn how to defend your revolution yourselves. We will help you for the time being, though not with soldiers but with aviation, artillery, equipment. If you want to survive you have to broaden the regime's social base, forget about socialism, share real power with the people who have real authority, including the leaders of bands and organizations that are now hostile towards you. Restore Islam to its rights, [restore] the people's customs, lean on the traditional authorities, find a way to make the people see what they are getting from the revolution. And turn the army into an army, stop with the Parchamist and Khalqist scuffle, raise the salaries of officers, mullahs, etc. Take care of private trade, you will not be able to establish a different economy for a long time yet. And so on in this vein.

He read several heart-rending letters, all of them not anonymous. There is a good deal of everything [in the letters]: international duty?! For what? Do the Afghans themselves want us to fulfill this duty? And is this duty worth the lives of our boys, who do not understand what they are fighting for?.. And why are you (the Soviet leadership) throwing recruits against professional killers and gangsters, who have been taught by the best foreign instructors and who are armed with the best weapons: ten of whom are capable of fighting against a whole brigade?! At least recruit volunteers or something...

Besides the letters filled with tears, mothers' grief over the dead and the crippled, heart-rending descriptions of funerals, there are letters of accusation: the Politburo made a mistake and it should be rectified, the sooner the better, because every day is taking lives.

By giving an account of this, Gorbachev was obviously forcing emotions, but he did not qualify the letters' evaluations, for example by saying whether it was a mistake or not. He concluded by saying: "With or without Karmal we will follow this line firmly, which must in a minimally short amount of time lead to our withdrawal from Afghanistan."

Marshal Sokolov took the floor twice, and it was obvious that he was ready to pull out of there and had no plans of giving Karmal any indulgences.

Gromyko took the floor, pronounced some amendments to the recommendations that are supposed to be handed over to Karmal in a day or two. One just had to see his colleagues', including Gorbachev's, ironic faces, they seemed to say: and why are you, jerk, now reasoning about it... you drew the country into such an affair, and now you would have us all responsible. I think Gorbachev will tell the people of this decision even before the Congress.

He called me in the evening, asked about France, where I just was. Just, he says, tell it frankly, do not embellish the situation after my (Gorbachev's) visit. He thoroughly "came down on" Zhora (Marchais) and Gremetz, and agreed with my evaluations.

I received the Hungarian Ambassador, explained to him everything about England on the eve of Kadar's visit there.

October 19th, 1985.

Yesterday I read materials prepared for Gorbachev for the Political Consultative Committee in Sofia, which is coming up on 11.22.85. There are new and brave approaches. It even seemed to me that the people who prepared this used our summary report draft for the CPSU Congress. Still, Gorbachev goes farther. For example, this is what is said about the ICM:

1) It [the ICM] is going through difficult times. Communist Parties will still have to interpret the process of the modern world and to work out a course that will respond to the present-day situation, and which will be capable to move the masses.

2) We should not dramatize the differences; we should not get offended when we are criticized. Often it turns out that we now have to admit to what we were criticized for, and to undertake the correction of what they pointed out to us. We should not expect to be only praised and people to have only enthusiasm for us.

3) An international conference of Communist Parties is not of importance in the present day. We must look for different forms and especially we must help Communist Parties by setting an example in the exploration of modern processes, i.e. by our scientific potential.

4) We must meet the objective difficulties of Communist Parties with understanding, and there are very many of them, just as there are many absolutely new problems. We must respect their independence.

In a word, this is the rejection of Ponomarevism and practically, although also indirectly, a censure of the practice for which many parties took a dislike to Ponomarev. It is the aversion to criteria in which Communist parties are judged on the basis of how readily and thoughtlessly they act as apologists for everything that happens in the USSR. This is a rejection of the instrumental-policing approach to the functions and fate of Communists.

Gorbachev got to the bottom of Ponomarev a long time ago. It is not without reason that all the time he ironically reminds us that we should not teach other communists how to live.

October 20th, 1985.

I read Zoshchenko's *Before the Sunrise...* In a manuscript, which Gulyga (a philosopher, author of books on Hegel, Kant, Herder, Schelling... husband of my old flame) gave me in the summer. But why is it a manuscript? This has been published, and it even says in the "Encyclopedic Dictionary" that Zoshchenko has such a work. And I remembered that I had read it sometime before. A deep work, extremely talented.

At the same time, I am reading about Saint-Just. I came across this thousand-page book in a bookstore in Montparnasse. I also bought Roger Debrais' *Europe Between Two Empires*. It turned out to be boring.

The publishing house Progress translated a book about Margaret Thatcher, written by one of her associates. Also boring. This is not what one wants to read about her, although before a trip to England I should read the boring books as well.

October 21st, 1985.

I am troubled by the fact that in the materials for the Party Congress Gorbachev's new thoughts are shrouded in such formulas that many people may not even notice the newness, this in particular concerns the propaganda. I checked these fears on my consultants—they should be quite the big intellectuals. It turned out that not many understand the new thoughts presented in old formulas.

October 23rd, 1985.

B.N. is correcting the draft of the CC summary report. Of course this is not the final correction, others will do it after him, people closer to Gorbachev. [Ponomarev has] an astonishing ability to debase phrases and to remove the appeal from the slightest thought. After all, only talented people can make up for the absence of culture from early childhood. But for the dull ones, no education later in life can make them intellectuals.

Yesterday I was at the CC Secretariat. The question of industrial injuries was discussed. There were two million cases in five years, 120,000 people remained disabled, 63,000 died. At the meeting, Ponomarev reasoned about the absence of objective reasons for industrial injuries under socialism! There was irony on people's faces. He is ridiculous, but will never be able to get it. Ligachev spoke of the ministers' lacking simple humanity: people are losing their lives... for the sake of the plan. And not one thought to call together at least a board of ministers to look into, for example, one of the specific cases of emergencies resulting in a fatality.

