

MEMORANDUM

4471

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WASHINGTON

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ACTION

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

November 8, 1969

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MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Laurence E. Lynn, Jr. *let*

SUBJECT: The SIOP

To follow through on our discussions of the SIOP, I have summarized below the salient features of the current SIOP to include:

- The current National Strategic Targeting Policy, drawing from Mel Laird's paper (attached at Tab A);
- The JCS rationale for this Policy and some argumentation pro and con;
- Specific issues that should be pursued in refining or revising the SIOP.

I believe the next step is for you to meet with General Wheeler and raise a number of issues, answers to which will enable you to furnish the President with a clear picture of the SIOP; present sub-SIOP options and rationale, and possibilities for SIOP revisions. Accordingly, I have also identified specific questions you might pursue (talking points at Tab B).

The Current SIOP

The present SIOP is designed primarily for a general nuclear war with the USSR. For lesser conflicts, reliance would be placed on theater contingency plans, such as those SACEUR has developed. For substantial efforts against the CPR, some strategic forces would be needed (primarily from SAC); but, we do not know how the planning and targeting would be done.

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

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NLN 98-43/1 *mu OSD letter 2-12-04*  
By *KMB* NARA, Date *4-12-04*

The present SIOP target list has been sub-divided into three tasks:

-- ALPHA: To destroy Sino-Soviet strategic nuclear delivery capabilities located outside urban areas. As part of this task, the highest Soviet and Chinese political and military control centers would be attacked -- the Moscow-Peking Missile Packages (MPMP).

-- BRAVO: To destroy other elements of the Sino-Soviet military forces and military resources not included in ALPHA which are located outside the major urban centers.

-- CHARLIE: To destroy Sino-Soviet military forces and military resources which were excluded from ALPHA and BRAVO because of their location within urban centers and at least 70% of the urban industrial bases of the USSR and Communist China.

These tasks have been further combined into five attack options. The smallest attack, a pre-emptive strike on the ALPHA targets, would involve 58% of our SIOP committed forces. Roughly 1,750 weapons would be expected to arrive on or near their targets in the USSR. More forces would be needed for this option if the Soviets had been forewarned of the attack.

The basic attack options are:

SIOP ATTACK OPTIONS

	<u>Attack Options</u>	<u>Tasks Normally Included</u>	<u>Tasks Withholdable</u>
Pre-emptive	1	A	(MPMP)
	2	A, B	—
	2X	All	—
Retaliatory	3	A, B, C	B & C, or C
	4	All	—

Two points might be underscored:

-- Under present plans we always attack the Soviet nuclear threat, in its entirety, before engaging "value" targets. This is

what makes even the smallest strike so large.

-- We initially can withhold an element of a task (MPMP in ALPHA), a task of an attack option (CHARLIE in option 2), or both.

I understand that there are other "withhold elements," as well as the MPMP, which would permit as many as 90 sub-variations on these attack options. How these work -- and what degree of real alternatives they afford -- we do not know.

-- I think we should ask General Wheeler for information about the withhold packages.

-- I strongly recommend also asking him about the possibility of designing additional withhold packages as a way of obtaining sub-SIOP attack options. This could be your way of obtaining other attack options in ways that would involve the least friction with the strategic planners.

Discussion Points: Task ALPHA Rationale

I believe you should focus discussion about the substance of the SIOP strictly to the ALPHA task. That task is always included in the SIOP options and it requires the largest part of our forces.

I also believe it would be useful to consider only pre-emptive strikes, at least initially. The issue of retaliation involves debatable assumptions about the enemy attack which must be agreed to before a discussion can be manageable.

You could proceed by asking General Wheeler for the JCS rationale on the ALPHA task. I expect he will give the reasons indicated below. (I have also indicated some counterpoints you may wish to raise.)

The JCS believe there are strong arguments for beginning a nuclear exchange on Russia with something like the complete ALPHA list. They give five different reasons:

1. "Soviet knowledge that the U. S. would contemplate a small-scale nuclear attack could downgrade the deterrent value of our strategic posture."

