Marking the Web publication by ProQuest of the massive indexed
reference collection on U.S.-Japan relations from 1977-1992 compiled
by the National Security Archive, today's posting includes:
Comprising more than 1,750 documents and 8,000 pages obtained through
the Freedom of Information Act, this publication is the most important
collection of former secrets available on U.S. ties with Japan during
the Carter, Reagan, and Bush I presidencies. During that critical
period spanning the final phase of the Cold War, the United States
struggled to develop a new global strategy -- one that included
Washington's most important Asian ally more closely on central issues
ranging from the Gulf War to nuclear issues to trade and finance
policies. The publication, Japan
and the United States: Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations,
Part II: 1977-1992, complements the first
collection in this series, which dealt with the period
1960-1976.
Also being published in the Digital Archive today is the Archive's
second collection on the Vietnam War, a groundbreaking compilation
based on the most recent declassifications of Nixon and Ford administration
documents, with detailed coverage of the Paris Peace negotiations,
the Vietnamization program, the war in Cambodia, the 1972 Christmas
Bombing, and the fall of South Vietnam. Highlights of the new Vietnam
collection include:
The National Security Archive is pleased to announce the addition
of Japan
and the United States: Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations,
Part II: 1977-1992, collected and edited by Dr.
Robert A. Wampler, to the collection of major document collections
available on the Digital
National Security Archive. This is the most important
compilation of formerly classified documents publicly available
on relations between the United States and Japan during the Carter,
Reagan and Bush I presidencies. This was the period when the Cold
War drew to a close and U.S. policy-makers strove to develop a new
global strategy. Incorporating the latest U.S. government releases,
obtained largely through the Freedom of Information Act, this collection
significantly enriches the historical record. White House, State
Department, Pentagon, Commerce Department, CIA and other documents,
virtually all of them previously classified, cover all the major
issues from this critical period, including high-level diplomatic,
military and economic relations. Topics covered in detail include
summit meetings during all three presidential administrations, U.S.
objectives in major trade negotiations on such items as automobiles
and semiconductors, the Structural Dialogue talks on trade, U.S.
efforts to guide Japanese defense policy, and the impact of the
first Persian Gulf conflict on U.S.-Japan relations. The collection
also incorporates new material from 1960-1976 released since the
publication of Japan
and the United States: Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations,
1960-1976.
Document
1. Memorandum of Conversation (S), between Vice President Mondale
and Prime Minister Fukuda, February 1, 1977
This document recounts the first official meeting between the
newly-inaugurated Carter administration and the Japanese government
of Prime Minister Fukuda, as Vice President Mondale visited several
key U.S. allies in East Asia soon after the inauguration. Wide
ranging in scope, the conversation highlighted a number of issues
that would put stress on U.S.-Japan relations in the coming years,
in particular Carter's desire to scale down the U.S. troop presence
in South Korea and Japan's fear this was the precursor to a major
American withdrawal from Asia, relations with China and Taiwan,
and U.S.-Japan trade issues.
Document
2. Memorandum of Conversation (S), between Defense Secretary Brown
and Foreign Minister Sonoda November 9, 1978
Here again Korea and China are at the forefront of the issues
discussed, as Brown and Sonoda discuss the uncertainties surrounding
Beijing's intentions regarding Taiwan and how this issue complicated
moves towards normalization of U.S.-China relations as well as
those surrounding South Korea's future economic development
Document
3. Memorandum of Conversation (classification unknown), Treasury
Secretary Regan, Japanese Finance Minister Watanabe, et al., c.
January 22, 1981
This meeting, one of the first between the newly-elected Reagan
administration and the Japanese government, reveals two issues
that the U.S. would be pressing Japan to address: increased Japanese
defense expenditures, and action to tackle the growing influx
of Japanese automobiles in the U.S.