There are reports from Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova about their plans for patching the hundred-million gaps in their budgets due to the reduction in wine manufacture. Ligachev told me of a conversation he had with “a good worker.” The latter told him (on the occasion of the kilometer-long lines for vodka): “They make people work—absolutely! But as far as giving a working man an opportunity to have a drink—here!” (he made a gesture to show that the people get nothing). It’s a problem!—concluded Egor Kuzmich.

November 3rd, 1985.

On October 27 “Pravda” wrote about the “Departure to London.” On the invitation of Great Britain’s Communist Party executive committee, the candidate to the CC CPSU and deputy head of the CC CPSU International Department A.S. Chernyaev and the CC CPSU International Department employee E.S. Lagutin departed from Moscow to London.

We landed at Heathrow on October 26th. Driving past Hyde Park we saw an anti-military demonstration, fairly large. One of the slogans was: “America, USSR, France, England—nuclear terrorists.” On the whole, judging by the posters, the demonstration was more anti-American than anti-Soviet.

We spent the next day, Sunday, at Windsor.

On October 28 we spent five hours at the Communist Party CC. *Pravda* correspondent Maslennikov was with us. The general conclusion from our discussions is the following: they understand everything, but are also absolutely incapable of acting; there is a complete absence of any kind of perspective of being a political power in the country. Their attitude toward me: trust, agitation, they perceive me almost like Gorbachev’s alter ego [sic]. We had lunch in a nearby tavern.

Then [we went to] the National gallery, once again the stunning Sarah Siddon [sic], I stood before her beauty for almost half an hour. And in general, a hall of the English greats: Gainsborough, Lawrence, Turner, Reynolds.

On October 29, Tuesday, again at the CC, but the talk was with the CPGB London organization. [We spoke] about the crisis in the party, about the minority opposition. In the evening, there was a meeting with functionaries from different London Party organizations. The main topic was racism (resulting from the influx of immigrants).

On October 30, Wednesday, with Maslennikov behind the wheel we drove to Cardiff. We had a meeting in a cafe with secretary of the Party organization of Whales. It was surprising: the party boss of an ultra-proletarian region is an artist who didn’t finish his studies, yesterday’s student.

In the management of the miners’ trade union is a trade union boss, quite drunk, who, looking directly at the party boss, met us with the words: “Who are you working

for, McLennan (the General Secretary), or for the *Morning Star* (a party organ in opposition to the CPGB leadership)?”

Awkwardness. I had to separate them and to set the conversation going. The miners’ dramatic problem right now is whether to recognize the defeat of the strike, the legal and moral aspect of the strike.

We had lunch with the editor of *Miner* [sic], a smart guy and with broad views. Kinnock (leader of the Labor Party) promised to advance him to the Parliament.

We went into the Rhondda valley. I remembered how in 1949-50 I wrote a dissertation on the topic of the miners’ struggle in the Rhondda valley. Could I have imagined then that I would find myself here! We visited the home of a municipal advisor, the former mayor of Rhondda. He is elderly, but energetic, smart, and busy. And there was another one, whom he invited to meet with us; by his looks he is quite feeble, and lame as well. But in conversation, he turned out to be one of those whom Lenin called intelligent workers. Towards evening we returned to Cardiff. There, a theoretical discussion at the home of a university professor was organized for us. The professor is a specialist on early French literature. We spoke about the fate of the working class under the STR, about the fall of the old coal industry, about the ICM crisis.

Very close to midnight, at the other end of Cardiff we met with veterans of the anti-war movement. There were many women, young leaders. I spoke about Gorbachev’s philosophy of international politics—for the present and the future. One girl, very pretty, wore me out with questions. Everyone is very concerned. It seems to be hopeless, but they continue to work, by the principle of “little steps.”

We drove back to London for two and a half hours at night. Maslennikov and I spoke about all kinds of things, he is real, smart, educated, sharp.

October 31, Thursday, was spent at the Parliament. Kinnock received me there. He spoke with me as if I know no less than Shevardnadze. And in general—during the entire trip I felt like a “highly significant person.” They took me seriously, like a plenipotentiary, an all-knowing CC CPSU representative. With Kinnock we spoke about the forthcoming highest-level conference in Geneva, about Thatcher, whom he called “little fool,” about the Strategic Defense Initiative, about England’s attitude towards Gorbachev. He spoke without haughtiness, even though it would seem like who am I and who is he—“the leader of Her Highness’ opposition!”

This is not the first time—when I am abroad—as a rule, but especially now under Gorbachev, I feel like an absolutely free person who can speak about anything without glancing back at any official directives.

They recommended that I visit the London National Bank. Penzin is the Moscow representative director there. He showed me his facilities there, told me a great deal, introduced some of the personnel. They are all English, but he has some of his own

people from Moscow with him as well. He spoke of the fact that he's been on this post for ten years now, and no one has run away or betrayed, even though there is temptation all around, big money everywhere, absolutely free connections. These people are making enormous millions of [hard] currency for the country.

November 1—after lunch I went to visit Rotshtein (he is a veteran of veterans of the Communist Party, a “Bolshevik,” the son a Lenin’s friend, whom the latter sometimes rocked on his knee). This is living history, but history, another confirmation of the fact that there is, and cannot be, any place for the Communists in the political life of England.

November 9th, 1985.

I was at the Kremlin reception—the first one without alcohol. There was still white and red [wine]. But, the buzz was not the same. People discussed the dresses of Gundareva and of Ignatenko’s wife. Kovalenko’s wife, a very pretty and attractive half-Japanese [was also present]. She mostly mixed with Arbatov: he is just back from China, and is euphoric; [she also spent time with him] because for him “everything is going well with Gorbachev.” they meet often, he writes him a great deal, Gorbachev warmly wished him happy holidays over the phone, complimented him (in relation to China) as “a smart and astute [member], whose work is useful” at the Politburo.