One could equally assert, of course, that willingness to cross the nuclear "firebreak" with a small-scale attack will clearly indicate that the U.S. might "go all the way," thus increasing our deterrent.

2. "That such an attack might warn the Soviets of U.S. intentions (real or imaginary) and induce them into a state of readiness less advantageous to us in the event larger attacks are necessary later."

This argument actually applies only to the special case where the Soviets are completely surprised. This is unlikely during a period of tension. It does not apply to U.S. attacks against the soft Soviet targets, where one U.S. weapon would destroy a number of Soviet non-alert or soft but mobile weapons. Our attack could be designed to destroy those forces that could be moved to a higher state of readiness.

In fact, I think this counterargument is sufficient without further evidence, but it could be supported by analysis if the following information were available:

- a list of the soft force targets in the USSR;
- U.S. weapon effectiveness against these targets (using various systems and warheads).

Some of the work has been done for NSSM 64. That analysis shows a great pay-off for the initial strikes on soft force targets by either side in strategic counterforce attacks.

One could object to this reasoning. Perhaps the soft targets are co-located with highly populated urban/industrial complexes. If they were attacked, the USSR might consider itself compelled to respond, perhaps against a similar or somewhat smaller U.S. city. Could a President take that risk?

3. "A small attack might trigger an immediate large-scale Soviet response, particularly of their soft nuclear forces."

This argument is clearly a corollary of the dilemma referred to in the previous paragraphs. If the initial U.S. attack is too small to get all soft Soviet forces, the argument is valid. The Soviets might attack with their remaining soft systems rather than see them destroyed in a subsequent U.S. attack. Perhaps the Soviets cannot distinguish a small from a large attack and would feel compelled to retaliate (this is another issue).

Much of the argument turns on an analysis of soft target vulnerability and collateral effects. This issue can be resolved by analysis, provided we know:

-- surrounding urban/industrial complexes near soft USSR nuclear systems targets.

4. "Rapid execution of a small strike could leave a large portion of our own strategic and theater forces at a relatively low level of force generation, making them particularly vulnerable to Soviet retaliations."

This argument is valid in the following case: An attack during which we left non-alert bombers and submarines in tender in a state of non-readiness, and we used only day-to-day ready forces in our initial strikes, perhaps to obtain maximum surprise. Thus, U.S. reliable and accurate systems would be used up, leaving the average or net reliability of the remaining forces somewhat less than it is now.

This condition could be eliminated if our forces were readied in secret or simultaneously with the strike, if advance plans and orders were given so that communications systems were not overloaded after the strike, and if reconnaissance requirements were kept to a minimum. Moreover, the JCS supposedly instituted a faster procedure for selective options last July (1969).

An important issue not directly related to the JCS point is what happens in the USSR and what its likely response to the crisis situation

might be. Once the attack hits, Soviet crisis management capabilities will be severely strained. All sorts of rumors will abound initially. With respect to Soviet forces, if part of the force targetted survives, what will it do if communication with headquarters has been lost? Would the Soviet operators respond against their general war targets?

5. "Any strike against the USSR should include consideration of suppressing or penetrating Soviet air and or missile defenses; several hundred weapons are included for this purpose in every SIOP option as an integral and mutually supporting element..."

This conclusion is not obvious. Like SAM suppression over NVN, the desirability of expending sorties on air defenses can be evaluated in terms of the reduced effectiveness of attack sorties when the defenses are left intact. The measures are higher attrition, higher abort rates, and less accurate delivery.

With respect to strategic attacks, attacking radar sites or air defense launchers with a small number of missiles could be more than repaid by the "wide open door" provided for the follow-on attack forces.

However, these attacks could also be destabilizing if they rendered the defended Soviet systems vulnerable.

In attack planning we could minimize this destabilizing risk and the "overhead" cost of removing defenses. For example, we could design attacks so that the defense systems were not attacked, or were attacked only enough to penetrate through to the soft targets they covered. To do the analysis, we would need:

-- Attack corridors into Soviet soft nuclear systems, including defenses only for the soft target and defenses for other targets as well.