Document
4. Memorandum of Conversation (S), Secretary of State Haig, Foreign
Minister Ito, et al., Subject: General Foreign Policy, Automobiles,
Defense, North South, March 23, 1981
Another early encounter between the Reagan administration and
the Japanese government, this time a meeting between Secretary
of State Haig and two key Japanese officials, Foreign Minister
Ito and Ambassador Okawara. Here again, a major topic of concern
was the growing American domestic political pressures on the government
to do something about the increasing number of Japanese automobile
imports; much of the talk centered on how the two governments
could best address this issue. Interestingly, both Haig and Ito
agreed that Japanese imports were not the cause of the U.S. car
industry's problems, but steps still needed to be taken that could
be seen as actively attacking the problem.
Document
5. Memorandum (S), Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President
Reagan, Subject: Japanese Defense Efforts, April 20, 1981
In this document, Defense Secretary Weinberger lays out for President
Reagan the administration's line of argument for pressing on visiting
Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki the U.S. goals for increased Japanese
defense spending. Weinberger argues that the U.S. has failed in
past efforts because, according to the Japanese, it never spelled
out what specifically the U.S. wanted Japan to do. To begin this
process of educating the Japanese, Weinberger provided Reagan
with talking points for his upcoming meeting with Suzuki.
Document
6. Memorandum for the President (no classification), from USTR
Brock, Subject: Japanese Trade Barriers, December 18, 1981
Here, U.S. Trade Representative William Brock provides the president
with his office's analysis of Japanese trade barriers, their impact
upon U.S. trade and the economy, and how the U.S. should begin
to address this problem. Brock concluded there were two basic
problems that needed to be solved: how to change fundamental Japanese
structural and attitudinal approaches to trade, and overcoming
Japanese resistance to any move toward increased imports that
they see as endangering full employment and the development of
knowledge-intensive industries.
Document
7. Memorandum (C), Thorne to Armacost, Subject: Growing Entanglement
of U.S.-Japan Trade and Defense Issues, July 26, 1985
This memorandum underscores the way in which persistent U.S.-Japan
trade conflicts were threatening to undermine continued cooperation
on defense issues, in particular the U.S. push for increased Japanese
defense spending. A common problem for both governments was growing
problems with legislators, in Congress and the Diet, who were
creating domestic political obstacles for Reagan and Prime Minister
Nakasone over trade issues. For Nakasone, this was a particular
problem, given his efforts to overturn the existing limits on
Japanese defense spending.
Document
8. Briefing Memorandum (S), Assistant Secretary Sigur to Secretary
of State Shultz, Subject: Your Meeting with Prime Minister Nakasone,
5:30 pm-6:00 p.m., Friday, March 6; c. March 6, 1987
This memorandum surveys the key issues surrounding the upcoming
summit meeting between Reagan and Nakasone in April 1987. Among
the key issues surveyed are the persistent trade friction and
resulting protectionist mood in Congress, the slow pace of structural
economic reform in Japan, and the potential risk that the planned
Japanese fighter plane, the FSX, and agreements between the two
nations on its development might link defense and trade in a damaging
way (a prescient observation).
Document
9. Memorandum (S), from Secretary of State Shultz to the President,
Subject: Visit of Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone, April 29-May
2, April 21, 1987
Here, Shultz provides Reagan with his bullet points on the key
issues and objectives sought by each side during Reagan's meetings
with Prime Minister Nakasone. Trade tensions continue to bedevil
the relationship, as seen in U.S. disappointment over slow moves
to open Japan to imports, Congress' frustrations and concerns
over Japan's high-tech competitive challenge, and trade sanctions
over alleged dumping of Japanese semiconductors in the U.S. market.
Nakasone is still seen as America's key ally in seeking the desired
political, security and economic objectives in Japan, so the meeting
is intended to bolster the Prime Minister for his struggles with
the Diet, while making clear the need for more effective actions
by Japan to meet U.S. concerns if this vital relationship is to
continue.
Document
10. Briefing Memorandum (S), Assistant Secretary Sigur to Secretary
of State Shultz, Subject: Scope Paper - Prime Minister Takeshita's
Visit, January 12-15, 1988; c. January 1988
This detailed memorandum prepared for Secretary of State Shultz's
participation in meetings with visiting new Japanese Prime Minister
Takeshita shows, as the Reagan administration neared its end,
that the record of accomplishments with Japan remained mixed.