Arbatov was at Ponomarev’s. He says that the talk didn’t work out. “What do you need it for?” I ask him. “Oh, for no specific reason.” He says that Ponomarev asked him to put a word in for him with the General Secretary! He even felt sorry for him!!

Zagladin had time to whisper that Chebrikov soon will be in Grishin’s place—at the Moscow pre-Congress conference. It’s high time to kick out this scoundrel and dullard.

Ponomarev continues to act overly busy... Now his favorite topic is the meeting of socialist countries’ CC Secretaries (Bucharest, December). He called Zimyanin and Rusakov, plus me, Shakhnazarov, Yermonsky. Compared to Zimyanin and Rusakov, our B.N. seems quite a mental giant and a bright intellect. Rusakov is just senile; he cannot grasp the most basic things: we had to go through the day’s agenda three times. M.V. (Zimyanin, “Mikhvas” in general usage) is shaky, as if all the time he is sorting something with his hands, he interrupts everyone, might say one thing and then the complete opposite. Both Rusakov and Zimyanin are living out their last months at their posts, and, of course, they both are nervous. It is terrible that one of these characters is the chief ideologist, and the other is the chief coordinator of our relations with socialist countries.

By the way, Arbatov is already counting his strategic conquests: he gave rise to the General Secretary’s doubts about the military people, dampened his trust of the MFA people—Gromyko has been completely moved aside, no one takes his opinion into consideration anymore, even though on the protocol, the three names that appear all the

time are: Gorbachev, Gromyko, Ryzhkov... as it was at first after the October 1964 Plenum, after Khrushchev.

Incidentally, little by little a “rehabilitation” of Khrushchev is beginning. Abroad (I saw it myself) every now and then there are articles about him. Two weeks ago in the *International Panorama* on TV [sic] Bovin reminded of Khrushchev’s visit to Hearst’s farm in the USA, and showed his portrait, respectfully calling him Nikita Serveevich. And it seems Gorbachev is leaning toward restoring his [Khrushchev’s] good name. In the intelligentsia circles there is talk that all of Gorbachev’s ideas were already budding under Khrushchev, but due to his little education and the absurdity of his character, he was not able to carry them into action, and if he did then it was in some caricature form, and he rushed about, afraid of his own boldness.

Yakovlev, when I reminded him about *The Children of Arbat*, said in an offhand manner that Gorbachev (to whom he is very close right now) is decidedly against “cultism,” cuts off all whisperings about “maintaining authority,” “popularization,” etc. with which Brezhnev “started” and with all the resulting... And concerning *The Children of Arbat*, I only told him, he says, that there is such a novel, and under our ridiculous censorship it might end up in *tamizdat*, and besides, such censorship encourages people to stow away their work in a drawer. I did not get the point of his referring to the General Secretary... he must be afraid to fall from this sharp ascending rise of his... until he is sure how the very “essence” related to Rybakov’s book will be taken.

November 11th, 1985.

I talk with Yakovlev on the phone. He is restraining himself from displaying before me that he is already [part of] big leadership, a special confidant. He is uncomfortable with me, after all those ultra democratic and “sincere” conversations in the evening streets of Montreal, and after I did some things to help get him out of the Canadian exile. Nevertheless, [there is] a metallic ring in his voice.

We were talking about giving him two consultants for the preparation of the foundation of Gorbachev’s TV interview when he returns from Geneva. I suggested Sobakin and Yermonsky. He rejected Menshikov... just like Arbatov, he does not like him, but—for a good reason.

Several hours later I remembered about Bovin—a very fitting author for an address to the people on such an occasion. Yakovlev called me, said that he thought about it too. But, firstly, my immediate boss (Zimyanin) cannot stand him. He is a minor figure of course and could be ignored (!!), but I don’t want to argue with him over this either!! And the second reason is Sashka (Bovin) himself: as soon as he exits the CC [building] after receiving such an assignment, all of Moscow will know that he is once again assigned to write an interview for the General Secretary!..

I told him: that’s true, he has hurt himself and let down other people with this many times. We decided that Yakovlev will not include him in the team that will be sent

to Volynskoe today; but later, when the guys prepare something, he will summon Bovin, and, having “talked with him,” will assign him to work on the text.

There is a great deal of all kinds of work, including the primary work that the Department is supposed to be doing right now—preparing the ICM, Social Democracy, and Revolutionary Democracy reviews for the Congress. Ponomarev “is not interested” in this, because he is afraid of these reviews: Gorbachev will not accept the halleluia-ing and glossing, but he [Ponomarev] does not want to report the truth to the CC, thinking that it will be perceived as the result his, Ponomarev’s, poor work “on his object.” However, this is partly really so: if for the past ten to fifteen years people in the ICM had worked Gorbachev style, and not Ponomarev-Brezhnev style, the situation probably would be not as sad as it is right now.

November 12th, 1985.

I saw Gorbachev’s memo on how he plans to conduct affairs with Reagan in Geneva. Politburo, naturally, approved of it.

- Not to deviate from the positions advanced in Paris, plus the additions that were made for the third round in Geneva.

- Not to get worked up about regional problems, but also not to waive our right to “be in solidarity” with the “fighters for independence,” not to recognize the USA’s “vital interests” wherever they wish.

- To agree that this meeting is only the beginning of a greater and regular dialogue and in general “we need to know how to live together,” we are different, but we must learn to respect this difference.

- In a word, not to provoke Reagan in order not to intensify the threat, not to play up to the hawks.