-- U.S. system effectiveness in attacks on these Soviet defenses.

6. The last JCS argument is "that there are existing theater forces under CINCPAC and SACEUR command and contingency plans for less than all-out attack."

One might say that this is the JCS "hedge" on the logic of JCS posture on the ALPHA list, including ALPHA targets in all the attack options.

Practical Problems in Changing the SIOP

There are certain practical problems involved in working with the SIOP:

-- Annually, there is a review of the SIOP during which targeting of systems is changed. At present, adjusting the SIOP after these reviews takes about six months.

-- The retargeting time can be improved. When SAC obtains the integrated command and control system for Minuteman, costing up to \$700 million, retargeting time could be reduced from 90 to 180 days to 17 days. Now, however, it is about six months.

-- Another constraint on retargeting Minuteman is the time and technical resources needed to change the guidance and control instructions in the missile itself. A specialized team is needed (there are about 100 of these) and the task can require up to eight hours per missile. This latter constraint will keep SIOP retargeting time above 14 days.

-- Changes in submarine targets can be accomplished more quickly. However, during a period of alert there is no way of ascertaining whether the submarine has received the new instructions because the submarine cannot communicate to the NCA without giving its position away.

-- Present weapon laydown criteria optimize target destruction for the full ALPHA list. To do this and protect against failures in launch, penetration, or weapon delivery, extensive cross targeting is done: This means a system with multiple warheads will engage several targets. In order to optimize destruction of a few specific targets, some changes to targeting would be necessary.

I believe that by focusing on withhold options you can obtain an "expanded SIOP" giving the President attack options varying in types and numbers of targets engaged. Since these options would be part of the SIOP, they could be promptly executed on Presidential order, without:

-- Elaborate readjustments of the weapons and delivery systems which would take from several days for a few weapons to a very minimum of three weeks for the entire force (using computer reprogram capabilities not yet available).

-- Degrading the general deterrent by expending crucial parts of it.

Proposed ALPHA Withhold Options

I think it would be useful, in order to start moving ahead on expanding the SIOP, for you to propose one or two ALPHA withhold options. This could be done by asking General Wheeler to have the Joint Targeting people design two options, along the following lines:

ALPHA SUB-OPTIONS

(Withhold all ALPHA but these targets)

Option

U.S. Force  
Requirements

Attack soft undefended Soviet nuclear systems in remote areas (not near urban/industrial complexes).

In each case, U.S. forces expended should be less than Soviet forces destroyed. This means the USSR targets must be co-located or that reloadable U.S. systems would be used, e.g. bombers or SSBNs.

Attack soft USSR nuclear systems (in remote areas) where only the defenses for the system attacked are eliminated.

RECOMMENDATION:

I recommend that you meet with General Wheeler to discuss the SIOP. At the meeting, you would raise some of the issues mentioned above (talking points are attached at Tab B).

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_



In addition, I recommend that you ask General Wheeler to have the Joint Staff targeting analysts examine ALPHA withhold options involving only a few attacks on some soft Soviet targets. I have also prepared a description of the two options discussed above (see Tab C).

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Enclosures

- Tab A - Mel Laird's paper
- Tab B - Talking points
- Tab C - Description of options

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

*Al - What does  
this mean?*

9 APR 1969

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
White House - 39  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Henry:

You will recall that we recently discussed with the President options available to U.S. and Allied military forces under contingency situations. The Joint Staff has prepared a list of representative examples which I am forwarding together with General Wheeler's comments on the subject (TAB A).

As General Wheeler notes, the list of options prepared by the Joint Staff does not by any means exhaust all the possibilities. I believe that the subject is of such importance that you and your staff may wish to consider originating a NSSM which would lead to further study of "sub-SIOP" options.



Enclosure  
Tab A - General Wheeler's comments

Copy 1 of 9 Copies.

