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IC 75-1320

15 January 1975

25X1A

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT: IC Responses to Post-Mortem  
Recommendations

1. Herewith the matrix you requested.
2. We do not, of course, claim that every action listed resulted directly or exclusively from a post-mortem recommendation. We believe, however, that the recommendations helped to focus the community's attention on desirable actions and frequently hastened such actions. And I think we can claim that the post-mortems did more than any other management instrumentality to spur action on the proliferation issue and induce major change in the way the community views the warning problem.

Chief, PRD/IC

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Attachment

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee

1 - IC Registry

1 - PRD Subject

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Analysis of Community Responses  
to Recommendations in ICS Post-Mortems

Post-Mortems

Chilean Coup of  
September 1973

Recommendations

1. Time permitting, NIEs should be updated when events occur which significantly alter basic judgments.
2. An expression of the probability of events occurring expressed in quantified terms would have been helpful to the consumer.
3. There is a need for producing national intelligence in crisis situations--no effective machinery for doing so currently exists.

Actions

1. The development of the NIO system has gone a long way towards sensitizing the community to the need for altering basic judgments when earlier views are clearly no longer valid. In addition, the ICS-sponsored alert memorandum proposal provides an additional vehicle by which basic judgments can be rapidly altered.
2. There is increased recognition within the community of our inability to answer definitively the "war-no war", "coup-no coup" type questions. As a result, there has been an increasing shift to examining these questions in terms of an increasing or decreasing probability that given events will or will not occur. The use of Bayesian methodology against questions of this type has been increasingly used in both Southeast Asia and the Middle East.
3. The National Watch Officers Bulletin is now in being. The National Analyst Summary (NAS) is still under study with two separate (but related) approaches being pursued--  
[redacted] CONTEXT study and the PRD-sponsored 25X1A committee to involve the principal production agencies in a test of the feasibility of producing a national level intelligence situation report during periods of international crisis.

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Post-Mortems

Arab/Israeli War,  
October 1973

Recommendations

1. Attune aspects of the collection system to the needs of the analytic system.
2. Develop systems for better exchange of views among analysts.
3. Establish system to challenge consensus.
4. Revamp community's warning system.

Actions

1. The ICS has initiated a continuous, systematic review of national intelligence products and will produce aperiodic reports on its findings. These will assess not only the quality of the finished product but also the contributions made by collectors to production analysts.
2. Three systems have been, or are being, developed by ICS to improve communication among analysts prior to and during crises:
  - a. NOIWON - Conferencing among Watch officers by secure phone
  - b. NOIAN - Conferencing among different agency analysts by secure phone
  - c. CONTEXT - Textual editing of intelligence drafts among physically separated analysts
3. The ICS has prepared a specific proposal for the establishment of a devil's advocacy system in the production of finished intelligence. It is currently being staffed through the NIOs prior to review by the DCI.
4. Two major actions have been taken:
  - a. Strategic warning: DCID 1/5 is being revised to narrow the function and tie it more closely to DOD warning mechanisms; the Watch Committee and the National Indications Center are to be eliminated; target date - 3 March 1975.

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Post-Mortems

Recommendations

Actions

5. Develop national family of products.

6. Improve intelligence production during crises.

b. General warning: A system has been established for the issuance by the DCI of Alert Memoranda whenever a critical development warranting the special attention of policy makers is foreseen by the community.

5. Three major actions have been taken:

a. The National Intelligence Bulletin (NIB), providing for multiple agency contributions and dissenting opinions, has been substituted for CIA's Current Intelligence Bulletin.

b. The National Intelligence Daily, with a higher classification than the NIB and addressed to a smaller, higher-level consumer, has been established. In addition to current items, it includes longer analytical articles.

c. Defense Intelligence Notices (DIN), which spot items of current intelligence, have been substituted for DIA's former daily Intelligence Summary. The DINs are supplemented by Intelligence Appraisals.

6. Under the direction of the IGS, the community is currently exploring the feasibility of producing a single National Intelligence Summary, instead of separate DIA, CIA and INR summaries, in times of crisis.

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Post-Mortems

Recommendations

Actions

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| <p>7. Strengthen analytic resources.</p> <p>8. Develop system to review estimates on regular basis.</p> <p>9. Review analytic methodologies.</p> | <p>7. Three major actions have been taken:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>a. The number of analysts in CIA's production elements have been moderately increased; in view of major manpower cuts in other elements of the community, this represents, in a relative sense, a significant shift in emphasis.</li><li>b. A major increase of effort and manpower has been devoted to the exploration of new analytical methodologies; an ARPA/CIA/ICS Analytical Support Center to assist this effort has been established.</li><li>c. A variety of actions have been taken to effect better communication between analysts and collectors, particularly the Foreign Service.</li></ul> <p>8. See 1. above.</p> <p>9. See 7. above.</p> |
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Post-Mortems

Indian Nuclear Blast,  
May 1974

Recommendations

1. Proliferation should be given a much higher priority than it seems to have enjoyed to date.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
2. HUMINT was determined as a key to nth countries intentions. An interagency task force with representation from both collection and production elements of the community should develop collection strategies for each nth country.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
3. COMIREX should review the failure of production elements to ask NPIC to exploit photography specifically requested from the NRO--a possible weakness in the imagery requirements system.

Actions

1. a. A concerted US Government effort is underway to establish an international exporters conference on nuclear technologies. This effort represents the increased priority placed on nuclear proliferation.
1. b. Intelligence reporting on proliferation subjects has increased tenfold.
1. c. AEC has established "A Proliferation Watch" to develop better indicators on potentially proliferating countries.
1. d. State is requesting overseas posts in key countries to arrange meetings at least once or twice annually to discuss the status of the proliferation effort locally.
1. e. At least one JAEIC meeting is to be devoted to the proliferation each year.
  
2. JAEIC established an interagency working group to focus on proliferation. They are preparing lists of "trigger" information and key target entities and individuals. The HSC established an ad hoc group to work with JAEIC to follow-up in the HUMINT area. This subcommittee has met frequently and political analysts have been designated to work on the problem with primarily technical JAEIC membership.
  
3. The interrelationship between collection and exploitation has been examined by COMIREX and remedial measures have been taken.

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Post-Mortems

Recommendations

Actions

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
- 4. Technical analysts should provide strong support to HUMINT collectors. In selected countries, permanent assignment of technical specialists would insure the HUMINT collectors understood the relationship between all sources intelligence and technical nuclear matters. At a minimum, technical specialists should periodically visit countries for these purposes.
  
- 5. New analytical approaches should be examined to see what new insight might be brought on the proliferation problem.

4. a. 

4. b. 

- 4. c. DIA is insuring that selected personnel in Defense Attache Offices are aware of pertinent information on known activities in their geographic area.
- 4. d. State is planning a regular program to brief political officers in key countries.

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