I was at the Secretariat. The state of the engineering industry was discussed. It is rotten. Only twenty one percent of the machines are at the world standard, and that is “at a stretch.”

Another question is even more serious: the state of material resources for culture. The situation is thoroughly bad, even in Moscow. For example, there is the same number of theaters in the capital as there were in 1940, while the population has doubled. If every person in the Soviet Union would want to go to the theater, he will only be able to do it once every six years. The number of theaters around the Soviet Union has decreased by half since 1950: right now there are about six hundred.

The expenditure on education and science has been decreasing in relative numbers since 1960, even though it is growing a little in absolute numbers. And in

comparison with the USA's and England's expenditure on this, we are appallingly behind.

It was striking that first Zimyanin, and then Ligachev himself, attacked the "thesis," which for a long time was used to cover the cutting of resources for social-cultural needs, namely: defense! "We need it, of course! But we also need to put an end to this excuse, due to which we have brought matters to such a state."

November 16th, 1985.

At work there is the routine stuff and a flow of information, mainly about the meeting in Geneva. It seems like a joint communiqué is in the offing, a pretty amicable one. Most likely a "spirit of Geneva" will arise, which, of course, will not remove the material preparation for war, but it will relax the confrontation, i.e. will strengthen the will to reject war as political means. Peaceful coexistence Gorbachev style is, in contrast to what we had before (regardless of whatever we said and wrote, and however we swore that we are against war and strong-arm tactics)—is "to live and let live:" seriously, properly, no kidding, without attempts to cheat, without attempts to get around and be superior after all.

B.N. was telling me about the last PB and "complained" that there were too many questions about staff: and everyone was "retired," "retired..." In particular, five agricultural ministries were liquidated. In a word, every week there are more and more "formers", and there are only a few people of Ponomarev's age left.

He makes the following declaration about the thirty-page report I did on the ICM's work in the period between Congresses--"I have a seditious thought... Maybe we should not present this at all? Why should we attract attention? They will again say that the situation is "bad," and all of that will be implied criticism of us..." I fervently objected: "It is precisely the argument that the situation is bad, which speaks in favor of presenting it. In their majority, your colleagues (because they do not have time to carefully consider the essence [of the matter]) think about the ICM in categories they were once taught in the Higher Party School (HPS), and think that we can give orders there, and thus the situation depends only on whether we, i.e. Ponomarev and the department, work well or not. We need to, finally, explain that the ICM about which they learned at the HPS has not existed for a long time now, and that nothing depends on our work (except, of course, self-isolation, if we decide to openly call everyone revisionists). Your colleagues must, finally, see the reality and evaluate our work from that position."

November 17th, 1985.

Mit'ka and I walked in the frosty cold in the alleys behind B. Pigorovka.

When I returned, I occupied myself with Marx' favorite pastime—going through books. I leafed through a good deal of Tolstoy. "Following his suggestion" I jumped over to Pascal and Kant. In the multitude of themes that are natural during such a pastime, one

arose by chance—about fame, through which many, especially people who had recognized abilities (talent) in themselves, sought meaning in life. Pascal, Tolstoy, and Gogol are the extreme examples of the denial of “this concept.” However, they all found an alternative in faith. That is—they found no alternative to “spiritual lust” (as opposed to “bodily lust,” from the words of Tolstoy himself).

Nevertheless, Lev Nikolaevich, in a foreword to Maupassant, whom he at first condemned (almost from the position of “social realism”), and twenty years later approved of, enthusiastically wrote: “Only the love of a woman is worth living for...” Fame, wealth—what is this for when you cannot buy a woman’s love with them. This is the only alternative... even, it turns out, at 65.

November 20th, 1985.

The consultants and I are composing speeches “for the worker, male collective farm worker and female collective farm worker,” which they will present at the USSR Supreme Soviet session on the results of Geneva... We are composing it, without knowing the results... But, not only for the worker and farmer, but also for the first secretary of the Leningrad obkom Soloviev! We’ve splendidly prepared the staff of the top echelon, which cannot speak about the foreign policy of its party without the “learned Jews...” Even though Soloviev is taking the place of Kirov... even Zhdanov...

Ponomarev is as banal as usual. He tells me to prepare a report on the CPSU Program at the party meeting of the department. I reply: there is a limit to human strength. For the second week I am [working] alone, the other deputies are all in different places. There is a load of assignments, including from you, and routine work.

He says: This is necessary, Anatoly Sergeevich, necessary; take **my** report from the Academy of Sciences. Have you read it? (That is what the consultants and I wrote for him during the entire holiday season). Read it, read it, there is a great deal of important material there (either this is senility, or impudence, or naive shamelessness!).

I say: I cannot do it that way. You know that I do not like to speak in public, but if I have to, I speak in my own way. And I never use other people’s (!) texts.

He says: But of course... I myself never use other people’s texts (My God!), but sometimes it so happens that you have to, when there is no time. I advise you to take my text, Balmashnov has a copy.

I can imagine what I would look like if I read that text, or any one of his texts, even if I personally wrote it.

Aganbegyan spoke at our “Tuesday” (which is a regular reading, to which scholars and other well known people are invited by the Department). He described the economic situation, which is bad judging by all parameters.

At the CC Secretariat, the issues of material resources for culture were discussed for the second time in a row. It is just a woeful picture.

Alas! The platform from which Gorbachev started his movements is completely weak. God give him strength.

The talks in Geneva (Gorbachev-Reagan) are in progress. I wonder whether the consultants and I guessed right when we wrote (on Ligachev's and Ponomarev's assignment) the drafts for PB resolutions for Geneva outcomes (without knowing the outcomes)—one closed and one to be published? We shall see.

November 24th, 1985.