Page 1 of 1 Pages.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

CM-4018-69  
20 March 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Options for Military Action

1. Recently the question of options available for military action by US and Allied forces under contingency situations was raised during discussions with you and the President. Attached is a list of options with representative examples of use which was prepared by the Joint Staff.
2. There are options inherent in the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) and portions of the SIOP can be executed on a selective basis, such as a retaliatory attack on Task Alpha (nuclear threat) targets only. The SIOP, however, is based on mutually supporting tasks and options and execution of a selected element would have to be weighed against the degradation that would result to the overall plan. For example, a US preemptive attack against only the northern tier of USSR missile sites could provoke an immediate and massive nuclear response with resulting destruction of a large part of our retaliatory forces. The list of options therefore also includes the use of nuclear weapons from other sources such as SACEUR in which case the SIOP would remain intact and available for catastrophic situations.
3. You may recall that one of the questions raised during our discussions with the President concerned US-sponsored use of Israeli forces in retaliation for Arab military activity. An attack on the Aswan Dam was mentioned. Such an option was considered in the preparation of the accompanying list; however, it was judged to be extremely escalatory in nature and would, in effect, be an "overkill" response. It was therefore deemed militarily unsound.

Sec Def has seen  
22 MAR 1969

*ASD/ISA has action to prepare a memo for the President by your signature*

1443 <sup>1443</sup> <sub>3/21/69</sub>

GROUP - 1  
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Sec Def Cont Nr. 2-

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*5-35256/129 03/16/69*

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4. Although the list of options included herewith obviously does not include all the possibilities, I feel that it provides a useful framework for future discussions and it indicates that there is a wide spectrum of military actions ranging from low-order contingencies through general nuclear war available at the present time.

5. It is suggested that you may wish to forward a copy of the enclosed information to Dr. Kissinger.



EARLE G. WHEELER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

GENERAL NUCLEAR WAR

A. SIOP

1. SIOP Attack  
Option 4C  
Retaliatory attack  
against Task Alpha  
(nuclear threat),  
Task Bravo (mil.  
outside urban), and  
Task Charlie (urban/  
indust).

Doctrinal;  
Task Charlie  
is not exe-  
cuted with-  
out Task  
Alpha and  
Task Bravo.

Negotiation for ces-  
sation of hostilities.

Negotiate for most  
favorable terms.

Neither side has  
the capability to  
prosecute nuclear  
war without suf-  
fering destruction  
JCS do not consid-  
er destroying cities  
while leaving mil-  
itary and nuclear threat  
intact to be a rea-  
sonable option.

2. SIOP Attack  
Option 3B  
Retaliatory attack  
against Tasks  
Alpha and Bravo.

Doctrinal;  
Task Bravo  
is not exe-  
cuted with-  
out Task  
Alpha.

Negotiation for ces-  
sation of hostilities.

Negotiate for most  
favorable terms.

This option mini-  
mizes urban damage  
consistent with  
military target  
requirements. JCS  
do not consider de-  
stroying military  
while leaving nuclei  
threat intact to be  
reasonable option.

3. SIOP Attack  
Option 2C  
Preemptive attack  
against Tasks  
Alpha, Bravo, and  
Charlie.

Doctrinal;  
Task Charlie  
is not exe-  
cuted with-  
out Tasks  
Alpha and  
Bravo.

Total nuclear retalia-  
tory attack against US  
and allies.

Negotiate for most  
favorable terms.

This option execut  
attacks against th  
fullest target  
system prior to  
release of Soviet  
weapons against US  
allies. JCS do not  
consider destroyin  
cities while leavi  
military and nucle  
threat intact to b  
reasonable option.

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FORM

4. SIOP Attack  
 Option 2B  
 Preemptive attack against Tasks Alpha and Bravo.

Doctrinal: Task Bravo is not executed with-out Task Alpha.

When in receipt of unequivocal warning of an all-out Soviet attack.

Total nuclear retaliatory attack against US and allies.

Negotiate for most favorable terms.

This option minimizes urban damage consistent with military target requirements. JCS do not consider destroying military while leaving nuclear threat intact to be a reasonable option.

5. SIOP Attack  
 Option 1A  
 Preemptive attack against Task Alpha.

When in receipt of unequivocal warning of an all-out Soviet attack.

Nuclear retaliatory attack against US and allies. Urban areas may or may not be spared.