While under former Prime Minister Nakasone Japan had been a strong
backer of U.S. security objectives, the pace of desired change
and reform in the economic and trade spheres had remained slow
and unsteady. Structural reform of the Japanese economy still
lagged, while trade issues continued to fester. The U.S. felt
it held a strong hand, based on the assumption that Takeshita,
as other prime ministers, needed to show he could successfully
manage U.S.-Japan relations in order to secure his political future.
The memorandum goes on to itemize the lengthy list of issues facing
Reagan and Takeshita in their talks.
Document
11. Talking Points (S), The President's July 8th Meeting with
Prime Minister Kaifu, c. July 8, 1990
These talking points outline the major issues surrounding President
Bush and Prime Minister Kaifu's meeting prior to the G-7 meeting,
so economic and financial subjects take prominence. Compared to
earlier such memoranda, this one paints a relatively rosier picture
of the state of U.S.-Japan economic and trade relations, based
on the perceived success of the Structural Impediments Initiative
that targeted areas for reform in each nation's economic and financial
policies. Perhaps basking in the positive glow of the fall of
the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet empire in Eastern
Europe, the hope is expressed that the two countries can build
on these steps to work in partnership on a range of global economic
issues, as well as on issues of joint concern, such as promoting
political and economic reform in China. A new issue that appears
on the agenda that will explode in importance a decade later is
tackling terrorism
Document
12. Cable (S), Ambassador Armacost to Department of State, Subject:
GOJ Contributions and Gulf Crisis, January 16, 1991
A half year after Bush and Kaifu met to discuss possible new
avenues for global cooperation in the post-Cold War era, the U.S.-Japan
relationship finds itself once more defined in terms of defense
and security issues in the wake of the first Gulf Crisis with
Saddam Hussein's Iraq. This cable reports on U.S. Ambassador Armacost's
talks with the Japanese government about securing a significant
contribution from Japan towards meeting the Gulf Crisis, with
Armacost expressing the hope that Japan would find a way to share
both the risks as well as the financial costs. Securing either
would prove to be a challenging problem.
Document
13. Cable (S), Ambassador Armacost to Department of State, Subject:
The Gulf War: Impact on Japan and U.S.-Japan Relations, March
14, 1991
In this cable Ambassador Armacost provides his sober assessment
of Japan's response to the challenges posed by the first Gulf
Crisis. Stressing Japan's essentially "passive" approach
to the Gulf War, the debate over Japan's post-Cold War role in
the world, and the still unanswered question of whether Japan's
political and bureaucratic system can handle new challenges, Armacost
rates Japan's response as "not unsuccessful by the standards
of Japan's foreign policy of the last forty five years" -
not exactly a ringing endorsement. He feels the crisis did serve
to highlight the obstacles to a mature Japanese foreign policy,
as well as the inadequacy of limiting Japan's role to sending
money without taking on the risks and responsibilities associated
with being a great power.
Document
14. Cable (S), Secretary of State Baker to Department of Defense,
Subject: Dealing with the North Korean Nuclear Problem: Impressions
from My Asia Trip, November 18, 1991
This cable provides Secretary of State Baker's views on the positions
being taken in Seoul, Beijing and Tokyo on dealing with the problem
of the DPRK nuclear program. It is marked by a clear sense of
the interplay of different perspectives and concerns motivating
the three governments. The delicate nature of this diplomatic
maneuvering was made clear in Baker's report that South Korean
President Roh's national security advisor had spelled out that
Koreans did not want Japan or Russia involved in the politics
of the Korean peninsula. The South Koreans acknowledged that Japan
had important economic leverage on the North that should be used
effectively in bringing Pyongyang to the bargaining table, but
Baker noted that the South Koreans' "own bitter history with
the Japanese will inhibit policy coordination." Tokyo's position,
for its part, seems to Baker to be hardening and moving closer
to the U.S. with regard to the commitments Pyongyang had to make
before normalization of relations and economic aid could be provided
to North Korea.