The spirit of Geneva, the symbol of Geneva. Gorbachev's interview is the source of a new understanding of the political world and of ourselves. Will we be able to take advantage of it?

A cardinal thing happened: the arms race is continuing, nothing has changed in military confrontation, but a turning point in international relations is taking shape. We are coming closer to acknowledging that no one will start a war; to understanding that we cannot keep provoking it either in the name of communism, or in the name of capitalism. Gorbachev has revived the hopes that have appeared after the XX Congress.

At the deputies conference B.N. told me about meeting Gorbachev in the airport. The latter told him in detail about what took place in Geneva. At first he saw the empty, lacking understanding, eyes of the president, who mumbled commonplace things from a piece of paper. Only towards the end of the second meeting was he able to establish a normal conversation. And in the end, Reagan finally opened up and even agreed to sign a joint declaration. Gorbachev also told him how Regan (the president's assistant) visited our guys and told of the enthusiasm about Gorbachev's actions, asked them to "keep on like this, pressure the president, persuade him, warm him up... for his own good."

November 30th, 1985.

B.N., as I've already written, is fussing terribly, in every possible way inserting himself in the big (Geneva) affair. It is true that he was right about the outcomes of Geneva: both our drafts went through almost without changes, withstanding the competition with the Geneva experts and with the MFA versions.

Yakovlev has been assigned to lead a work group under Gorbachev on the preparation of a draft report for the XXVII CPSU Congress. He has our October version handy, and asked the Department to give one consultant for the group. But no... B.N. is fussing about it too. He called me up and said that he spoke with Yakovlev, that he is prepared to give him Yermonsky, that goes without saying, he says, but he also promised to make another, updated, version. And right away he assigned me to prepare it in three days.

Arbatov came by. He was in Geneva as an expert. Gave thirty-seven interviews there, says that two teams came together there—wall to wall: the “doves” (Arbatov, Velikhov, Sagdeev) and the “hawks” (Zamyatin, Kornienko, General Chervov³⁹). Yakovlev was in the role of a balancer.

It became known from General Kobysh, who was also there, that Gorbachev reprimanded Kornienko and Chervov for picking at the text of the joint declaration, for arguing with the Americans on every point, for imposing all kinds of our wordings and almost frustrating the whole affair—which was the acceptance of the declaration (our initiative, by the way). This is supported by Yakovlev’s remarks, he told me over the phone: “What a jerk this Kornienko is, what a blockhead! I did not know him like this, I thought differently of him. But now I am afraid that the MFA might ruin the whole positive effect of Geneva for us.”

I assured Yakovlev that Kornienko is like this, and has always been like this, and that more than once I clashed with him on these grounds at the “theoretical” dachas. But he always had the upper hand, since he was under Gromyko’s patronage, under the MFA’s total monopoly over all our foreign policy.

In Prague, Gorbachev informed the Warsaw Pact leaders on the outcomes of Geneva. He, as well as Husak and Jaruzelsky, spoke in favor of changing the style of these kinds of meetings, believing that we must put an end to the situation in which an exchange of monologues takes place and in which everyone keeps on convincing each other of what we all are already long convinced.

Yesterday with B.N. and Rykin (deputy of the German sector) we went to Moscow’s sculptor studios. We were looking at the possible versions of Thälmann memorial statue. One is by the brothers Artamonov (that is the Moldavian mafia, headed by Luchinsky); the other by Krymov. Rykin and Herbert Miss are speaking in favor of the latter. I also pressured B.N. carefully in favor of Krymov. His Thälmann is in a sea cadet’s uniform. I think he’s good, but designed for an intellectual perception and a rather good knowledge of Thälmann’s biography. The passerby of the masses does not have to know it, the “image of the leader” is clearer to him. That’s what Ponomarev understood. But Krymov will have to work some more: his Thälmann is a young man, while he became “Führer” when he was already forty, and was imprisoned at forty-eight.

December 8th, 1985.

B.N. called us together before sending us to the Gorky dacha, where we are to produce a new version for the XXVII Congress. The boys were saying some smart things. Ponomarev [was saying] his usual banalities, very far from the “Gorbachev spirit.” I did not get wound up. I thought it was useless: we will do what we can to make it maximally in the Gorbachev style, and then let him change it as he wants.

³⁹ General Nikolai Chervov—Head of the Treaty and Legal Department of the Defense Ministry

And that's what we did. We worked with enthusiasm. I presented the text to him on Wednesday evening, and on Thursday he summoned me to Moscow and showed how he corrected [the draft]. I carefully looked through his alterations, came over to him and said impudently: "Boris Nikolaevich, it is striking that you have knocked out with about ninety-five percent precision all the places that were directly taken from Gorbachev, and not only ideas, but unquoted phrases, terms, concepts, even specific words that he likes to use..."

- But I didn't do it on purpose!

- Of course, - I reassured him.

I went to my office and was thinking to myself: that's the thing, that you did not do it on purpose. You, to be sure, did not read Gorbachev carefully, and so you remember neither his words, nor phrases; you do not accept his innovation, his really principally new politics, which is the only thing that can save us from war. You do not believe that he will be able to achieve anything in either the foreign arena or domestically. That is why you can so unerringly knock out everything Gorbachev-like from our text. All your life you kept adjusting to circumstances, that is why you survived under all the regimes. But this time you do not have enough gray matter to understand what's going on, to realistically evaluate how your colleagues, and Gorbachev, perceive you, the people who decide whether you will be in this place in the future. You have not learned even from Gromyko's experience, who was politely and honorably pushed out of real politics not only because he is old, but because his policies, which he almost completely lorded over for ten years, have collapsed.

Instead of finally taking up your work—the ICM—before the Congress, you poke your nose in other people's work and only cause irritation, which becomes contempt. You were not even ashamed to impose yourself on Yakovlev for the work group at Volynskoe.