Negotiate for favorable terms or: if cities hit execute Tasks Bravo and Charlie.

This option strikes only military nuclear threat targets.

6. SIOP withholds

a. Missile package.

Doctrinal: only Moscow and Peiping exist as package holds under current planning.

In retaliation when there is high confidence attack is confined to military targets.

Response in withholding part of missile force.

Execute missile package when situation indicates total war.

High level controls survive for negotiation.

b. Country

When country action deemed friendly to US and allied.

Takeover country and use as base for future military operations.

Execute withheld forces against country withheld.

US command and control must survive to order execution of withheld forces.

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S/ALLIED  
PTIONS

GAPS

EXAMPLE  
OF USE

PROBABLE  
SOVIET  
RESPONSE

PROBABLE  
US/ALLIED  
REACTION

REMARKS

c. Specific  
sortie/  
targets.

Doctrinal;  
not cur-  
rently  
considered.

When specific target  
deemed valuable to  
save.

Utilize target.

Execute if value  
of target decreases.

Could be used to  
preserve locality  
of Very Important  
Government offic

7. SIOF Forces  
Selective Employ-  
ment.

a. Doctrinal;  
not currently  
practiced.

a. When use of indi-  
vidual weapons  
desired such as for  
staging bases or  
demonstration.

a. Action short of  
full nuclear exchange.

a. Negotiate to  
deescalate.

b. Doctrinal, seasonal, and  
equipment

b. SSBM missile  
launches from Arctic  
cover against USSR  
Arctic bomber staging  
bases.

b. Execution of RIOSP  
against US.

b. Execute SSP/SIOF.

b. USSR unable to  
differentiate the  
type launch from  
US launched ICBM  
attacks since  
approach azimuth  
similar and into  
USSR ABM detectio  
concentration. S  
capability to con  
duct missile  
launches varies  
full capability  
none with season  
ice thickness; na  
gational accuracy  
degraded in high  
latitudes.

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SELECTIVE NUCLEAR

A. Expanded battle-field use.

Launch of tactical air nuclear attack against military targets in expanded battle area (excluding USSR territory).

General nuclear attack against allied forces and facilities in western Europe.

General release of tactical nuclear weapons, except USSR.

SACEUR would probably execute pertinent portions of his regional priority program (RPP). NATO urges nuclear attack against USSR.

B. Local Battle Area.

Selective use of airborne and ground nuclear weapons to regain the initiative in local area.

Widespread attack on allied airfields and PERSHING missile sites.

Expanded battlefield use and launch of tactical air nuclear attacks against enemy nuclear capability threatening the area (including attacks on USSR).

Command and control of NATO forces now tenuous (Problem of consultation with NATO, in accordance with ATHEN GUIDELINES, may affect timely use of nuclear options.)

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US/ALLIED  
OPTIONS

GAPS

EXAMPLE  
OF USE

PROBABLE  
SOVIET  
RESPONSE

PROBABLE  
US/ALLIED  
REACTION

REMARKS

B. SACEUR Scheduled  
Program (SSP)

1. Release of  
full SSP.

Doctrinal;  
closely  
coupled  
with SIOP.

For attack of all SSP  
targets in USSR and  
satellites.  
All-out attack against  
NATO countries and/or  
US.

Retaliation in kind.

Execution of SSI  
without SIOP  
technically  
feasible but in-  
ficient without  
support.

2. Limited use of  
SSP into USSR  
against selected  
targets.

Doctrinal;  
closely  
coupled  
with SIOP.  
Procedural;  
not pre-  
sently  
planned.

Military SSP targets  
in USSR.

USSR strikes against  
UK, Guam, West Germany.

Consider full release  
of SSP.

3. Selected  
execution of SSP.

Execute against  
all but USSR.

General nuclear attack  
against NATO forces in  
Western Europe.

Negotiate to terminate  
or consider full  
release of SSP.

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ALLIED GAPS	EXAMPLE OF USE	PROBABLE SOVIET RESPONSE	PROBABLE US/ALLIED REACTION	REMARKS
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Defensive Use  
ADMs used to blunt enemy advance.

Retaliates with nuclear weapons, as necessary, in battle zone.

Commence selective battlefield and air defense use of tactical nuclear weapons.

Demonstrative Use  
Allies employ high airburst of nuclear weapon over allied territory at the forward edge of the battle area.

Demonstration in kind and continuation of conventional attack.

NATO appeals for French support and intervention.

DeGaulle urges restraint, calls for summit meeting, but maintains neutrality.

CONVENTIONAL

Major Conventional War

1. Major Conventional War ensues. NATO unable to contain Warsaw Pact forces by conventional means.

1. Warsaw Pact forces exploit military gain.

1. Selective employment of nuclear weapons proposed by SACEUR.

1. US capability, with mobilization, while maintaining the security of the western hemisphere either to:  
(1) Reinforce Europe and conduct forward defense operation in a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict, while conducting defensive operations in the Southeast Asia area and maintaining essential deployments elsewhere (e.g., Korea or  
(2) Conduct major

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US/ALLIED  
OPTIONS

GAPS

EXAMPLE  
OF USE

PROBABLE  
SOVIET  
RESPONSE

PROBABLE  
US/ALLIED  
REACTION

REMARKS

2. Major conven-  
tional conflict  
limited to sea.

2. Attempt to limit  
conflict to sea,  
within USSR capa-  
bilities.

2. Stay with "con-  
flict at sea"  
concept with the  
major effort to  
protect US/allied  
shipping and LOC,  
invoking air to  
assist in hitting  
naval forces of  
USSR. Attempt to  
negotiate end to  
conflict with stated  
threat to escalate  
by nuclear attacks  
against support  
facilities of USSR.  
If above is unsuc-  
cessful, selective  
use of nuclear  
weapons in ASW and  
against support  
facilities will  
ensue.

2. US/allies rel  
on sea LOC to ex  
and to prosecute  
to a much larger  
extent than the  
USSR. Hence,  
limiting conflict  
to seas to the  
relative advantage  
of the USSR.

Operations outst  
the NATO area to  
include counter  
CPR intervention  
or aggression,  
while maintainin  
forward deployme  
in the NATO area

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ALLIED  
IONS

OPTION  
GAPS

EXAMPLE  
OF USE

PROBABLE  
SOVIET  
RESPONSE

PROBABLE  
US/ALLIED  
REACTION

REMARKS

B. Major  
Aggression

1. Third party  
proxy action  
to divert USSR  
attention and  
decrease acti-  
vity elsewhere.

1. US politi-  
cal lever-  
age on third  
parties.

1. Chinese  
nationalist  
agent detonates  
satchel charge/  
atomic detona-  
tion in port of  
Vladivostok  
concurrent with  
CPR conventional  
attack.

1. East German forces  
cross West German  
border in force.  
(USSR proxy.)

1. NATO employs full  
scale conventional  
forces. Commence  
consultations on  
selective use of  
nuclear weapons.

1. No joint US/CPR  
plan in existence.

2. Increase  
USSR involve-  
ment world-  
wide.

2. Political  
leverage on  
third party.

2. Japanese launch  
amphibious attack  
on Karafut Island  
and seize USSR bases  
on Kunashiri and  
Etorofu Islands.

2. North Koreans invade  
South Korea and USSR  
aircraft bomb Japanese  
bases in northern Japan.

2. US forces join  
South Koreans in  
defense of S. Korea  
and attack invading  
forces.

2. No Japanese plan  
will, or known capa-  
bility to accomplish  
action. Further,  
laws of Japan need  
revision to permit  
since Japanese  
forces are now only  
"defense forces."

3. Demonstra-  
tion of intent  
to resolve.

3a. Detain USSR/  
communist ships and  
aircraft in US.

3a. Retaliation in kind  
by communist world.

3a. Warning to USSR  
and other communist  
countries to use  
caution.