Returning to Gorbachev, I tried to pretty blatantly restore a maximum of Gorbachev's style in the text. I did not achieve much.

... One episode from the argument about the "new thinking."

- What thinking,—B.N. exclaimed—We have the right thinking. Let the Americans change their thinking.

I show him Gorbachev's text, where in black and white it says what he means when he speaks of **our** new thinking.

- I don't know, I don't know. He said that in Paris, in Geneva—for them, for the West!

- Does that mean that you think this is just demagogy?

- One needs to know how to conduct the fight... (??)

Or about the idea that only through the improvement and changing of our own society can we win the competition with imperialism.

B.N.: “Are you talking about peaceful coexistence? I wrote about that in the materials for the XIX Party Congress. What’s new in that?”

I: “What is new is that the idea now sounds quite differently. Stalin also said that he is for a world without war. Nobody believed him, but people were ready to believe Khrushchev. For almost twenty years, Brezhnev talked profusely about peaceful coexistence. He spoke at the Peace Congress, responded to the calls of different peace-loving powers, received numerous peace-loving delegations and swore to his peaceable intentions. But nobody believed him. But everyone believed Gorbachev right away, because he brought together the word and the deed.”

B.N.: “What do you find to be wrong about our policies? That we explored outer space? That we created intercontinental missiles? Are you against power, which is the only thing imperialism takes into consideration?”

In the end, the text was sent in Ponomarev’s interpretation. I called Yermonsky at Volynskoe and told him about these discussions.

This is what I am worried about in this affair: the point is not in the text, which will be written without us, and not any worse. The point is that it is shameful and disappointing to appear an idiot just when something real is taking place. For how many years under Brezhnev we, the international specialists, were the liberals, even revisionists. We insisted on the freedom and originality of thought, and sometimes even of action (in relation to fraternal parties, the Social Democratic and other movements, and the West in general). That is—we wanted, waited, and strove to bring closer that, which began under Gorbachev. And now we turn into conservatives and blockheads... thanks to Ponomarev.

December 14th, 1985.

There is a freedom in the press that was inconceivable a year, or even six months ago—in the newspapers, magazines, and already on television (by the way, today it was announced that Lapin was dismissed).

For over a month a discussion around an article called “Truth and Half-truth” by a certain Karpova is printed in the *Literary Gazette*. Two years ago, the minimal consequences for this would be dismissal from the Party and the Writer’s Union. And what reserves open up: of intelligence, culture, professional writing, and the Russian language itself! Take for example the leading article in *Soviet Russia* from December 10, which gives instructions to Russian writers before their Congress...

That means an explosion of courage [to search] for truth has taken place, and can now be stopped only by imprisoning people...

There was a call from one of the Party Organization Department sector deputies.

- Anatoly Sergeevich, there is a decision for the all deputies of the CC apparatus to participate in oblast and major city pre-Congress conferences.

I: You probably have some kind of assignment—who, where, when?

He: Yes, I will send it to you.

I: Are all the deputies of our department considered, or only specific people?

He: Everyone except Zagladin. He is going by a different assignment, since he is going to be elected delegate to the Congress and to the CC body.

I: Thank you!

Thus, I, candidate to the CC, will not be promoted to full membership, and that means the time has come to decide—to leave before the Congress with a three hundred ruble pension, or to wait, and, in a year, having been in the position of one pushed back, to be “let go” with two hundred rubles.

December 23rd, 1985.

I just got back from Malta, where I headed the CPSU delegation to meet with the Communists and Laborites, who are in power there right now. On the way back I visited Rome.

Today is a day of rejoicing for all of Moscow: Grishin has finally been dismissed. He is replaced by Yeltsin.

Yesterday B.N. moved me as far away as possible from the telephones and told me in a half-whisper: “the first” (he showed his on his fingers, did not pronounce the name) demanded that Menshikov never set foot in the CC apparatus again. His conversation with Americans in a restaurant was recorded. He said that he, Menshikov, is the core of the brain trust that supplies Gorbachev with all the major ideas. B.N. charged me with job placement for Menshikov (who, incidentally, is his own protégé, his pet). But, when I find a job for him, I cannot explain the reasons [why he is changing jobs]. He suggested, maybe Arbatov’s institute? But how would that be,—I objected—when Arbatov considers him to be the scum of scum.

December 28th, 1985.

Razumov, first deputy of the *Party Organization Department* called and said that “I [Chernayev] was being sent” to Tambov to a regional party conference. That is where

the elections to the Congress will take place. And yesterday the first secretary of the Tambov obkom called. He said that I would be the “chief party worker from Moscow” there, and will have to speak. What might that mean? At any rate, it is a “different matter” than what was mentioned above on this topic.

I visited Arbatov at Barvikha. He is there on prophylactic treatment after a micro heart attack. We walked around the paths, talked. Gorbachev sent him a draft of the New Year’s address to the Americans. I saw your corrections in the text, he says, the ones you told me about. The text is fairly dry; it was prepared at Shevardnadze’s. I told Arbatov that the day before, an article was circulated around the PB with a rebuttal to the Americans on regional problems. I had to alter it drastically: it was written loudly, even shrilly, as if there was no Geneva. It seems the minister is still under the charm of cheap journalism.

Yurka [Arbatov] boasted that he incited doctor Laun (“The Doctors for Peace Movement”) to press on Gorbachev during the meeting for the latter not to revoke the January 1st moratorium on nuclear explosions. I read a transcript of this meeting. Laun was, really, persistently and even blatantly persuading Gorbachev not to do it: all the energy of your new policies of the past six months will be smeared, people will again stop believing you. It seemed to me that Gorbachev began to hesitate.