7

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By **AMNARA** Date **6/9/05**

ALLIED  
IONS  
OPTION  
GAPS  
EXAMPLE  
OF USE  
PROBABLE  
SOVIET  
RESPONSE  
PROBABLE  
US/ALLIED  
REACTION  
REMARKS

B. Major  
Aggression

1. Third party proxy action to divert USSR attention and decrease activity elsewhere.

1. US political leverage on third parties.

1. Chinese nationalist agent detonates satchel charge/atomic detonation in port of Vladivostock concurrent with CPR conventional attack.

1. East German forces cross West German border in force. (USSR proxy.)

1. NATO employs full scale conventional forces. Commence consultations on selective use of nuclear weapons.

1. No joint US/CPR plan in existence.

2. Increase USSR involvement world-wide.

2. Political leverage on third party.

2. Japanese launch amphibious attack on Karafut Island and seize USSR bases on Kunashiri and Etorofu Islands.

2. North Koreans invade South Korea and USSR aircraft bomb Japanese bases in northern Japan.

2. US forces join South Koreans in defense of S. Korea and attack invading forces.

2. No Japanese plan will, or known capability to accomplish. Further, laws of Japan need revision to permit since Japanese forces are now only "defense forces."

3. Demonstration of intent and resolve.

3a. Detain USSR/communist ships and aircraft in US.

3a. Retaliation in kind by communist world.

3a. Warning to USSR and other communist countries to use caution.

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Authority E 612958  
By AKYAK/DAU Date 6/1/05

MEETING WITH GENERAL WHEELER  
ON SIOP

TALKING POINTS

(You might start off the discussion thanking General Wheeler for preparing the SIOP descriptions Mel Laird furnished us last spring. Moreover, you also might want to say that, though a study of less than all-out nuclear exchanges is being conducted NSSM 64 by an interagency task force, you consider a discussion of the SIOP too sensitive for the NSSM 64 forum.

1. ALPHA Tasks

As I understand the briefings we have received on the current SIOP, all our attack options start out with an attack on the Soviet nuclear forces -- Task ALPHA. I also recall that this task takes the largest part of our forces -- 58-74%. Accordingly:

- we might focus on the ALPHA task at least initially;
- we might further restrict ourselves to U.S. pre-emptive attacks, since a discussion of retaliation presupposes assumptions about how the Soviets attack us and how quickly we respond.

(General Wheeler may want to furnish detail on this subject for a future discussion.)

Could you explain the current JCS rationale for the ALPHA task?

(Allow time for discussion -- draw on argumentation in memorandum as necessary.)

2. Withhold Packages

I understand there are a number of withhold elements in the SIOP, besides the Moscow Peking Missile Packages. What I only understand vaguely, however, is the degree of real alternatives they afford:

-- Could you describe these withhold elements in more detail?

-- Could we design additional withhold packages as a way of obtaining additional sub-SIOP attack options?

(Allow time for discussion.)

3. ALPHA Sub-Options

So that we might move ahead on expanding the SIOP, it might be useful if I were to suggest several ALPHA withhold options.

(You could furnish General Wheeler the option description attached at Tab C).

-- Could your targeting people develop several ALPHA withhold options along these lines?

4. Discussions of Task CHARLIE - Urban/Industrial Targets

At a future meeting, I would like to continue our discussion, focusing further on Task ALPHA, and also looking at Task CHARLIE, an attack on urban/industrial targets. I understand that only about 11% of our forces are committed to this task and that they are expected to destroy 70% of the Soviet targets in the urban/industrial category:

-- Can you provide us with any further information of the types and numbers of targets and the rationale for selecting them to prepare me for a future session to discuss the CHARLIE task?



TOP SECRET

SIOP WITHHOLD OPTIONS

ALPHA SUB-OPTIONS  
(Withhold all ALPHA but these targets)

Option

U.S. Force  
Requirements

Attack soft undefended Soviet nuclear systems in remote areas (not near urban/industrial complexes).

In each case, U.S. forces expended should be less than Soviet forces destroyed. This means the USSR targets must be co-located or that re-loadable U.S. systems would be used, e.g. bombers or SSBNs.

Attack soft USSR nuclear systems (in remote areas) where only the defenses for the system attacked are eliminated.

TOP SECRET