In addition, Dobrynin also grew bolder: yesterday he sent a telegram from Washington with the same idea. I think the moratorium will be extended after all, even though just a month ago there was a PB resolution (a confirmed letter to Reagan) about the resumption of explosions and about the propaganda “to justify it.”

Belyaev (Shauro’s deputy, deputy of the CC Culture Department), the one who was explaining to Rybakov what his *The Children of Arbat* meant, was moved to the post of the editor of the *Soviet Culture* three days after Grishin’s dismissal. In that way, he was taken out of the “literary process.” Shauro himself is in the hospital, and people are saying that he will not come back to work from there. His first deputy Tumanova is on the verge of retirement. In a word, a complete dispersal of this ideological sub-center, which, incidentally, was one of the persecutors of Lyubimov’s theater on Taganka.

By the way, there I met Vasiliy Romanovich Sitnikov (a person of high rank in the KGB; who was Andropov’s advisor; criticized the Taganka, and at the same time shielded it from Grishin, Shauro & Co.). He is a handsome, jovial, educated man. Recently he told me the following: Gromyko is a world-scale thief. He and his wife collected tributes from all the embassies and trade representatives for position appointments. Gromyko knew that Andropov knew everything about him, and when the latter became General Secretary, he really toned down. But Chebrikov, who replaced Andropov, also knows everything. Gromyko provided himself with an honorary burial (when the time comes) by getting his bearings on Gorbachev in time, and appeared as his “godfather.” But he knows that Gorbachev also knows everything now.

* * *

Thus, the year 1985—looking back 17 years later.

Now it is recognized by almost everyone as a threshold in the history of the country and the world.

All major dates are relative; they appear that way especially when later people find out the details of the events related to them. For example, that's how October 25th (November 7th) 1917 in Petrograd appears.

Many will agree that in the XX century the years 1985 and 1917 are comparable in the scale (not in the character) of their consequences.

The author of the journal entries presented in this volume, as others like him, who were close to the highest leadership, wanted and was waiting for greater changes; he understood their necessity and already had grounds for connecting them with Gorbachev. Nevertheless, not one of these people could even remotely imagine that his election as CC CPSU General Secretary on March 11, 1985 (true events of Gorbachev's election are carefully reproduced in the journal, disproving the conjectures about other versions and opponents), and, a month later, his speech at the April CC Plenum would be the beginning of such immense and tragic changes in the fate of the country and the world. Gorbachev himself, as he later admitted more than once, had not imagined that having opened just a little door, he would provoke such a torrent that would break down the entire, seemingly everlasting and indestructible, Soviet dam.

The magic words “perestroika” and “glasnost” had not yet been uttered in 1985. At least, they had not yet become the symbols of the initiated reforms. And, no cardinal reforms that would strongly affect society had been undertaken, if one doesn't consider the start on the campaign against alcoholism, which once again (in history) demonstrated that good intentions, once they become government policy, often bring more evil than some criminal plan. A justified and even necessary measure, once included in the context of big politics, turned out to be a fatal mistake.

But something extremely important was accomplished this year—the **style of politics** was changed.

When the CC members, colleagues, the press, and people abroad took notice of his new style, Gorbachev became angry: he thought that “style” is something superficial, unworthy of his intentions; he was afraid that with such evaluations he would appear ambitious, someone who tried to be original in order to look different from the people he replaced. And he was mistaken.

In a rigidly bureaucratic society, which had become stiff in rules and dogmas, where people grew accustomed to servility and hierarchical laws as behavioral norms, where the fear for saying a word too many was mixed with one's blood, where the saying “I am the boss—you an idiot, you're the boss—I'm an idiot” virtually defined people's relations at work and in life... and other such things that demeaned a person's dignity and

offended his common sense—in such a society people were stunned by a demonstrative rejection of all of this coming from the very top.

Gorbachev would go into the street and begin a discussion (!) with the first group he came across... this had not happened since the 1920s.

He spoke in his own words, did not read from a piece of paper, did not use formal language worked out in nomenclature apparatuses.

He prohibited hanging his portraits and carrying them at demonstrations.

Sharply and with scorn, he stopped the familiar glorification.

The new General Secretary threw aside the “grand” manners of “the leader,” the unapproachable divinity; he completely liquidated this pernicious legacy of a tsarist instinct, rooted in centuries. He appeared before the people as a person who seemed to be “like everyone else,” but... a real leader, whom the people wanted, whom they had missed for a long time.

Gorbachev put an end to political repressions (even though he did not right away finish off with the consequences of past repressions). He removed fear from the social and political atmosphere.

He made it so that at the Politburo, at the CC, at the Plenums, at meetings—problems were really discussed, rather than being obediently “approved” regardless whether you agree or not...

He encouraged and required each person to say what he thought, “to tell it like it is.” And he checked the people who by habit or out of subservience checked those who dared to speak their mind. He allowed criticizing leadership publicly... and of increasingly higher and higher rank.

Gorbachev presented his wife to the world as his life companion (in clear defiance of the shameful status of leader’s wives as household accessories, impermissible for presenting to the public).

All this was **style**, even though it was done unintentionally, not for the sake of style, but by the inner motives of his nature, and “for the sake of the liberation of the minds,” as he said. And all this is the year 1985.

In the strictly political sense, the year is marked by, obviously, staff changes, mainly in the highest echelon. Gorbachev disposed of some figures (alas! Not right away and not of all of those, who should have been disposed of!). But he did this not because they were not ready to serve the new “first,” the more so not because of some ideological reasons; but by reason of their worthlessness, incompetence, ignorance, their “accidental” assignment to high posts (the products of Brezhnev’s, Chernenko’s favoritism); or

because they discredited themselves glaringly at their posts, giving rise to well deserved contempt in their circles and in society.

From the start, Gorbachev conceived the idea to include “the human factor” into the reform process: to arouse energy, initiative, and enthusiasm in people. From the point of view of political science, which emerged later, that meant giving society a natural flow, to inspire it to “self-propel.” But society had been long unaccustomed to living without orders and without the petrified forms of its organization. Gorbachev’s error is understandable—it came from an innately democratic nature. The times were hard for all of us, and it was hardly possible to understand (all the more, to agree!) that a “natural” progress of society cannot serve to “perfect” and “improve” the system (of “advanced socialism”), of which everyone was so tired, and under which life was so bad.

Also obvious was the new General Secretary’s stress on raising (and renovating) the role of the party. By the momentum of the very essence of the Soviet regime, he expected to make the CPSU a vanguard and a motor for reforms... As Khrushchev in his time, but with different motives, opposed the party to the “statesman” Malenkov, the party that under Stalin had been in disregard and was monitored by the NKVD-KGB. Insight came to Gorbachev with a big (and fatal!) delay.

1985 was a year of the exposure (and comprehension) of the real situation in the country and the world. Data came into the country’s government’s command (and people were less and less ashamed to talk about it), which in essence gave evidence of a real crisis in all aspects of life. The launching platform for deep reforms appeared quite unsteady, and in some places dilapidated.

The Politburo and the CC Secretariat took, as they say, measures, but for a while they still came down to the traditional “increase,” “demand,” “order,” “elevate the discipline,” “set an example;” they appealed to conscience and conscientiousness, to the Communist duty, etc.

The intensive emergence into the international arena with the new foreign policy was dictated first of all by the grave state of the country’s economy. We had to urgently change the West’s attitude toward the Soviet Union, had to put an end to the confrontation, the arms race, shake off the unbearable burden of the STR (the reader may notice in the journal materials that already in this first year of the perestroika, discontent with the pressure and voracity of the STR is beginning to show through in the speeches of some Politburo members and CC Secretaries, which would have been blasphemous and punishable a short while before), and, possibly, to establish more effective external economic links. It is also the result (and, probably, chiefly) of a personal factor—Gorbachev’s moral aversion to a nuclear threat to all humanity.

The changes are emphasized here. But precisely as a result of the “**style**,” and by no means because of more and already troubling disarmament and declarative Moscow initiatives, which were also present.

Gorbachev's appearance, behavior, ability to conduct a dialogue, to convince, to reason to the point instead of getting off with banalities that set one's teeth on edge, gave the public and Western leaders hope for finally ending the cold war.

I suppose the reader noticed the prominent part that the International Communist Movement occupies in this year's materials. That is explained, of course, by the author's place of work. But the subjects that he touches upon also are significant for that period's political process.

Firstly, the most important character of these episodes is B.N. Ponomarev. He was, by his character and intellectual baggage, by far not the worst in the top echelon of the Soviet ruling stratum, in the so-called elite. But he is a typical figure among the statesmen with whom Gorbachev had to begin perestroika, not only in Moscow but on the level of the entire party and State. And not all of them had such advisors, which due to specific circumstances were with Ponomarev and tried to somehow correct his behavior and to act in the Gorbachev style.

Secondly, the journal's international Communist themes show a very important aspect, a matter of principle in the position of the Soviet Union. **Objectively**, and rapidly so, it was ceasing to be an ideological stronghold. ... It lost all historical perspectives, because for a long time already the ICM had not been a real factor in world development. Only the momentum kept it moving, and that was disappearing before our eyes. By the same momentum, the CPSU continued to pose as the ICM's leading power. But the real leadership, embodied by Gorbachev and his then closest colleagues, did this more and more reluctantly, as if paying tribute to the "international duty" inherited from Lenin and the October. At the same time (despite the endeavors of Ponomarev and others like him), they tried to do away with the Comintern methods of relating to the "fraternal parties." One could more and more distinctly sense the lack of information on the Communist Movement in the leadership and the CPSU ranks. And it was more and more frankly said that it is time to get rid of the burden (including the financial burden) of being the "older brother."

For practical [purposes], especially for the new foreign policy, it had become unnecessary and even harmful. Communist Parties could no longer be an instrument of not only USSR's foreign policy, but even of propaganda in its defense. By this time, they were disappointed in the Soviet Union as the "leading light of the future." Nevertheless, Gorbachev tried to make them "simply disinterested friends."

On some level the same was true for the "national liberation movement," this is especially strikingly evident in the Afghan problem.

Thirdly, the episodes related to the CC International Department's work debunk the West's deep and inveterate delusion (one partly cultivated by the CIA and such organizations for Cold War purposes), that precisely here was the center of Moscow's subversive activities, that Ponomarev was the "Gray Cardinal," who commanded the

secret service (the KGB), and the MFA, and other foreign policy organs, and in general determined all of the USSR's foreign policy.

Fourthly, the role and position of "speechwriters" [sic] in the CPSU system of leading the country shows quite clearly: when policies were worked out and presented mostly through the preparation of speeches for the major heads, who were capable of neither thinking, nor (as a rule) writing competently. These "staffers," together with some intellectuals "from the side," while composing speeches for other people, tried to infuse elements of common sense into policies. Incidentally, since on the inside and the outside they were perceived to be CC representatives (!), by their behavior, erudition, and thought that was not always orthodox, they made it seem *urbu et orbi* [sic]--since such people exist close to the very "top," then everything is not hopeless in this country, and there is some human resource for Gorbachev's innovation.

Such was this year 1985, mainly "**a year of style**" that changed the atmosphere in the country and partially outside. Now it is remembered, at least by those who back them enthusiastically rushed into Gorbachev's politics, in a kind of romantic halo.